/
niceSOFT
/
systemd
Обзор
Документация
Войти
/
niceSOFT
/
systemd
Код
Задачи
Вики
Пакеты
0
Релизы
0
Аналитика
Безопасность
v261
src/cryptsetup/cryptsetup.c
2 896 строк
115 KB
Will Fancher
cryptsetup: Invalidate ineffective try_discover_key before trying
19 июн 2026, 09:23
19 июн 2026, 09:23
7aaa265
Код
Авторство
О чём код?
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ #include <sys/mman.h> #include <sys/stat.h> #include <unistd.h> #include "sd-device.h" #include "sd-event.h" #include "sd-json.h" #include "sd-messages.h" #include "alloc-util.h" #include "ask-password-api.h" #include "build.h" #include "crypto-util.h" #include "cryptsetup-fido2.h" #include "cryptsetup-keyfile.h" #include "cryptsetup-pkcs11.h" #include "cryptsetup-tpm2.h" #include "cryptsetup-util.h" #include "efi-api.h" #include "efi-loader.h" #include "efivars.h" #include "env-util.h" #include "errno-util.h" #include "escape.h" #include "extract-word.h" #include "fileio.h" #include "format-table.h" #include "fs-util.h" #include "hexdecoct.h" #include "json-util.h" #include "libfido2-util.h" #include "libmount-util.h" #include "log.h" #include "main-func.h" #include "memory-util.h" #include "nulstr-util.h" #include "options.h" #include "parse-util.h" #include "path-util.h" #include "pkcs11-util.h" #include "pretty-print.h" #include "process-util.h" #include "random-util.h" #include "string-table.h" #include "string-util.h" #include "strv.h" #include "time-util.h" #include "tpm2-pcr.h" #include "tpm2-util.h" #include "verbs.h" /* internal helper */ #define ANY_LUKS "LUKS" /* as in src/cryptsetup.h */ #define CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE 512U #define CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE 4096U typedef enum PassphraseType { PASSPHRASE_NONE, PASSPHRASE_REGULAR = 1 << 0, PASSPHRASE_RECOVERY_KEY = 1 << 1, PASSPHRASE_BOTH = PASSPHRASE_REGULAR|PASSPHRASE_RECOVERY_KEY, _PASSPHRASE_TYPE_MAX, _PASSPHRASE_TYPE_INVALID = -1, } PassphraseType; typedef enum TokenType { TOKEN_TPM2, TOKEN_FIDO2, TOKEN_PKCS11, _TOKEN_TYPE_MAX, _TOKEN_TYPE_INVALID = -EINVAL, } TokenType; static const char *arg_type = NULL; /* ANY_LUKS, CRYPT_LUKS1, CRYPT_LUKS2, CRYPT_TCRYPT, CRYPT_BITLK or CRYPT_PLAIN */ static char *arg_cipher = NULL; static unsigned arg_key_size = 0; static unsigned arg_sector_size = CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE; static int arg_key_slot = CRYPT_ANY_SLOT; static unsigned arg_keyfile_size = 0; static uint64_t arg_keyfile_offset = 0; static bool arg_keyfile_erase = false; static bool arg_try_empty_password = false; static char *arg_hash = NULL; static char *arg_header = NULL; static unsigned arg_tries = 3; static bool arg_readonly = false; static bool arg_verify = false; static bool arg_password_cache_set = false; /* Not the actual argument value, just an indicator that some value is set */ static AskPasswordFlags arg_ask_password_flags = ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED | ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE; static bool arg_discards = false; static bool arg_same_cpu_crypt = false; static bool arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus = false; static bool arg_no_read_workqueue = false; static bool arg_no_write_workqueue = false; static bool arg_tcrypt_hidden = false; static bool arg_tcrypt_system = false; static bool arg_tcrypt_veracrypt = false; static uint32_t arg_tcrypt_veracrypt_pim = 0; static char **arg_tcrypt_keyfiles = NULL; static uint64_t arg_offset = 0; static uint64_t arg_skip = 0; static usec_t arg_timeout = USEC_INFINITY; static char *arg_pkcs11_uri = NULL; static bool arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = false; static char *arg_fido2_device = NULL; static bool arg_fido2_device_auto = false; static void *arg_fido2_cid = NULL; static size_t arg_fido2_cid_size = 0; static char *arg_fido2_rp_id = NULL; /* For now and for compatibility, if the user explicitly configured FIDO2 support and we do * not read FIDO2 metadata off the LUKS2 header, default to the systemd 248 logic, where we * use PIN + UP when needed, and do not configure UV at all. */ static Fido2EnrollFlags arg_fido2_manual_flags = FIDO2ENROLL_PIN_IF_NEEDED | FIDO2ENROLL_UP_IF_NEEDED | FIDO2ENROLL_UV_OMIT; static char *arg_tpm2_device = NULL; /* These and the following fields are about locking an encrypted volume to the local TPM */ static bool arg_tpm2_device_auto = false; static uint32_t arg_tpm2_pcr_mask = UINT32_MAX; static char *arg_tpm2_signature = NULL; static bool arg_tpm2_pin = false; static char *arg_tpm2_pcrlock = NULL; static usec_t arg_token_timeout_usec = 30*USEC_PER_SEC; static unsigned arg_tpm2_measure_pcr = UINT_MAX; /* This and the following field is about measuring the unlocked volume key to the local TPM */ static char **arg_tpm2_measure_banks = NULL; static char *arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr = NULL; static char *arg_link_keyring = NULL; static char *arg_link_key_type = NULL; static char *arg_link_key_description = NULL; static char *arg_fixate_volume_key = NULL; STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_cipher, freep); STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_hash, freep); STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_header, freep); STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tcrypt_keyfiles, strv_freep); STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_pkcs11_uri, freep); STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_device, freep); STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_cid, freep); STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_rp_id, freep); STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_device, freep); STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_signature, freep); STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_measure_banks, strv_freep); STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr, freep); STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_pcrlock, freep); STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_link_keyring, freep); STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_link_key_type, freep); STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_link_key_description, freep); STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fixate_volume_key, freep); static const char* const passphrase_type_table[_PASSPHRASE_TYPE_MAX] = { [PASSPHRASE_REGULAR] = "passphrase", [PASSPHRASE_RECOVERY_KEY] = "recovery key", [PASSPHRASE_BOTH] = "passphrase or recovery key", }; DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(passphrase_type, PassphraseType); static const char* const token_type_table[_TOKEN_TYPE_MAX] = { [TOKEN_TPM2] = "tpm2", [TOKEN_FIDO2] = "fido2", [TOKEN_PKCS11] = "pkcs11", }; DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(token_type, TokenType); /* Options Debian's crypttab knows we don't: check= checkargs= noearly loud quiet keyscript= initramfs */ static int parse_one_option(const char *option) { const char *val; int r; assert(option); /* Handled outside of this tool */ if (STR_IN_SET(option, "noauto", "auto", "nofail", "fail", "_netdev", "keyfile-timeout")) return 0; if (startswith(option, "keyfile-timeout=")) return 0; if ((val = startswith(option, "cipher="))) { r = free_and_strdup(&arg_cipher, val); if (r < 0) return log_oom(); } else if ((val = startswith(option, "size="))) { r = safe_atou(val, &arg_key_size); if (r < 0) { log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); return 0; } if (arg_key_size % 8) { log_warning("size= not a multiple of 8, ignoring."); return 0; } arg_key_size /= 8; } else if ((val = startswith(option, "sector-size="))) { r = safe_atou(val, &arg_sector_size); if (r < 0) { log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); return 0; } if (arg_sector_size % 2) { log_warning("sector-size= not a multiple of 2, ignoring."); return 0; } if (arg_sector_size < CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE || arg_sector_size > CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE) log_warning("sector-size= is outside of %u and %u, ignoring.", CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE, CRYPT_MAX_SECTOR_SIZE); } else if ((val = startswith(option, "key-slot=")) || (val = startswith(option, "keyslot="))) { arg_type = ANY_LUKS; r = safe_atoi(val, &arg_key_slot); if (r < 0) log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tcrypt-keyfile="))) { arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT; if (path_is_absolute(val)) { if (strv_extend(&arg_tcrypt_keyfiles, val) < 0) return log_oom(); } else log_warning("Key file path \"%s\" is not absolute, ignoring.", val); } else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-size="))) { r = safe_atou(val, &arg_keyfile_size); if (r < 0) log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); } else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-offset="))) { r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_keyfile_offset); if (r < 0) log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); } else if ((val = startswith(option, "keyfile-erase="))) { r = parse_boolean(val); if (r < 0) { log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); return 0; } arg_keyfile_erase = r; } else if (streq(option, "keyfile-erase")) arg_keyfile_erase = true; else if ((val = startswith(option, "hash="))) { r = free_and_strdup(&arg_hash, val); if (r < 0) return log_oom(); } else if ((val = startswith(option, "header="))) { if (!arg_type || !STR_IN_SET(arg_type, ANY_LUKS, CRYPT_LUKS1, CRYPT_LUKS2, CRYPT_TCRYPT)) arg_type = ANY_LUKS; if (!path_is_absolute(val)) return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Header path \"%s\" is not absolute, refusing.", val); if (arg_header) return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Duplicate header= option, refusing."); arg_header = strdup(val); if (!arg_header) return log_oom(); } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tries="))) { r = safe_atou(val, &arg_tries); if (r < 0) log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "readonly", "read-only")) arg_readonly = true; else if (streq(option, "verify")) arg_verify = true; else if ((val = startswith(option, "password-echo="))) { if (streq(val, "masked")) arg_ask_password_flags &= ~(ASK_PASSWORD_ECHO|ASK_PASSWORD_SILENT); else { r = parse_boolean(val); if (r < 0) { log_warning_errno(r, "Invalid password-echo= option \"%s\", ignoring.", val); return 