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crypt_blowfish.c
818 строк
29 KB
Peter Jones
Restructure our includes.
10 мар 2021, 23:54
10 мар 2021, 23:54
f033a1d
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent /* * The crypt_blowfish homepage is: * * http://www.openwall.com/crypt/ * * This code comes from John the Ripper password cracker, with reentrant * and crypt(3) interfaces added, but optimizations specific to password * cracking removed. * * Written by Solar Designer <solar at openwall.com> in 1998-2011. * No copyright is claimed, and the software is hereby placed in the public * domain. In case this attempt to disclaim copyright and place the software * in the public domain is deemed null and void, then the software is * Copyright (c) 1998-2011 Solar Designer and it is hereby released to the * general public under the following terms: * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted. * * There's ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, express or implied. * * It is my intent that you should be able to use this on your system, * as part of a software package, or anywhere else to improve security, * ensure compatibility, or for any other purpose. I would appreciate * it if you give credit where it is due and keep your modifications in * the public domain as well, but I don't require that in order to let * you place this code and any modifications you make under a license * of your choice. * * This implementation is mostly compatible with OpenBSD's bcrypt.c (prefix * "$2a$") by Niels Provos <provos at citi.umich.edu>, and uses some of his * ideas. The password hashing algorithm was designed by David Mazieres * <dm at lcs.mit.edu>. For more information on the level of compatibility, * prefer refer to the comments in BF_set_key() below and to the included * crypt(3) man page. * * There's a paper on the algorithm that explains its design decisions: * * http://www.usenix.org/events/usenix99/provos.html * * Some of the tricks in BF_ROUND might be inspired by Eric Young's * Blowfish library (I can't be sure if I would think of something if I * hadn't seen his code). */ #include "shim.h" typedef unsigned int BF_word; typedef signed int BF_word_signed; /* Number of Blowfish rounds, this is also hardcoded into a few places */ #define BF_N 16 typedef BF_word BF_key[BF_N + 2]; typedef struct { BF_word S[4][0x100]; BF_key P; } BF_ctx; /* * Magic IV