0; } SET_FLAG(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_ECHO, r); SET_FLAG(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_SILENT, !r); } } else if ((val = startswith(option, "password-cache="))) { arg_password_cache_set = true; if (streq(val, "read-only")) { arg_ask_password_flags |= ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED; arg_ask_password_flags &= ~ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE; } else { r = parse_boolean(val); if (r < 0) { log_warning_errno(r, "Invalid password-cache= option \"%s\", ignoring.", val); return 0; } SET_FLAG(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED|ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE, r); } } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "allow-discards", "discard")) arg_discards = true; else if (streq(option, "same-cpu-crypt")) arg_same_cpu_crypt = true; else if (streq(option, "submit-from-crypt-cpus")) arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus = true; else if (streq(option, "no-read-workqueue")) arg_no_read_workqueue = true; else if (streq(option, "no-write-workqueue")) arg_no_write_workqueue = true; else if (streq(option, "luks")) arg_type = ANY_LUKS; else if (streq(option, "bitlk")) arg_type = CRYPT_BITLK; else if (streq(option, "tcrypt")) arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT; else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "tcrypt-hidden", "tcrypthidden")) { arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT; arg_tcrypt_hidden = true; } else if (streq(option, "tcrypt-system")) { arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT; arg_tcrypt_system = true; } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "tcrypt-veracrypt", "veracrypt")) { arg_type = CRYPT_TCRYPT; arg_tcrypt_veracrypt = true; } else if ((val = startswith(option, "veracrypt-pim="))) { r = safe_atou32(val, &arg_tcrypt_veracrypt_pim); if (r < 0) { log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); return 0; } } else if (STR_IN_SET(option, "plain", "swap", "tmp") || startswith(option, "tmp=")) arg_type = CRYPT_PLAIN; else if ((val = startswith(option, "timeout="))) { r = parse_sec_fix_0(val, &arg_timeout); if (r < 0) log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); } else if ((val = startswith(option, "offset="))) { r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_offset); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s: %m", option); } else if ((val = startswith(option, "skip="))) { r = safe_atou64(val, &arg_skip); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s: %m", option); } else if ((val = startswith(option, "pkcs11-uri="))) { if (streq(val, "auto")) { arg_pkcs11_uri = mfree(arg_pkcs11_uri); arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = true; } else { if (!pkcs11_uri_valid(val)) return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "pkcs11-uri= parameter expects a PKCS#11 URI, refusing."); r = free_and_strdup(&arg_pkcs11_uri, val); if (r < 0) return log_oom(); arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = false; } } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-device="))) { if (streq(val, "auto")) { arg_fido2_device = mfree(arg_fido2_device); arg_fido2_device_auto = true; } else { r = free_and_strdup(&arg_fido2_device, val); if (r < 0) return log_oom(); arg_fido2_device_auto = false; } } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-cid="))) { if (streq(val, "auto")) arg_fido2_cid = mfree(arg_fido2_cid); else { _cleanup_free_ void *cid = NULL; size_t cid_size; r = unbase64mem(val, &cid, &cid_size); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to decode FIDO2 CID data: %m"); free(arg_fido2_cid); arg_fido2_cid = TAKE_PTR(cid); arg_fido2_cid_size = cid_size; } /* Turn on FIDO2 as side-effect, if not turned on yet. */ if (!arg_fido2_device && !arg_fido2_device_auto) arg_fido2_device_auto = true; } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-rp="))) { r = free_and_strdup(&arg_fido2_rp_id, val); if (r < 0) return log_oom(); } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-pin="))) { r = parse_boolean(val); if (r < 0) { log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); return 0; } arg_fido2_manual_flags &= ~FIDO2ENROLL_PIN_IF_NEEDED; SET_FLAG(arg_fido2_manual_flags, FIDO2ENROLL_PIN, r); } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-up="))) { r = parse_boolean(val); if (r < 0) { log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); return 0; } arg_fido2_manual_flags &= ~FIDO2ENROLL_UP_IF_NEEDED; SET_FLAG(arg_fido2_manual_flags, FIDO2ENROLL_UP, r); } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fido2-uv="))) { r = parse_boolean(val); if (r < 0) { log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); return 0; } arg_fido2_manual_flags &= ~FIDO2ENROLL_UV_OMIT; SET_FLAG(arg_fido2_manual_flags, FIDO2ENROLL_UV, r); } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-device="))) { if (streq(val, "auto")) { arg_tpm2_device = mfree(arg_tpm2_device); arg_tpm2_device_auto = true; } else { r = free_and_strdup(&arg_tpm2_device, val); if (r < 0) return log_oom(); arg_tpm2_device_auto = false; } } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-pcrs="))) { r = tpm2_parse_pcr_argument_to_mask(val, &arg_tpm2_pcr_mask); if (r < 0) return r; } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-signature="))) { if (!path_is_absolute(val)) return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "TPM2 signature path \"%s\" is not absolute, refusing.", val); r = free_and_strdup(&arg_tpm2_signature, val); if (r < 0) return log_oom(); } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-pin="))) { r = parse_boolean(val); if (r < 0) { log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); return 0; } arg_tpm2_pin = r; } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-pcrlock="))) { if (!path_is_absolute(val)) return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "TPM2 pcrlock policy path \"%s\" is not absolute, refusing.", val); r = free_and_strdup(&arg_tpm2_pcrlock, val); if (r < 0) return log_oom(); } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-measure-pcr="))) { unsigned pcr; r = safe_atou(val, &pcr); if (r < 0) { r = parse_boolean(val); if (r < 0) { log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); return 0; } pcr = r ? TPM2_PCR_SYSTEM_IDENTITY : UINT_MAX; } else if (!TPM2_PCR_INDEX_VALID(pcr)) { log_warning("Selected TPM index for measurement %u outside of allowed range 0…%u, ignoring.", pcr, TPM2_PCRS_MAX-1); return 0; } arg_tpm2_measure_pcr = pcr; } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-measure-bank="))) { #if HAVE_OPENSSL _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; r = DLOPEN_LIBCRYPTO(LOG_ERR, SD_ELF_NOTE_DLOPEN_PRIORITY_RECOMMENDED); if (r < 0) return r; l = strv_split(val, ":"); if (!l) return log_oom(); STRV_FOREACH(i, l) { const EVP_MD *implementation; implementation = sym_EVP_get_digestbyname(*i); if (!implementation) return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Unknown bank '%s', refusing.", val); if (strv_extend(&arg_tpm2_measure_banks, sym_EVP_MD_get0_name(implementation)) < 0) return log_oom(); } #else log_error("Build lacks OpenSSL support, cannot measure to PCR banks, ignoring: %s", option); #endif } else if ((val = startswith(option, "tpm2-measure-keyslot-nvpcr="))) { r = isempty(val) ? false : parse_boolean(val); if (r == 0) { arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr = mfree(arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr); return 0; } if (r > 0) val = "cryptsetup"; else if (!tpm2_nvpcr_name_is_valid(val)) { log_warning("Invalid NvPCR name, ignoring: %s", option); return 0; } if (free_and_strdup(&arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr, val) < 0) return log_oom(); } else if ((val = startswith(option, "try-empty-password="))) { r = parse_boolean(val); if (r < 0) { log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); return 0; } arg_try_empty_password = r; } else if (streq(option, "try-empty-password")) arg_try_empty_password = true; else if ((val = startswith(option, "headless="))) { r = parse_boolean(val); if (r < 0) { log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); return 0; } SET_FLAG(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_HEADLESS, r); } else if (streq(option, "headless")) arg_ask_password_flags |= ASK_PASSWORD_HEADLESS; else if ((val = startswith(option, "token-timeout="))) { r = parse_sec_fix_0(val, &arg_token_timeout_usec); if (r < 0) log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse %s, ignoring: %m", option); } else if ((val = startswith(option, "link-volume-key="))) { _cleanup_free_ char *keyring = NULL, *key_type = NULL, *key_description = NULL; const char *sep; /* Stick with cryptsetup --link-vk-to-keyring format * <keyring_description>::%<key_type>:<key_description>, * where %<key_type> is optional and defaults to 'user'. */ sep = strstr(val, "::"); if (!sep) return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to parse link-volume-key= option value: %s", val); /* cryptsetup (cli) supports <keyring_description> passed in various formats: * - well-known keyrings prefixed with '@' (@u user, @s session, etc) * - text descriptions prefixed with "%:" or "%keyring:". * - text description with no prefix. * - numeric keyring id (ignored in current patch set). */ keyring = strndup(val, sep - val); if (!keyring) return log_oom(); /* add type prefix if missing (crypt_set_keyring_to_link() expects it) */ if (!IN_SET(*keyring, '@', '%')) if (!strprepend(&keyring, "%:")) return log_oom(); sep += 2; /* %<key_type> is optional (and defaults to 'user') */ if (*sep == '%') { /* must be separated by colon */ const char *c = strchr(sep, ':'); if (!c) return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Failed to parse link-volume-key= option value: %s", val); key_type = strndup(sep + 1, c - sep - 1); if (!key_type) return log_oom(); sep = c + 1; } key_description = strdup(sep); if (!key_description) return log_oom(); free_and_replace(arg_link_keyring, keyring); free_and_replace(arg_link_key_type, key_type); free_and_replace(arg_link_key_description, key_description); } else if ((val = startswith(option, "fixate-volume-key="))) { r = free_and_strdup(&arg_fixate_volume_key, val); if (r < 0) return log_oom(); } else if (!streq(option, "x-initrd.attach")) log_warning("Encountered unknown /etc/crypttab option '%s', ignoring.", option); return 0; } static int