for 64 Blowfish encryptions that we do at the end. * The string is "OrpheanBeholderScryDoubt" on big-endian. */ static BF_word BF_magic_w[6] = { 0x4F727068, 0x65616E42, 0x65686F6C, 0x64657253, 0x63727944, 0x6F756274 }; /* * P-box and S-box tables initialized with digits of Pi. */ static BF_ctx BF_init_state = { { { 0xd1310ba6, 0x98dfb5ac, 0x2ffd72db, 0xd01adfb7, 0xb8e1afed, 0x6a267e96, 0xba7c9045, 0xf12c7f99, 0x24a19947, 0xb3916cf7, 0x0801f2e2, 0x858efc16, 0x636920d8, 0x71574e69, 0xa458fea3, 0xf4933d7e, 0x0d95748f, 0x728eb658, 0x718bcd58, 0x82154aee, 0x7b54a41d, 0xc25a59b5, 0x9c30d539, 0x2af26013, 0xc5d1b023, 0x286085f0, 0xca417918, 0xb8db38ef, 0x8e79dcb0, 0x603a180e, 0x6c9e0e8b, 0xb01e8a3e, 0xd71577c1, 0xbd314b27, 0x78af2fda, 0x55605c60, 0xe65525f3, 0xaa55ab94, 0x57489862, 0x63e81440, 0x55ca396a, 0x2aab10b6, 0xb4cc5c34, 0x1141e8ce, 0xa15486af, 0x7c72e993, 0xb3ee1411, 0x636fbc2a, 0x2ba9c55d, 0x741831f6, 0xce5c3e16, 0x9b87931e, 0xafd6ba33, 0x6c24cf5c, 0x7a325381, 0x28958677, 0x3b8f4898, 0x6b4bb9af, 0xc4bfe81b, 0x66282193, 0x61d809cc, 0xfb21a991, 0x487cac60, 0x5dec8032, 0xef845d5d, 0xe98575b1, 0xdc262302, 0xeb651b88, 0x23893e81, 0xd396acc5, 0x0f6d6ff3, 0x83f44239, 0x2e0b4482, 0xa4842004, 0x69c8f04a, 0x9e1f9b5e, 0x21c66842, 0xf6e96c9a, 0x670c9c61, 0xabd388f0, 0x6a51a0d2, 0xd8542f68, 0x960fa728, 0xab5133a3, 0x6eef0b6c, 0x137a3be4, 0xba3bf050, 0x7efb2a98, 0xa1f1651d, 0x39af0176, 0x66ca593e, 0x82430e88, 0x8cee8619, 0x456f9fb4, 0x7d84a5c3, 0x3b8b5ebe, 0xe06f75d8, 0x85c12073, 0x401a449f, 0x56c16aa6, 0x4ed3aa62, 0x363f7706, 0x1bfedf72, 0x429b023d, 0x37d0d724, 0xd00a1248, 0xdb0fead3, 0x49f1c09b, 0x075372c9, 0x80991b7b, 0x25d479d8, 0xf6e8def7, 0xe3fe501a, 0xb6794c3b, 0x976ce0bd, 0x04c006ba, 0xc1a94fb6, 0x409f60c4, 0x5e5c9ec2, 0x196a2463, 0x68fb6faf, 0x3e6c53b5, 0x1339b2eb, 0x3b52ec6f, 0x6dfc511f, 0x9b30952c, 0xcc814544, 0xaf5ebd09, 0xbee3d004, 0xde334afd, 0x660f2807, 0x192e4bb3, 0xc0cba857, 0x45c8740f, 0xd20b5f39, 0xb9d3fbdb, 0x5579c0bd, 0x1a60320a, 0xd6a100c6, 0x402c7279, 0x679f25fe, 0xfb1fa3cc, 0x8ea5e9f8, 0xdb3222f8, 0x3c7516df, 0xfd616b15, 0x2f501ec8, 0xad0552ab, 0x323db5fa, 0xfd238760, 0x53317b48, 0x3e00df82, 0x9e5c57bb, 0xca6f8ca0, 0x1a87562e, 0xdf1769db, 0xd542a8f6, 0x287effc3, 0xac6732c6, 0x8c4f5573, 0x695b27b0, 0xbbca58c8, 0xe1ffa35d, 0xb8f011a0, 0x10fa3d98, 0xfd2183b8, 0x4afcb56c, 0x2dd1d35b, 0x9a53e479, 0xb6f84565, 0xd28e49bc, 0x4bfb9790, 0xe1ddf2da, 0xa4cb7e33, 0x62fb1341, 0xcee4c6e8, 0xef20cada, 0x36774c01, 0xd07e9efe, 0x2bf11fb4, 0x95dbda4d, 0xae909198, 0xeaad8e71, 0x6b93d5a0, 0xd08ed1d0, 0xafc725e0, 0x8e3c5b2f, 0x8e7594b7, 0x8ff6e2fb, 0xf2122b64, 0x8888b812, 0x900df01c, 0x4fad5ea0, 0x688fc31c, 0xd1cff191, 0xb3a8c1ad, 0x2f2f2218, 0xbe0e1777, 0xea752dfe, 0x8b021fa1, 0xe5a0cc0f, 0xb56f74e8, 0x18acf3d6, 0xce89e299, 0xb4a84fe0, 0xfd13e0b7, 0x7cc43b81, 0xd2ada8d9, 0x165fa266, 0x80957705, 0x93cc7314, 0x211a1477, 0xe6ad2065, 0x77b5fa86, 0xc75442f5, 0xfb9d35cf, 0xebcdaf0c, 0x7b3e89a0, 0xd6411bd3, 0xae1e7e49, 0x00250e2d, 0x2071b35e, 0x226800bb, 0x57b8e0af, 0x2464369b, 0xf009b91e, 0x5563911d, 0x59dfa6aa, 0x78c14389, 0xd95a537f, 0x207d5ba2, 0x02e5b9c5, 0x83260376, 0x6295cfa9, 0x11c81968, 0x4e734a41, 0xb3472dca, 0x7b14a94a, 0x1b510052, 0x9a532915, 0xd60f573f, 0xbc9bc6e4, 0x2b60a476, 0x81e67400, 0x08ba6fb5, 0x571be91f, 0xf296ec6b, 0x2a0dd915, 0xb6636521, 0xe7b9f9b6, 0xff34052e, 0xc5855664, 0x53b02d5d, 0xa99f8fa1, 0x08ba4799, 0x6e85076a }, { 0x4b7a70e9, 0xb5b32944, 0xdb75092e, 0xc4192623, 0xad6ea6b0, 0x49a7df7d, 0x9cee60b8, 0x8fedb266, 0xecaa8c71, 0x699a17ff, 0x5664526c, 0xc2b19ee1, 0x193602a5, 0x75094c29, 0xa0591340, 0xe4183a3e, 0x3f54989a, 0x5b429d65, 0x6b8fe4d6, 0x99f73fd6, 0xa1d29c07, 0xefe830f5, 0x4d2d38e6, 0xf0255dc1, 0x4cdd2086, 0x8470eb26, 0x6382e9c6, 0x021ecc5e, 0x09686b3f, 0x3ebaefc9, 0x3c971814, 0x6b6a70a1, 0x687f3584, 0x52a0e286, 0xb79c5305, 0xaa500737, 0x3e07841c, 0x7fdeae5c, 0x8e7d44ec, 0x5716f2b8, 0xb03ada37, 0xf0500c0d, 0xf01c1f04, 0x0200b3ff, 0xae0cf51a, 0x3cb574b2, 0x25837a58, 0xdc0921bd, 0xd19113f9, 0x7ca92ff6, 0x94324773, 0x22f54701, 0x3ae5e581, 0x37c2dadc, 0xc8b57634, 0x9af3dda7, 0xa9446146, 0x0fd0030e, 0xecc8c73e, 0xa4751e41, 0xe238cd99, 0x3bea0e2f, 0x3280bba1, 0x183eb331, 0x4e548b38, 0x4f6db908, 0x6f420d03, 0xf60a04bf, 0x2cb81290, 0x24977c79, 0x5679b072, 0xbcaf89af, 0xde9a771f, 0xd9930810, 0xb38bae12, 0xdccf3f2e, 0x5512721f, 0x2e6b7124, 0x501adde6, 0x9f84cd87, 0x7a584718, 0x7408da17, 0xbc9f9abc, 0xe94b7d8c, 0xec7aec3a, 0xdb851dfa, 0x63094366, 0xc464c3d2, 0xef1c1847, 0x3215d908, 0xdd433b37, 0x24c2ba16, 0x12a14d43, 0x2a65c451, 0x50940002, 0x133ae4dd, 0x71dff89e, 0x10314e55, 0x81ac77d6, 0x5f11199b, 0x043556f1, 0xd7a3c76b, 0x3c11183b, 0x5924a509, 0xf28fe6ed, 0x97f1fbfa, 0x9ebabf2c, 0x1e153c6e, 0x86e34570, 0xeae96fb1, 0x860e5e0a, 0x5a3e2ab3, 0x771fe71c, 0x4e3d06fa, 0x2965dcb9, 0x99e71d0f, 0x803e89d6, 0x5266c825, 0x2e4cc978, 0x9c10b36a, 0xc6150eba, 