parse_crypt_config(const char *options) { assert(options); for (;;) { _cleanup_free_ char *word = NULL; int r; r = extract_first_word(&options, &word, ",", EXTRACT_DONT_COALESCE_SEPARATORS | EXTRACT_UNESCAPE_SEPARATORS); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse options: %m"); if (r == 0) break; r = parse_one_option(word); if (r < 0) return r; } /* sanity-check options */ if (arg_type && !streq(arg_type, CRYPT_PLAIN)) { if (arg_offset != 0) log_warning("offset= ignored with type %s", arg_type); if (arg_skip != 0) log_warning("skip= ignored with type %s", arg_type); } if (arg_pkcs11_uri || arg_pkcs11_uri_auto) { /* If password-cache was not configured explicitly, default to no cache for PKCS#11 */ if (!arg_password_cache_set) arg_ask_password_flags &= ~(ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED|ASK_PASSWORD_PUSH_CACHE); /* This prevents future backward-compatibility issues if we decide to allow caching for PKCS#11 */ if (FLAGS_SET(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED)) return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Password cache is not supported for PKCS#11 security tokens."); } return 0; } static char* disk_description(const char *path) { static const char name_fields[] = "DM_NAME\0" "ID_MODEL_FROM_DATABASE\0" "ID_MODEL\0"; _cleanup_(sd_device_unrefp) sd_device *device = NULL; const char *name; struct stat st; assert(path); if (stat(path, &st) < 0) return NULL; if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode)) return NULL; if (sd_device_new_from_stat_rdev(&device, &st) < 0) return NULL; if (sd_device_get_property_value(device, "ID_PART_ENTRY_NAME", &name) >= 0) { _cleanup_free_ char *unescaped = NULL; ssize_t l; /* ID_PART_ENTRY_NAME uses \x style escaping, using libblkid's blkid_encode_string(). Let's * reverse this here to make the string more human friendly in case people embed spaces or * other weird stuff. */ l = cunescape(name, UNESCAPE_RELAX, &unescaped); if (l < 0) { log_debug_errno(l, "Failed to unescape ID_PART_ENTRY_NAME, skipping device: %m"); return NULL; } if (!isempty(unescaped) && !string_has_cc(unescaped, NULL)) return TAKE_PTR(unescaped); } /* These need no unescaping. */ NULSTR_FOREACH(i, name_fields) if (sd_device_get_property_value(device, i, &name) >= 0 && !isempty(name)) return strdup(name); return NULL; } static char* disk_mount_point(const char *label) { _cleanup_(mnt_free_tablep) struct libmnt_table *table = NULL; _cleanup_(mnt_free_iterp) struct libmnt_iter *iter = NULL; _cleanup_free_ char *device = NULL; int r; /* Yeah, we don't support native systemd unit files here for now */ assert(label); device = strjoin("/dev/mapper/", label); if (!device) return NULL; r = libmount_parse_fstab(&table, &iter); if (r < 0) return NULL; for (;;) { struct libmnt_fs *fs; r = sym_mnt_table_next_fs(table, iter, &fs); if (r != 0) return NULL; if (path_equal(sym_mnt_fs_get_source(fs), device)) { const char *target = sym_mnt_fs_get_target(fs); if (target) return strdup(target); } } } static char *friendly_disk_name(const char *src, const char *vol) { _cleanup_free_ char *description = NULL, *mount_point = NULL; char *name_buffer = NULL; int r; assert(src); assert(vol); description = disk_description(src); mount_point = disk_mount_point(vol); /* If the description string is simply the volume name, then let's not show this twice */ if (description && streq(vol, description)) description = mfree(description); if (mount_point && description) r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s (%s) on %s", description, vol, mount_point); else if (mount_point) r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s on %s", vol, mount_point); else if (description) r = asprintf(&name_buffer, "%s (%s)", description, vol); else return strdup(vol); if (r < 0) return NULL; return name_buffer; } static PassphraseType check_registered_passwords(struct crypt_device *cd) { _cleanup_free_ bool *slots = NULL; int slot_max; PassphraseType passphrase_type = PASSPHRASE_NONE; assert(cd); if (!streq_ptr(sym_crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS2)) { log_debug("%s: not a LUKS2 device, only passphrases are supported", sym_crypt_get_device_name(cd)); return PASSPHRASE_REGULAR; } /* Search all used slots */ assert_se((slot_max = sym_crypt_keyslot_max(CRYPT_LUKS2)) > 0); slots = new(bool, slot_max); if (!slots) return log_oom(); for (int slot = 0; slot < slot_max; slot++) slots[slot] = IN_SET(sym_crypt_keyslot_status(cd, slot), CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE, CRYPT_SLOT_ACTIVE_LAST); /* Iterate all LUKS2 tokens and keep track of all their slots */ for (int token = 0; token < sym_crypt_token_max(CRYPT_LUKS2); token++) { _cleanup_(sd_json_variant_unrefp) sd_json_variant *v = NULL; const char *type; sd_json_variant *w, *z; int tk; tk = cryptsetup_get_token_as_json(cd, token, NULL, &v); if (IN_SET(tk, -ENOENT, -EINVAL)) continue; if (tk < 0) { log_warning_errno(tk, "Failed to read JSON token data, ignoring: %m"); continue; } w = sd_json_variant_by_key(v, "type"); if (!w || !sd_json_variant_is_string(w)) { log_warning("Token JSON data lacks type field, ignoring."); continue; } type = sd_json_variant_string(w); if (STR_IN_SET(type, "systemd-recovery", "systemd-pkcs11", "systemd-fido2", "systemd-tpm2")) { /* At least exists one recovery key */ if (streq(type, "systemd-recovery")) passphrase_type |= PASSPHRASE_RECOVERY_KEY; w = sd_json_variant_by_key(v, "keyslots"); if (!w || !sd_json_variant_is_array(w)) { log_warning("Token JSON data lacks keyslots field, ignoring."); continue; } JSON_VARIANT_ARRAY_FOREACH(z, w) { unsigned u; int at; if (!sd_json_variant_is_string(z)) { log_warning("Token JSON data's keyslot field is not an array of strings, ignoring."); continue; } at = safe_atou(sd_json_variant_string(z), &u); if (at < 0) { log_warning_errno(at, "Token JSON data's keyslot field is not an integer formatted as string, ignoring."); continue; } if (u >= (unsigned) slot_max) { log_warning_errno(at, "Token JSON data's keyslot field exceeds the maximum value allowed, ignoring."); continue; } slots[u] = false; } } } /* Check if any of the slots is not referenced by systemd tokens */ for (int slot = 0; slot < slot_max; slot++) if (slots[slot]) { passphrase_type |= PASSPHRASE_REGULAR; break; } /* All the slots are referenced by systemd tokens, so if a recovery key is not enrolled, * we will not be able to enter a passphrase. */ return passphrase_type; } static int get_password( const char *vol, const char *src, usec_t until, bool ignore_cached, PassphraseType passphrase_type, char ***ret) { _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL, *text = NULL, *disk_path = NULL, *id = NULL; _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords = NULL; AskPasswordFlags flags = arg_ask_password_flags; int r; assert(vol); assert(src); assert(ret); if (FLAGS_SET(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_HEADLESS)) return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOPKG), "Password querying disabled via 'headless' option."); friendly = friendly_disk_name(src, vol); if (!friendly) return log_oom(); if (asprintf(&text, "Please enter %s for disk %s:", passphrase_type_to_string(passphrase_type), friendly) < 0) return log_oom(); disk_path = cescape(src); if (!disk_path) return log_oom(); id = strjoin("cryptsetup:", disk_path); if (!id) return log_oom(); AskPasswordRequest req = { .tty_fd = -EBADF, .message = text, .icon = "drive-harddisk", .id = id, .keyring = "cryptsetup", .credential = "cryptsetup.passphrase", .until = until, .hup_fd = -EBADF, }; if (ignore_cached) flags &= ~ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED; r = ask_password_auto(&req, flags, &passwords); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query password: %m"); if (arg_verify) { _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords2 = NULL; assert(strv_length(passwords) == 1); text = mfree(text); if (asprintf(&text, "Please enter %s for disk %s (verification):", passphrase_type_to_string(passphrase_type), friendly) < 0) return log_oom(); free(id); id = strjoin("cryptsetup-verification:", disk_path); if (!id) return log_oom(); req.message = text; req.id = id; r = ask_password_auto(&req, flags, &passwords2); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query verification password: %m"); assert(strv_length(passwords2) == 1); if (!streq(passwords[0], passwords2[0])) return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "Passwords did not match, retrying."); } strv_uniq(passwords); STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords) { char *c; if (strlen(*p)+1 >= arg_key_size) continue; /* Pad password if necessary */ c = new(char, arg_key_size); if (!c) return log_oom(); strncpy(c, *p, arg_key_size); erase_and_free(*p); *p = TAKE_PTR(c); } *ret = TAKE_PTR(passwords); return 0; } static int measure_volume_key( struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const void *volume_key, size_t volume_key_size) { int r; assert(cd); assert(name); assert(volume_key); assert(volume_key_size > 0); if (arg_tpm2_measure_pcr == UINT_MAX) { log_debug("Not measuring volume key, deactivated."); return 0; } r = efi_measured_os(LOG_WARNING); if (r < 0) return r; if (r == 0) { log_debug("OS measurements not explicitly requested and kernel stub did not measure kernel image into the expected PCR, skipping userspace volume key measurement, too."); return 0; } #if HAVE_TPM2 _cleanup_(tpm2_context_unrefp) Tpm2Context *c = NULL; r = tpm2_context_new_or_warn(arg_tpm2_device, &c); if (r < 0) return r; _cleanup_strv_free_ char **l = NULL; if (strv_isempty(arg_tpm2_measure_banks)) { r = tpm2_get_good_pcr_banks_strv(c, UINT32_C(1) << arg_tpm2_measure_pcr, &l); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Could not verify pcr banks: %m"); } _cleanup_free_ char *joined = strv_join(l ?: arg_tpm2_measure_banks, ", "); if (!joined) return log_oom(); /* Note: we don't directly measure the volume key, it might be a security problem to send an * unprotected direct hash of the secret volume key over the wire to the TPM. Hence let's instead * send a HMAC signature instead. */ _cleanup_free_ char *prefix = NULL; /* Note: what is extended to the SHA256 bank here must match the expected hash of 'fixate-volume-key=' * calculated by cryptsetup_get_volume_key_id(). */ r = cryptsetup_get_volume_key_prefix(cd, name, &prefix); if (r) return log_error_errno(r, "Could not verify pcr banks: %m"); r = tpm2_pcr_extend_bytes( c, /* banks= */ l ?: arg_tpm2_measure_banks, /* pcr_index = */ arg_tpm2_measure_pcr, /* data = */ &IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(prefix), /* secret = */ &IOVEC_MAKE(volume_key, volume_key_size), /* event_type = */ TPM2_EVENT_VOLUME_KEY, /* description = */ prefix); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Could not extend PCR: %m"); log_struct(LOG_INFO, LOG_MESSAGE_ID(SD_MESSAGE_TPM_PCR_EXTEND_STR), LOG_MESSAGE("Successfully extended PCR index %u with '%s' and volume key (banks %s).", arg_tpm2_measure_pcr, prefix, joined), LOG_ITEM("MEASURING=%s", prefix), LOG_ITEM("PCR=%u", arg_tpm2_measure_pcr), LOG_ITEM("BANKS=%s", joined)); return 0; #else return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "TPM2 support disabled, not measuring volume key."); #endif } static int measure_keyslot( struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *mechanism, int keyslot) { #if HAVE_TPM2 int r; #endif assert(cd); assert(name); if (!arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr) { log_debug("Not measuring unlock keyslot, deactivated."); return 0; } #if HAVE_TPM2 r = efi_measured_os(LOG_WARNING); if (r < 0) return r; if (r == 0) { log_debug("OS measurements not explicitly requested and kernel stub did not measure kernel image into the expected PCR, skipping userspace key slot measurement, too."); return 0; } _cleanup_(tpm2_context_unrefp) Tpm2Context *c = NULL; r = tpm2_context_new_or_warn(arg_tpm2_device, &c); if (r < 0) return r; _cleanup_free_ char *escaped = NULL; escaped = xescape(name, ":"); /* avoid ambiguity around ":" once we join things below */ if (!escaped) return log_oom(); _cleanup_free_ char *k = NULL; if (keyslot >= 0 && asprintf(&k, "%i", keyslot) < 0) return log_oom(); _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL; s = strjoin("cryptsetup-keyslot:", escaped, ":", strempty(sym_crypt_get_uuid(cd)), ":", strempty(mechanism), ":", strempty(k)); if (!s) return log_oom(); r = tpm2_nvpcr_extend_bytes(c, /* session= */ NULL, arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr, &IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(s), /* secret= */ NULL, TPM2_EVENT_KEYSLOT, s); if (r == -ENETDOWN) { /* NvPCR is not initialized yet. Do so now. */ _cleanup_(iovec_done_erase) struct iovec anchor_secret = {}; r = tpm2_nvpcr_acquire_anchor_secret(&anchor_secret, /* sync_secondary= */ false); if (r < 0) return r; r = tpm2_nvpcr_initialize(c, /* session= */ NULL, arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr, &anchor_secret); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to extend NvPCR index '%s' with anchor secret: %m", name); r = tpm2_nvpcr_extend_bytes(c, /* session= */ NULL, arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr, &IOVEC_MAKE_STRING(s), /* secret= */ NULL, TPM2_EVENT_KEYSLOT, s); } if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Could not extend NvPCR: %m"); log_struct(LOG_INFO, "MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_TPM_NVPCR_EXTEND_STR, LOG_MESSAGE("Successfully extended NvPCR index '%s' with '%s'.", arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr, s), "MEASURING=%s", s, "NVPCR=%s", arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr); return 0; #else return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "TPM2 support disabled, not measuring keyslot."); #endif } static int log_external_activation(int r, const char *volume) { assert(volume); log_notice_errno(r, "Volume '%s' has been activated externally while we have been trying to activate it.", volume); return 0; } static int measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key( struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *mechanism, int keyslot, const void *volume_key, size_t volume_key_size, uint32_t flags) { int r; assert(cd); assert(name); /* A wrapper around crypt_activate_by_volume_key() which also measures to a PCR if that's requested. */ /* First, check if volume key digest matches the expectation. */ if (arg_fixate_volume_key) { _cleanup_free_ char *key_id = NULL; r = cryptsetup_get_volume_key_id( cd, /* volume_name= */ name, /* volume_key= */ volume_key, /* volume_key_size= */ volume_key_size, /* ret= */ &key_id); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to get volume key id."); if (!streq(arg_fixate_volume_key, key_id)) return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Volume key id: '%s' does not match the expectation: '%s'.", key_id, arg_fixate_volume_key); } r = sym_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size, flags); if (r == -EEXIST) /* volume is already active */ return log_external_activation(r, name); if (r < 0) return r; if (arg_tpm2_measure_pcr == UINT_MAX) { log_debug("Not measuring volume key, deactivated."); return 0; } if (volume_key_size > 0) (void) measure_volume_key(cd, name, volume_key, volume_key_size); /* OK if fails */ else log_debug("Not measuring volume key, none specified."); (void) measure_keyslot(cd, name, mechanism, keyslot); /* ditto */ return r; } static int measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase( struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *mechanism, int keyslot, const char *passphrase, size_t passphrase_size, uint32_t flags) { _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *vk = NULL; size_t vks; int r; assert(cd); /* A wrapper around crypt_activate_by_passphrase() which also measures to a PCR if that's * requested. Note that we may need the volume key for the measurement and/or for the comparison, and * crypt_activate_by_passphrase() doesn't give us access to this. Hence, we operate indirectly, and * retrieve the volume key first, and then activate through that. */ if (arg_tpm2_measure_pcr == UINT_MAX && !arg_fixate_volume_key) goto shortcut; r = sym_crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd); if (r < 0) return r; if (r == 0) { log_debug("Not measuring volume key, none defined."); goto shortcut; } vk = malloc(vks = r); if (!vk) return -ENOMEM; keyslot = sym_crypt_volume_key_get(cd, keyslot, vk, &vks, passphrase, passphrase_size); if (keyslot < 0) return keyslot; return measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, mechanism, keyslot, vk, vks, flags); shortcut: keyslot = sym_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, keyslot, passphrase, passphrase_size, flags); if (keyslot == -EEXIST) /* volume is already active */ return log_external_activation(keyslot, name); if (keyslot < 0) return keyslot; (void) measure_keyslot(cd, name, mechanism, keyslot); return keyslot; } static int attach_tcrypt( struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, TokenType token_type, const char *key_file, const struct iovec *key_data, char **passwords, uint32_t flags) { int r = 0; _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *passphrase = NULL; struct crypt_params_tcrypt params = { .flags = CRYPT_TCRYPT_LEGACY_MODES, .keyfiles = (const char **)arg_tcrypt_keyfiles, .keyfiles_count = strv_length(arg_tcrypt_keyfiles) }; assert(cd); assert(name); assert(key_file || key_data || !strv_isempty(passwords)); if (token_type >= 0) /* Ask for a regular password */ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "Sorry, but tcrypt devices are currently not supported in conjunction with pkcs11/fido2/tpm2 support."); if (arg_tcrypt_hidden) params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_HIDDEN_HEADER; if (arg_tcrypt_system) params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_SYSTEM_HEADER; if (arg_tcrypt_veracrypt) params.flags |= CRYPT_TCRYPT_VERA_MODES; if (arg_tcrypt_veracrypt && arg_tcrypt_veracrypt_pim != 0) params.veracrypt_pim = arg_tcrypt_veracrypt_pim; if (key_data) { params.passphrase = key_data->iov_base; params.passphrase_size = key_data->iov_len; r = sym_crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, ¶ms); } else if (key_file) { r = read_one_line_file(key_file, &passphrase); if (r < 0) { log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read password file '%s': %m", key_file); return -EAGAIN; /* log with the actual error, but return EAGAIN */ } params.passphrase = passphrase; params.passphrase_size = strlen(passphrase); r = sym_crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, ¶ms); } else { r = -EINVAL; STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords){ params.passphrase = *p; params.passphrase_size = strlen(*p); r = sym_crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_TCRYPT, ¶ms); if (r >= 0) break; } } if (r < 0) { if (r == -EPERM) { if (key_data) log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate using discovered key. (Key not correct?)"); else if (key_file) log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate using password file '%s'. (Key data not correct?)", key_file); else log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate using supplied passwords."); return r; } return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load tcrypt superblock on device %s: %m", sym_crypt_get_device_name(cd)); } r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key( cd, name, /* mechanism= */ NULL, /* keyslot= */ -1, /* volume_key= */ NULL, /* volume_key_size= */ 0, flags); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate tcrypt device %s: %m", sym_crypt_get_device_name(cd)); return 0; } static char *make_bindname(const char *volume, TokenType token_type) { const char *token_type_name = token_type_to_string(token_type), *suffix; char *bindname; int r; switch (token_type) { case TOKEN_FIDO2: suffix = "-salt"; break; default: suffix = NULL; } r = asprintf(&bindname, "@%" PRIx64"/cryptsetup%s%s%s/%s", random_u64(), token_type_name ? "-" : "", strempty(token_type_name), strempty(suffix), volume); if (r < 0) return NULL; return bindname; } static int make_security_device_monitor( sd_event **ret_event, sd_device_monitor **ret_monitor) { _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL; _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL; int r; assert(ret_event); assert(ret_monitor); /* Waits for a device with "security-device" tag to show up in udev */ log_debug("Creating device monitor for tag 'security-device' with timeout %s", FORMAT_TIMESPAN(arg_token_timeout_usec, 1*USEC_PER_SEC)); r = sd_event_default(&event); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate event loop: %m"); r = sd_event_add_time_relative(event, NULL, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, arg_token_timeout_usec, USEC_PER_SEC, NULL, INT_TO_PTR(-ETIMEDOUT)); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to