0x94e2ea78, 0xa5fc3c53, 0x1e0a2df4, 0xf2f74ea7, 0x361d2b3d, 0x1939260f, 0x19c27960, 0x5223a708, 0xf71312b6, 0xebadfe6e, 0xeac31f66, 0xe3bc4595, 0xa67bc883, 0xb17f37d1, 0x018cff28, 0xc332ddef, 0xbe6c5aa5, 0x65582185, 0x68ab9802, 0xeecea50f, 0xdb2f953b, 0x2aef7dad, 0x5b6e2f84, 0x1521b628, 0x29076170, 0xecdd4775, 0x619f1510, 0x13cca830, 0xeb61bd96, 0x0334fe1e, 0xaa0363cf, 0xb5735c90, 0x4c70a239, 0xd59e9e0b, 0xcbaade14, 0xeecc86bc, 0x60622ca7, 0x9cab5cab, 0xb2f3846e, 0x648b1eaf, 0x19bdf0ca, 0xa02369b9, 0x655abb50, 0x40685a32, 0x3c2ab4b3, 0x319ee9d5, 0xc021b8f7, 0x9b540b19, 0x875fa099, 0x95f7997e, 0x623d7da8, 0xf837889a, 0x97e32d77, 0x11ed935f, 0x16681281, 0x0e358829, 0xc7e61fd6, 0x96dedfa1, 0x7858ba99, 0x57f584a5, 0x1b227263, 0x9b83c3ff, 0x1ac24696, 0xcdb30aeb, 0x532e3054, 0x8fd948e4, 0x6dbc3128, 0x58ebf2ef, 0x34c6ffea, 0xfe28ed61, 0xee7c3c73, 0x5d4a14d9, 0xe864b7e3, 0x42105d14, 0x203e13e0, 0x45eee2b6, 0xa3aaabea, 0xdb6c4f15, 0xfacb4fd0, 0xc742f442, 0xef6abbb5, 0x654f3b1d, 0x41cd2105, 0xd81e799e, 0x86854dc7, 0xe44b476a, 0x3d816250, 0xcf62a1f2, 0x5b8d2646, 0xfc8883a0, 0xc1c7b6a3, 0x7f1524c3, 0x69cb7492, 0x47848a0b, 0x5692b285, 0x095bbf00, 0xad19489d, 0x1462b174, 0x23820e00, 0x58428d2a, 0x0c55f5ea, 0x1dadf43e, 0x233f7061, 0x3372f092, 0x8d937e41, 0xd65fecf1, 0x6c223bdb, 0x7cde3759, 0xcbee7460, 0x4085f2a7, 0xce77326e, 0xa6078084, 0x19f8509e, 0xe8efd855, 0x61d99735, 0xa969a7aa, 0xc50c06c2, 0x5a04abfc, 0x800bcadc, 0x9e447a2e, 0xc3453484, 0xfdd56705, 0x0e1e9ec9, 0xdb73dbd3, 0x105588cd, 0x675fda79, 0xe3674340, 0xc5c43465, 0x713e38d8, 0x3d28f89e, 0xf16dff20, 0x153e21e7, 0x8fb03d4a, 0xe6e39f2b, 0xdb83adf7 }, { 0xe93d5a68, 0x948140f7, 0xf64c261c, 0x94692934, 0x411520f7, 0x7602d4f7, 0xbcf46b2e, 0xd4a20068, 0xd4082471, 0x3320f46a, 0x43b7d4b7, 0x500061af, 0x1e39f62e, 0x97244546, 0x14214f74, 0xbf8b8840, 0x4d95fc1d, 0x96b591af, 0x70f4ddd3, 0x66a02f45, 0xbfbc09ec, 0x03bd9785, 0x7fac6dd0, 0x31cb8504, 0x96eb27b3, 0x55fd3941, 0xda2547e6, 0xabca0a9a, 0x28507825, 0x530429f4, 0x0a2c86da, 0xe9b66dfb, 0x68dc1462, 0xd7486900, 0x680ec0a4, 0x27a18dee, 0x4f3ffea2, 0xe887ad8c, 0xb58ce006, 0x7af4d6b6, 0xaace1e7c, 0xd3375fec, 0xce78a399, 0x406b2a42, 0x20fe9e35, 0xd9f385b9, 0xee39d7ab, 0x3b124e8b, 0x1dc9faf7, 0x4b6d1856, 0x26a36631, 0xeae397b2, 0x3a6efa74, 0xdd5b4332, 0x6841e7f7, 0xca7820fb, 0xfb0af54e, 0xd8feb397, 0x454056ac, 0xba489527, 0x55533a3a, 0x20838d87, 0xfe6ba9b7, 0xd096954b, 0x55a867bc, 0xa1159a58, 0xcca92963, 