install timeout event source: %m"); r = sd_device_monitor_new(&monitor); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate device monitor: %m"); (void) sd_device_monitor_set_description(monitor, "security-device"); r = sd_device_monitor_filter_add_match_tag(monitor, "security-device"); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to configure device monitor: %m"); r = sd_device_monitor_attach_event(monitor, event); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to attach device monitor: %m"); r = sd_device_monitor_start(monitor, NULL, NULL); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to start device monitor: %m"); *ret_event = TAKE_PTR(event); *ret_monitor = TAKE_PTR(monitor); return 0; } static int run_security_device_monitor( sd_event *event, sd_device_monitor *monitor) { bool processed = false; int r; assert(event); assert(monitor); /* Runs the event loop for the device monitor until either something happens, or the timeout is * hit. */ for (;;) { int x; r = sd_event_get_exit_code(event, &x); if (r < 0) { if (r != -ENODATA) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query exit code from event loop: %m"); /* On ENODATA we aren't told to exit yet. */ } else { assert(x == -ETIMEDOUT); return log_notice_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "Timed out waiting for security device, aborting security device based authentication attempt."); } /* Wait for one event, and then eat all subsequent events until there are no further ones */ r = sd_event_run(event, processed ? 0 : UINT64_MAX); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to run event loop: %m"); if (r == 0) /* no events queued anymore */ return 0; processed = true; } } static bool use_token_plugins(void) { #if HAVE_TPM2 /* Currently, there's no way for us to query the volume key when plugins are used. Hence don't use * plugins, if measurement has been requested. */ if (arg_tpm2_measure_pcr != UINT_MAX) return false; if (arg_tpm2_measure_keyslot_nvpcr) return false; /* Volume key is also needed if the expected key id is set */ if (arg_fixate_volume_key) return false; #endif /* Disable tokens if we're in FIDO2 mode with manual parameters. */ if (arg_fido2_cid) return false; #if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS int r; /* Permit a way to disable libcryptsetup token module support, for debugging purposes. */ r = getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_CRYPTSETUP_USE_TOKEN_MODULE"); if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse $SYSTEMD_CRYPTSETUP_USE_TOKEN_MODULE env var: %m"); if (r == 0) return false; return sym_crypt_token_external_path(); #else return false; #endif } #if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS static int acquire_pins_from_env_variable(char ***ret_pins) { _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *envpin = NULL; _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **pins = NULL; int r; assert(ret_pins); r = getenv_steal_erase("PIN", &envpin); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to acquire PIN from environment: %m"); if (r > 0) { pins = strv_new(envpin); if (!pins) return log_oom(); } *ret_pins = TAKE_PTR(pins); return 0; } #endif static int crypt_activate_by_token_pin_ask_password( struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *type, usec_t until, void *userdata, uint32_t activation_flags, const char *message, const char *keyring, const char *credential) { #if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS AskPasswordFlags flags = arg_ask_password_flags; _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **pins = NULL; int r; r = sym_crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, type, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, /* pin= */ NULL, /* pin_size= */ 0, userdata, activation_flags); if (r > 0) /* returns unlocked keyslot id on success */ return 0; if (r == -EEXIST) /* volume is already active */ return log_external_activation(r, name); if (r != -ENOANO) /* needs pin or pin is wrong */ return r; r = acquire_pins_from_env_variable(&pins); if (r < 0) return r; STRV_FOREACH(p, pins) { r = sym_crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, type, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, *p, strlen(*p), userdata, activation_flags); if (r > 0) /* returns unlocked keyslot id on success */ return 0; if (r == -EEXIST) /* volume is already active */ return log_external_activation(r, name); if (r != -ENOANO) /* needs pin or pin is wrong */ return r; } if (FLAGS_SET(arg_ask_password_flags, ASK_PASSWORD_HEADLESS)) return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOPKG), "PIN querying disabled via 'headless' option. Use the '$PIN' environment variable."); for (;;) { pins = strv_free_erase(pins); AskPasswordRequest req = { .tty_fd = -EBADF, .message = message, .icon = "drive-harddisk", .keyring = keyring, .credential = credential, .until = until, .hup_fd = -EBADF, }; r = ask_password_auto(&req, flags, &pins); if (r < 0) return r; STRV_FOREACH(p, pins) { r = sym_crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, type, CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, *p, strlen(*p), userdata, activation_flags); if (r > 0) /* returns unlocked keyslot id on success */ return 0; if (r == -EEXIST) /* volume is already active */ return log_external_activation(r, name); if (r != -ENOANO) /* needs pin or pin is wrong */ return r; } flags &= ~ASK_PASSWORD_ACCEPT_CACHED; } return r; #else return -EOPNOTSUPP; #endif } static int attach_luks2_by_fido2_via_plugin( struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, usec_t until, void *userdata, uint32_t activation_flags) { return crypt_activate_by_token_pin_ask_password( cd, name, "systemd-fido2", until, userdata, activation_flags, "Please enter security token PIN:", "fido2-pin", "cryptsetup.fido2-pin"); } static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_fido2( struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *key_file, const struct iovec *key_data, usec_t until, uint32_t flags, bool pass_volume_key) { _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL; _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *decrypted_key = NULL; _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL; size_t decrypted_key_size; _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL; int keyslot = arg_key_slot, r; bool use_libcryptsetup_plugin = use_token_plugins(); assert(cd); assert(name); assert(arg_fido2_device || arg_fido2_device_auto); if (arg_fido2_cid && !key_file && !iovec_is_set(key_data)) return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "FIDO2 mode with manual parameters selected, but no keyfile specified, refusing."); friendly = friendly_disk_name(sym_crypt_get_device_name(cd), name); if (!friendly) return log_oom(); for (;;) { if (use_libcryptsetup_plugin && !arg_fido2_cid) { r = attach_luks2_by_fido2_via_plugin(cd, name, until, arg_fido2_device, flags); if (IN_SET(r, -ENOTUNIQ, -ENXIO, -ENOENT)) return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "Automatic FIDO2 metadata discovery was not possible because missing or not unique, falling back to traditional unlocking."); } else { if (arg_fido2_cid) r = acquire_fido2_key( name, friendly, arg_fido2_device, arg_fido2_rp_id, arg_fido2_cid, arg_fido2_cid_size, key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset, key_data, until, arg_fido2_manual_flags, "cryptsetup.fido2-pin", arg_ask_password_flags, &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size); else r = acquire_fido2_key_auto( cd, name, friendly, arg_fido2_device, until, "cryptsetup.fido2-pin", arg_ask_password_flags, &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size); if (r >= 0) break; } if (r != -EAGAIN) /* EAGAIN means: token not found */ return r; if (!monitor) { /* We didn't find the token. In this case, watch for it via udev. Let's * create an event loop and monitor first. */ assert(!event); r = make_security_device_monitor(&event, &monitor); if (r < 0) return r; log_notice("Security token not present for unlocking volume %s, please plug it in.", friendly); /* Let's immediately rescan in case the token appeared in the time we needed * to create and configure the monitor */ continue; } r = run_security_device_monitor(event, monitor); if (r < 0) return r; log_debug("Got one or more potentially relevant udev events, rescanning FIDO2..."); } if (pass_volume_key) r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key( cd, name, "fido2", /* keyslot= */ -1, decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, flags); else { _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL; ssize_t base64_encoded_size; /* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it, for compat with homed */ base64_encoded_size = base64mem(decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, &base64_encoded); if (base64_encoded_size < 0) return log_oom(); r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase( cd, name, "fido2", keyslot, base64_encoded, base64_encoded_size, flags); } if (r == -EPERM) { log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with FIDO2 decrypted key. (Key incorrect?)"); return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ } if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with FIDO2 acquired key: %m"); return 0; } static int attach_luks2_by_pkcs11_via_plugin( struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *friendly_name, usec_t until, const char *askpw_credential, uint32_t flags) { #if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS int r; if (!streq_ptr(sym_crypt_get_type(cd), CRYPT_LUKS2)) return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Automatic PKCS#11 metadata requires LUKS2 device."); systemd_pkcs11_plugin_params params = { .friendly_name = friendly_name, .until = until, .askpw_credential = askpw_credential, .askpw_flags = arg_ask_password_flags, }; r = sym_crypt_activate_by_token_pin(cd, name, "systemd-pkcs11", CRYPT_ANY_TOKEN, NULL, 0, ¶ms, flags); if (r > 0) /* returns unlocked keyslot id on success */ r = 0; if (r == -EEXIST) /* volume is already active */ r = log_external_activation(r, name); return r; #else return -EOPNOTSUPP; #endif } static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11( struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *key_file, const struct iovec *key_data, usec_t until, uint32_t flags, bool pass_volume_key) { _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL; _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL, *discovered_uri = NULL; size_t decrypted_key_size = 0, discovered_key_size = 0; _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *decrypted_key = NULL; _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL; _cleanup_free_ void *discovered_key = NULL; struct iovec discovered_key_data = {}; Pkcs11RsaPadding rsa_padding = PKCS11_RSA_PADDING_PKCS1V15; int keyslot = arg_key_slot, r; const char *uri = NULL; bool use_libcryptsetup_plugin = use_token_plugins(); assert(cd); assert(name); assert(arg_pkcs11_uri || arg_pkcs11_uri_auto); if (arg_pkcs11_uri_auto) { if (!use_libcryptsetup_plugin) { r = find_pkcs11_auto_data(cd, &discovered_uri, &discovered_key, &discovered_key_size, &rsa_padding, &keyslot); if (IN_SET(r, -ENOTUNIQ, -ENXIO)) return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "Automatic PKCS#11 metadata discovery was not possible because missing or not unique, falling back to traditional unlocking."); if (r < 0) return r; uri = discovered_uri; discovered_key_data = IOVEC_MAKE(discovered_key, discovered_key_size); key_data = &discovered_key_data; } } else { uri = arg_pkcs11_uri; if (!key_file && !iovec_is_set(key_data)) return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "PKCS#11 mode selected but no key file specified, refusing."); } friendly = friendly_disk_name(sym_crypt_get_device_name(cd), name); if (!friendly) return log_oom(); for (;;) { if (use_libcryptsetup_plugin && arg_pkcs11_uri_auto) r = attach_luks2_by_pkcs11_via_plugin( cd, name, friendly, until, "cryptsetup.pkcs11-pin", flags); else { r = decrypt_pkcs11_key( name, friendly, uri, rsa_padding, key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset, key_data, until, arg_ask_password_flags, &decrypted_key, &decrypted_key_size); if (r >= 0) break; } if (r != -EAGAIN) /* EAGAIN means: token not found */ return r; if (!monitor) { /* We didn't find the token. In this case, watch for it via udev. Let's * create an event loop and monitor first. */ assert(!event); r = make_security_device_monitor(&event, &monitor); if (r < 0) return r; log_notice("Security token%s%s not present for unlocking volume %s, please plug it in.", uri ? " " : "", strempty(uri), friendly); /* Let's immediately rescan in case the token appeared in the time we needed * to create and configure the monitor */ continue; } r = run_security_device_monitor(event, monitor); if (r < 0) return r; log_debug("Got one or more potentially relevant udev events, rescanning PKCS#11..."); } assert(decrypted_key); if (pass_volume_key) r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key( cd, name, "pkcs11", /* keyslot= */ -1, decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, flags); else { _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL; ssize_t base64_encoded_size; /* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it. Why? For compatibility * with homed's PKCS#11 hookup: there we want to use the key we acquired through * PKCS#11 for other authentication/decryption mechanisms too, and some of them do * not take arbitrary binary blobs, but require NUL-terminated strings — most * importantly UNIX password hashes. Hence, for compatibility we want to use a string * without embedded NUL here too, and that's easiest to generate from a binary blob * via base64 encoding. */ base64_encoded_size = base64mem(decrypted_key, decrypted_key_size, &base64_encoded); if (base64_encoded_size < 0) return log_oom(); r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase( cd, name, "pkcs11", keyslot, base64_encoded, base64_encoded_size, flags); } if (r == -EPERM) { log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with PKCS#11 decrypted key. (Key incorrect?)"); return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ } if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with PKCS#11 acquired key: %m"); return 0; } static int make_tpm2_device_monitor( sd_event **ret_event, sd_device_monitor **ret_monitor) { _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL; _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL; int r; assert(ret_event); assert(ret_monitor); r = sd_event_default(&event); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate event loop: %m"); r = sd_event_add_time_relative(event, NULL, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, arg_token_timeout_usec, USEC_PER_SEC, NULL, INT_TO_PTR(-ETIMEDOUT)); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to install timeout event source: %m"); r = sd_device_monitor_new(&monitor); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to allocate device monitor: %m"); (void) sd_device_monitor_set_description(monitor, "tpmrm"); r = sd_device_monitor_filter_add_match_subsystem_devtype(monitor, "tpmrm", NULL); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to configure device monitor: %m"); r = sd_device_monitor_attach_event(monitor, event); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to attach device monitor: %m"); r = sd_device_monitor_start(monitor, NULL, NULL); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to start device monitor: %m"); *ret_event = TAKE_PTR(event); *ret_monitor = TAKE_PTR(monitor); return 0; } static int attach_luks2_by_tpm2_via_plugin( struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, usec_t until, uint32_t flags) { #if HAVE_LIBCRYPTSETUP_PLUGINS systemd_tpm2_plugin_params params = { .search_pcr_mask = arg_tpm2_pcr_mask, .device = arg_tpm2_device, .signature_path = arg_tpm2_signature, .pcrlock_path = arg_tpm2_pcrlock, }; if (!use_token_plugins()) return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP), "libcryptsetup has external plugins support disabled."); return crypt_activate_by_token_pin_ask_password( cd, name, "systemd-tpm2", until, ¶ms, flags, "Please enter TPM2 PIN:", "tpm2-pin", "cryptsetup.tpm2-pin"); #else return -EOPNOTSUPP; #endif } static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_tpm2( struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *key_file, const struct iovec *key_data, usec_t until, uint32_t flags, bool pass_volume_key) { _cleanup_(sd_device_monitor_unrefp) sd_device_monitor *monitor = NULL; _cleanup_(iovec_done_erase) struct iovec decrypted_key = {}; _cleanup_(sd_event_unrefp) sd_event *event = NULL; _cleanup_free_ char *friendly = NULL; int keyslot = arg_key_slot, r; assert(cd); assert(name); assert(arg_tpm2_device || arg_tpm2_device_auto); friendly = friendly_disk_name(sym_crypt_get_device_name(cd), name); if (!friendly) return log_oom(); for (;;) { if (key_file || iovec_is_set(key_data)) { /* If key data is specified, use that */ r = acquire_tpm2_key( name, arg_tpm2_device, arg_tpm2_pcr_mask == UINT32_MAX ? TPM2_PCR_MASK_DEFAULT_LEGACY : arg_tpm2_pcr_mask, UINT16_MAX, /* pubkey= */ NULL, /* pubkey_pcr_mask= */ 0, /* signature_path= */ NULL, /* pcrlock_path= */ NULL, /* primary_alg= */ 0, key_file, arg_keyfile_size, arg_keyfile_offset, key_data, /* n_blobs= */ iovec_is_set(key_data) ? 1 : 0, /* policy_hash= */ NULL, /* we don't know the policy hash */ /* n_policy_hash= */ 0, /* salt= */ NULL, /* srk= */ NULL, /* pcrlock_nv= */ NULL, arg_tpm2_pin ? TPM2_FLAGS_USE_PIN : 0, until, "cryptsetup.tpm2-pin", arg_ask_password_flags, &decrypted_key); if (r >= 0) break; if (IN_SET(r, -EACCES, -ENOLCK)) return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "TPM2 PIN unlock failed, falling back to traditional unlocking."); if (ERRNO_IS_NOT_SUPPORTED(r)) /* TPM2 support not compiled in? */ return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "TPM2 support not available, falling back to traditional unlocking."); /* EAGAIN means: no tpm2 chip found */ if (r != -EAGAIN) { log_notice_errno(r, "TPM2 operation failed, falling back to traditional unlocking: %m"); return -EAGAIN; /* Mangle error code: let's make any form of TPM2 failure non-fatal. */ } } else { r = attach_luks2_by_tpm2_via_plugin(cd, name, until, flags); if (r >= 0) return 0; /* EAGAIN means: no tpm2 chip found * EOPNOTSUPP means: no libcryptsetup plugins support */ if (r == -ENXIO) return log_notice_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "No TPM2 metadata matching the current system state found in LUKS2 header, falling back to traditional unlocking."); if (r == -ENOENT) return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "No TPM2 metadata enrolled in LUKS2 header or TPM2 support not available, falling back to traditional unlocking."); if (!IN_SET(r, -EOPNOTSUPP, -EAGAIN)) { log_notice_errno(r, "TPM2 operation failed, falling back to traditional unlocking: %m"); return -EAGAIN; /* Mangle error code: let's make any form of TPM2 failure non-fatal. */ } } if (r == -EOPNOTSUPP) { /* Plugin not available, let's process TPM2 stuff right here instead */ bool found_some = false; int token = 0; /* first token to look at */ /* If no key data is specified, look for it in the header. In order to support * software upgrades we'll iterate through all suitable tokens, maybe one of them * works. */ for (;;) { _cleanup_(iovec_done) struct iovec pubkey = {}, salt = {}, srk = {}, pcrlock_nv = {}; struct iovec *blobs = NULL, *policy_hash = NULL; uint32_t hash_pcr_mask, pubkey_pcr_mask; size_t n_blobs = 0, n_policy_hash = 0; uint16_t pcr_bank, primary_alg; TPM2Flags tpm2_flags; CLEANUP_ARRAY(blobs, n_blobs, iovec_array_free); CLEANUP_ARRAY(policy_hash, n_policy_hash, iovec_array_free); r = find_tpm2_auto_data( cd, arg_tpm2_pcr_mask, /* if != UINT32_MAX we'll only look for tokens with this PCR mask */ token, /* search for the token with this index, or any later index than this */ &hash_pcr_mask, &pcr_bank, &pubkey, &pubkey_pcr_mask, &primary_alg, &blobs, &n_blobs, &policy_hash, &n_policy_hash, &salt, &srk, &pcrlock_nv, &tpm2_flags, &keyslot, &token); if (r == -ENXIO) /* No further TPM2 tokens found in the LUKS2 header. */ return log_full_errno(found_some ? LOG_NOTICE : LOG_DEBUG, SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), found_some ? "No TPM2 metadata matching the current system state found in LUKS2 header, falling back to traditional unlocking." : "No TPM2 metadata enrolled in LUKS2 header, falling back to traditional unlocking."); if (ERRNO_IS_NEG_NOT_SUPPORTED(r)) /* TPM2 support not compiled in? */ return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "TPM2 support not available, falling back to traditional unlocking."); if (r < 0) return r; found_some = true; r = acquire_tpm2_key( name, arg_tpm2_device, hash_pcr_mask, pcr_bank, &pubkey, pubkey_pcr_mask, arg_tpm2_signature, arg_tpm2_pcrlock, primary_alg, /* key_file= */ NULL, /* key_file_size= */ 0, /* key_file_offset= */ 0, /* no key file */ blobs, n_blobs, policy_hash, n_policy_hash, &salt, &srk, &pcrlock_nv, tpm2_flags, until, "cryptsetup.tpm2-pin", arg_ask_password_flags, &decrypted_key); if (IN_SET(r, -EACCES, -ENOLCK)) return log_notice_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "TPM2 PIN unlock failed, falling back to traditional unlocking."); if (r != -EPERM) break; token++; /* try a different token next time */ } if (r >= 0) break; /* EAGAIN means: no tpm2 chip found */ if (r != -EAGAIN) { log_notice_errno(r, "TPM2 operation failed, falling back to traditional unlocking: %m"); return -EAGAIN; /* Mangle error code: let's make any form of TPM2 failure non-fatal. */ } } if (!monitor) { /* We didn't find the TPM2 device. In this case, watch for it via udev. Let's create * an event loop and monitor first. */ assert(!event); if (is_efi_boot() && !efi_has_tpm2()) return log_notice_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "No TPM2 hardware discovered and EFI firmware does not see it either, falling back to traditional unlocking."); r = make_tpm2_device_monitor(&event, &monitor); if (r < 0) return r; log_info("TPM2 device not present for unlocking %s, waiting for it to become available.", friendly); /* Let's immediately rescan in case the device appeared in the time we needed * to create and configure the monitor */ continue; } r = run_security_device_monitor(event, monitor); if (r < 0) return r; log_debug("Got one or more potentially relevant udev events, rescanning for TPM2..."); } if (pass_volume_key) r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key( cd, name, "tpm2", /* keyslot= */ -1, decrypted_key.iov_base, decrypted_key.iov_len, flags); else { _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL; ssize_t base64_encoded_size; /* Before using this key as passphrase we base64 encode it, for compat with homed */ base64_encoded_size = base64mem(decrypted_key.iov_base, decrypted_key.iov_len, &base64_encoded); if (base64_encoded_size < 0) return log_oom(); r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase( cd, name, "tpm2", keyslot, base64_encoded, base64_encoded_size, flags); } if (r == -EPERM) { log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with TPM2 decrypted key. (Key incorrect?)"); return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ } if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with TPM2 acquired key: %m"); return 0; } static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_data( struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const struct iovec *key_data, uint32_t flags, bool pass_volume_key) { int r; assert(cd); assert(name); assert(key_data); if (pass_volume_key) r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, /* mechanism= */ NULL, /* keyslot= */ -1, key_data->iov_base, key_data->iov_len, flags); else r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, /* mechanism= */ NULL, arg_key_slot, key_data->iov_base, key_data->iov_len, flags); if (r == -EPERM) { log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate. (Key incorrect?)"); return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ } if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate: %m"); return 0; } static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_file( struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, const char *key_file, uint32_t flags, bool pass_volume_key) { _cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *kfdata = NULL; _cleanup_free_ char *bindname = NULL; size_t kfsize; int r; assert(cd); assert(name); assert(key_file); /* If we read the key via AF_UNIX, make this client recognizable */ bindname = make_bindname(name, /* token_type= */ _TOKEN_TYPE_INVALID); if (!bindname) return log_oom(); r = read_full_file_full( AT_FDCWD, key_file, arg_keyfile_offset == 0 ? UINT64_MAX : arg_keyfile_offset, arg_keyfile_size == 0 ? SIZE_MAX : arg_keyfile_size, READ_FULL_FILE_SECURE|READ_FULL_FILE_WARN_WORLD_READABLE|READ_FULL_FILE_CONNECT_SOCKET, bindname, &kfdata, &kfsize); if (r == -E2BIG) { log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate, key file '%s' too large.", key_file); return -EAGAIN; } if (r == -ENOENT) { log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate, key file '%s' missing.", key_file); return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ } if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read key file '%s': %m", key_file); if (pass_volume_key) r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, /* mechanism= */ NULL, /* keyslot= */ -1, kfdata, kfsize, flags); else r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, /* mechanism= */ NULL, arg_key_slot, kfdata, kfsize, flags); if (r == -EPERM) { log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with key file '%s'. (Key data incorrect?)", key_file); return -EAGAIN; /* Log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ } if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with key file '%s': %m", key_file); return 0; } static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_passphrase( struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, char **passwords, uint32_t flags, bool pass_volume_key) { int r; assert(cd); assert(name); r = -EINVAL; STRV_FOREACH(p, passwords) { if (pass_volume_key) r = measured_crypt_activate_by_volume_key(cd, name, /* mechanism= */ NULL, /* keyslot= */ -1, *p, arg_key_size, flags); else r = measured_crypt_activate_by_passphrase(cd, name, /* mechanism= */ NULL, arg_key_slot, *p, strlen(*p), flags); if (r >= 0) break; } if (r == -EPERM) { log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with specified passphrase. (Passphrase incorrect?)"); return -EAGAIN; /* log actual error, but return EAGAIN */ } if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to activate with specified passphrase: %m"); return 0; } static int attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk( struct crypt_device *cd, const char *name, TokenType token_type, const char *key_file, const struct iovec *key_data, char **passwords, uint32_t flags, usec_t until) { bool pass_volume_key = false; int r; assert(cd); assert(name); if ((!arg_type && !sym_crypt_get_type(cd)) || streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_PLAIN)) { struct crypt_params_plain params = { .offset = arg_offset, .skip = arg_skip, .sector_size = arg_sector_size, }; const char *cipher, *cipher_mode; _cleanup_free_ char *truncated_cipher = NULL; if (streq_ptr(arg_hash, "plain")) /* plain isn't a real hash type. it just means "use no hash" */ params.hash = NULL; else if (arg_hash) params.hash = arg_hash; else if (!key_file) /* for CRYPT_PLAIN, the behaviour of cryptsetup package is to not hash when a key * file is provided */ params.hash = "ripemd160"; if (arg_cipher) { size_t l; l = strcspn(arg_cipher, "-"); truncated_cipher = strndup(arg_cipher, l); if (!truncated_cipher) return log_oom(); cipher = truncated_cipher; cipher_mode = arg_cipher[l] ? arg_cipher+l+1 : "plain"; } else { cipher = "aes"; cipher_mode = "cbc-essiv:sha256"; } /* for CRYPT_PLAIN limit reads from keyfile to key length, and ignore keyfile-size */ arg_keyfile_size = arg_key_size; /* In contrast to what the name crypt_format() might suggest this doesn't actually format * anything, it just configures encryption parameters when used for plain mode. */ r = sym_crypt_format(cd, CRYPT_PLAIN, cipher, cipher_mode, NULL, NULL, arg_keyfile_size, ¶ms); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Loading of cryptographic parameters failed: %m"); /* hash == NULL implies the user passed "plain" */ pass_volume_key = !params.hash; } log_info("Set cipher %s, mode %s, key size %i bits for device %s.", sym_crypt_get_cipher(cd), sym_crypt_get_cipher_mode(cd), sym_crypt_get_volume_key_size(cd)*8, sym_crypt_get_device_name(cd)); if (token_type == TOKEN_TPM2) return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_tpm2(cd, name, key_file, key_data, until, flags, pass_volume_key); if (token_type == TOKEN_FIDO2) return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_fido2(cd, name, key_file, key_data, until, flags, pass_volume_key); if (token_type == TOKEN_PKCS11) return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_pkcs11(cd, name, key_file, key_data, until, flags, pass_volume_key); if (key_data) return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_data(cd, name, key_data, flags, pass_volume_key); if (key_file) return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_key_file(cd, name, key_file, flags, pass_volume_key); return attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk_by_passphrase(cd, name, passwords, flags, pass_volume_key); } static int help(void) { _cleanup_free_ char *link = NULL; _cleanup_(table_unrefp) Table *options = NULL, *verbs = NULL; int r; r = terminal_urlify_man("systemd-cryptsetup", "8", &link); if (r < 0) return log_oom(); r = verbs_get_help_table(&verbs); if (r < 0) return r; r = option_parser_get_help_table(&options); if (r < 0) return r; (void) table_sync_column_widths(0, verbs, options); printf("%s [OPTIONS...] {COMMAND} ...\n\n" "%sAttach or detach an encrypted block device.%s\n" "\n%sCommands:%s\n", program_invocation_short_name, ansi_highlight(), ansi_normal(), ansi_underline(), ansi_normal()); r = table_print_or_warn(verbs); if (r < 0) return r; printf("\n%sOptions:%s\n", ansi_underline(), ansi_normal()); r = table_print_or_warn(options); if (r < 0) return r; printf("\nSee the %s for details.\n", link); return 0; } VERB_COMMON_HELP_HIDDEN(help); static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[], char ***ret_args) { assert(argc >= 0); assert(argv); assert(ret_args); OptionParser opts = { argc, argv }; FOREACH_OPTION_OR_RETURN(c, &opts) switch (c) { OPTION_COMMON_HELP: return help(); OPTION_COMMON_VERSION: return version(); } *ret_args = option_parser_get_args(&opts); return 1; } static uint32_t determine_flags(void) { uint32_t flags = 0; if (arg_readonly) flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_READONLY; if (arg_discards) flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_ALLOW_DISCARDS; if (arg_same_cpu_crypt) flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SAME_CPU_CRYPT; if (arg_submit_from_crypt_cpus) flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SUBMIT_FROM_CRYPT_CPUS; if (arg_no_read_workqueue) flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_READ_WORKQUEUE; if (arg_no_write_workqueue) flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_NO_WRITE_WORKQUEUE; /* Try to decrease the risk of OOM event if memory hard key derivation function is in use */ /* https://gitlab.com/cryptsetup/cryptsetup/issues/446/ */ flags |= CRYPT_ACTIVATE_SERIALIZE_MEMORY_HARD_PBKDF; return flags; } static void remove_and_erasep(const char **p) { int r; assert(p); if (!*p) return; r = unlinkat_deallocate(AT_FDCWD, *p, UNLINK_ERASE); if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT) log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to erase key file '%s', ignoring: %m", *p); } static TokenType determine_token_type(void) { if (arg_tpm2_device || arg_tpm2_device_auto) return TOKEN_TPM2; if (arg_fido2_device || arg_fido2_device_auto) return TOKEN_FIDO2; if (arg_pkcs11_uri || arg_pkcs11_uri_auto) return TOKEN_PKCS11; return _TOKEN_TYPE_INVALID; } static int discover_key(const char *key_file, const char *volume, TokenType token_type, struct iovec *ret_key_data) { _cleanup_free_ char *bindname = NULL; const char *token_type_name; int r; assert(key_file); assert(volume); assert(ret_key_data); bindname = make_bindname(volume, token_type); if (!bindname) return log_oom(); /* If a key file is not explicitly specified, search for a key in a well defined search path, and load it. */ r = find_key_file(key_file, STRV_MAKE("/etc/cryptsetup-keys.d", "/run/cryptsetup-keys.d"), bindname, ret_key_data); if (r <= 0) return r; token_type_name = token_type_to_string(token_type); if (token_type_name) log_debug("Automatically discovered encrypted key for volume '%s' (token type: %s).", volume, token_type_name); else log_debug("Automatically discovered key for volume '%s'.", volume); return r; } VERB(verb_attach, "attach", "VOLUME SOURCE-DEVICE [KEY-FILE] [CONFIG]", 3, 5, 0, "Attach an encrypted block device"); static int verb_attach(int argc, char *argv[], uintptr_t _data, void *userdata) { _cleanup_(crypt_freep) struct crypt_device *cd = NULL; _unused_ _cleanup_(remove_and_erasep) const char *destroy_key_file = NULL; crypt_status_info status; uint32_t flags = 0; unsigned tries; usec_t until; PassphraseType passphrase_type = PASSPHRASE_NONE; int r; /* Arguments: systemd-cryptsetup attach VOLUME SOURCE-DEVICE [KEY-FILE] [CONFIG] */ assert(argc >= 3 && argc <= 5); const char *volume = ASSERT_PTR(argv[1]), *source = ASSERT_PTR(argv[2]), *key_file = argc >= 4 ? mangle_none(argv[3]) : NULL, *config = argc >= 5 ? mangle_none(argv[4]) : NULL; if (!filename_is_valid(volume)) return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Volume name '%s' is not valid.", volume); if (key_file && !path_is_absolute(key_file)) { log_warning("Password file path '%s' is not absolute. Ignoring.", key_file); key_file = NULL; } if (config) { r = parse_crypt_config(config); if (r < 0) return r; } log_debug("%s %s ← %s type=%s cipher=%s", __func__, volume, source, strempty(arg_type), strempty(arg_cipher)); /* A delicious drop of snake oil */ (void) safe_mlockall(MCL_CURRENT|MCL_FUTURE|MCL_ONFAULT); /* Only erase key files explicitly configured on the command line, never the ones we * auto-discover in /etc/cryptsetup-keys.d/ and /run/cryptsetup-keys.d/: those are shared * resources not owned by an individual volume. (key_file is NULL when auto-discovery is used.) */ if (key_file && arg_keyfile_erase) destroy_key_file = key_file; /* let's get this baby erased when we leave */ if (arg_header) { if (streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_TCRYPT)){ log_debug("tcrypt header: %s", arg_header); r = sym_crypt_init_data_device(&cd, arg_header, source); } else { log_debug("LUKS header: %s", arg_header); r = sym_crypt_init(&cd, arg_header); } } else r = sym_crypt_init(&cd, source); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "crypt_init() failed: %m"); cryptsetup_enable_logging(cd); status = sym_crypt_status(cd, volume); if (IN_SET(status, CRYPT_ACTIVE, CRYPT_BUSY)) { log_info("Volume %s already active.", volume); return 0; } flags = determine_flags(); until = usec_add(now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC), arg_timeout); if (until == USEC_INFINITY) until = 0; if (arg_key_size == 0) arg_key_size = 256U / 8U; if (key_file) { struct stat st; /* Ideally we'd do this on the open fd, but since this is just a warning it's OK to do this * in two steps. */ if (stat(key_file, &st) >= 0 && S_ISREG(st.st_mode) && (st.st_mode & 0005)) log_warning("Key file %s is world-readable. This is not a good idea!", key_file); } if (!arg_type || STR_IN_SET(arg_type, ANY_LUKS, CRYPT_LUKS1, CRYPT_LUKS2)) { r = sym_crypt_load(cd, !arg_type || streq(arg_type, ANY_LUKS) ? CRYPT_LUKS : arg_type, NULL); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load LUKS superblock on device %s: %m", sym_crypt_get_device_name(cd)); /* since cryptsetup 2.7.0 (Jan 2024) */ if (arg_link_key_description) { r = sym_crypt_set_keyring_to_link(cd, arg_link_key_description, NULL, arg_link_key_type, arg_link_keyring); if (r == -ENOSYS) log_warning("Loaded libcryptsetup does not support linking volume keys in user specified kernel keyrings upon device activation, ignoring."); else if (r < 0) log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to set keyring or key description to link volume key in, ignoring: %m"); } if (arg_header) { r = sym_crypt_set_data_device(cd, source); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to set LUKS data device %s: %m", source); } /* Tokens are available in LUKS2 only, but it is ok to call (and fail) with LUKS1. */ if (!key_file && use_token_plugins()) { r = crypt_activate_by_token_pin_ask_password( cd, volume, /* type= */ NULL, until, /* userdata= */ NULL, flags, "Please enter LUKS2 token PIN:", "luks2-pin", "cryptsetup.luks2-pin"); if (r >= 0) { log_debug("Volume %s activated with a LUKS token.", volume); return 0; } log_debug_errno(r, "Token activation unsuccessful for device %s: %m", sym_crypt_get_device_name(cd)); } } if (streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_BITLK)) { r = sym_crypt_load(cd, CRYPT_BITLK, NULL); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to load Bitlocker superblock on device %s: %m", sym_crypt_get_device_name(cd)); } bool use_cached_passphrase = true, try_discover_key = !key_file; const char *discovered_key_fn = strjoina(volume, ".key"); _cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords = NULL; for (tries = 0; arg_tries == 0 || tries < arg_tries; tries++) { _cleanup_(iovec_done_erase) struct iovec discovered_key_data = {}; const struct iovec *key_data = NULL; TokenType token_type = determine_token_type(); log_debug("Beginning attempt %u to unlock.", tries); /* When we were able to acquire multiple keys, let's always process them in this order: * * 1. A key acquired via PKCS#11 or FIDO2 token, or TPM2 chip * 2. The configured or discovered key, of which both are exclusive and optional * 3. The empty password, in case arg_try_empty_password is set * 4. We enquire the user for a password */ if (try_discover_key) { r = discover_key(discovered_key_fn, volume, token_type, &discovered_key_data); if (r < 0) return r; if (r > 0) key_data = &discovered_key_data; else try_discover_key = false; } if (token_type < 0 && !key_file && !key_data && !passwords) { /* If we have nothing to try anymore, then acquire a new password */ if (arg_try_empty_password) { /* Hmm, let's try an empty password now, but only once */ arg_try_empty_password = false; key_data = &iovec_empty; } else { /* Ask the user for a passphrase or recovery key only as last resort, if we * have nothing else to check for */ if (passphrase_type == PASSPHRASE_NONE) { passphrase_type = check_registered_passwords(cd); if (passphrase_type == PASSPHRASE_NONE) return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "No passphrase or recovery key registered."); } r = get_password( volume, source, until, /* ignore_cached= */ !use_cached_passphrase || arg_verify, passphrase_type, &passwords); use_cached_passphrase = false; if (r == -EAGAIN) continue; if (r < 0) return r; } } if (streq_ptr(arg_type, CRYPT_TCRYPT)) r = attach_tcrypt(cd, volume, token_type, key_file, key_data, passwords, flags); else r = attach_luks_or_plain_or_bitlk(cd, volume, token_type, key_file, key_data, passwords, flags, until); if (r >= 0) break; if (r != -EAGAIN) return r; /* Key not correct? Let's try again, but let's invalidate one of the passed fields, so that * we fall back to the next best thing. */ if (token_type == TOKEN_TPM2) { arg_tpm2_device = mfree(arg_tpm2_device); arg_tpm2_device_auto = false; continue; } if (token_type == TOKEN_FIDO2) { arg_fido2_device = mfree(arg_fido2_device); arg_fido2_device_auto = false; continue; } if (token_type == TOKEN_PKCS11) { arg_pkcs11_uri = mfree(arg_pkcs11_uri); arg_pkcs11_uri_auto = false; continue; } if (try_discover_key) { try_discover_key = false; continue; } if (key_file) { key_file = NULL; continue; } if (passwords) { passwords = strv_free_erase(passwords); continue; } log_debug("Prepared for next attempt to unlock."); } if (arg_tries != 0 && tries >= arg_tries) return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), "Too many attempts to activate; giving up."); return 0; } VERB(verb_detach, "detach", "VOLUME", 2, 2, 0, "Detach an encrypted block device"); static int verb_detach(int argc, char *argv[], uintptr_t _data, void *userdata) { _cleanup_(crypt_freep) struct crypt_device *cd = NULL; const char *volume = ASSERT_PTR(argv[1]); int r; assert(argc == 2); if (!filename_is_valid(volume)) return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Volume name '%s' is not valid.", volume); r = sym_crypt_init_by_name(&cd, volume); if (r == -ENODEV) { log_info("Volume %s already inactive.", volume); return 0; } if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "crypt_init_by_name() for volume '%s' failed: %m", volume); cryptsetup_enable_logging(cd); r = sym_crypt_deactivate(cd, volume); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to deactivate '%s': %m", volume); return 0; } static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) { int r; log_setup(); umask(0022); char **args = NULL; r = parse_argv(argc, argv, &args); if (r <= 0) return r; r = DLOPEN_CRYPTSETUP(LOG_ERR, SD_ELF_NOTE_DLOPEN_PRIORITY_REQUIRED); if (r < 0) return r; return dispatch_verb(args, NULL); } DEFINE_MAIN_FUNCTION(run);