0x99e1db33, 0xa62a4a56, 0x3f3125f9, 0x5ef47e1c, 0x9029317c, 0xfdf8e802, 0x04272f70, 0x80bb155c, 0x05282ce3, 0x95c11548, 0xe4c66d22, 0x48c1133f, 0xc70f86dc, 0x07f9c9ee, 0x41041f0f, 0x404779a4, 0x5d886e17, 0x325f51eb, 0xd59bc0d1, 0xf2bcc18f, 0x41113564, 0x257b7834, 0x602a9c60, 0xdff8e8a3, 0x1f636c1b, 0x0e12b4c2, 0x02e1329e, 0xaf664fd1, 0xcad18115, 0x6b2395e0, 0x333e92e1, 0x3b240b62, 0xeebeb922, 0x85b2a20e, 0xe6ba0d99, 0xde720c8c, 0x2da2f728, 0xd0127845, 0x95b794fd, 0x647d0862, 0xe7ccf5f0, 0x5449a36f, 0x877d48fa, 0xc39dfd27, 0xf33e8d1e, 0x0a476341, 0x992eff74, 0x3a6f6eab, 0xf4f8fd37, 0xa812dc60, 0xa1ebddf8, 0x991be14c, 0xdb6e6b0d, 0xc67b5510, 0x6d672c37, 0x2765d43b, 0xdcd0e804, 0xf1290dc7, 0xcc00ffa3, 0xb5390f92, 0x690fed0b, 0x667b9ffb, 0xcedb7d9c, 0xa091cf0b, 0xd9155ea3, 0xbb132f88, 0x515bad24, 0x7b9479bf, 0x763bd6eb, 0x37392eb3, 0xcc115979, 0x8026e297, 0xf42e312d, 0x6842ada7, 0xc66a2b3b, 0x12754ccc, 0x782ef11c, 0x6a124237, 0xb79251e7, 0x06a1bbe6, 0x4bfb6350, 0x1a6b1018, 0x11caedfa, 0x3d25bdd8, 0xe2e1c3c9, 0x44421659, 0x0a121386, 0xd90cec6e, 0xd5abea2a, 0x64af674e, 0xda86a85f, 0xbebfe988, 0x64e4c3fe, 0x9dbc8057, 0xf0f7c086, 0x60787bf8, 0x6003604d, 0xd1fd8346, 0xf6381fb0, 0x7745ae04, 0xd736fccc, 0x83426b33, 0xf01eab71, 0xb0804187, 0x3c005e5f, 0x77a057be, 0xbde8ae24, 0x55464299, 0xbf582e61, 0x4e58f48f, 0xf2ddfda2, 0xf474ef38, 0x8789bdc2, 0x5366f9c3, 0xc8b38e74, 0xb475f255, 0x46fcd9b9, 0x7aeb2661, 0x8b1ddf84, 0x846a0e79, 0x915f95e2, 0x466e598e, 0x20b45770, 0x8cd55591, 0xc902de4c, 0xb90bace1, 0xbb8205d0, 0x11a86248, 0x7574a99e, 0xb77f19b6, 0xe0a9dc09, 0x662d09a1, 0xc4324633, 0xe85a1f02, 0x09f0be8c, 0x4a99a025, 0x1d6efe10, 0x1ab93d1d, 0x0ba5a4df, 0xa186f20f, 0x2868f169, 0xdcb7da83, 0x573906fe, 0xa1e2ce9b, 0x4fcd7f52, 0x50115e01, 0xa70683fa, 0xa002b5c4, 0x0de6d027, 0x9af88c27, 0x773f8641, 0xc3604c06, 0x61a806b5, 0xf0177a28, 0xc0f586e0, 0x006058aa, 0x30dc7d62, 0x11e69ed7, 0x2338ea63, 0x53c2dd94, 0xc2c21634, 0xbbcbee56, 0x90bcb6de, 0xebfc7da1, 0xce591d76, 0x6f05e409, 0x4b7c0188, 0x39720a3d, 0x7c927c24, 0x86e3725f, 0x724d9db9, 0x1ac15bb4, 0xd39eb8fc, 0xed545578, 0x08fca5b5, 0xd83d7cd3, 0x4dad0fc4, 0x1e50ef5e, 0xb161e6f8, 0xa28514d9, 0x6c51133c, 0x6fd5c7e7, 0x56e14ec4, 0x362abfce, 0xddc6c837, 0xd79a3234, 0x92638212, 0x670efa8e, 0x406000e0 }, { 0x3a39ce37, 0xd3faf5cf, 0xabc27737, 0x5ac52d1b, 0x5cb0679e, 0x4fa33742, 0xd3822740, 0x99bc9bbe, 0xd5118e9d, 0xbf0f7315, 0xd62d1c7e, 0xc700c47b, 0xb78c1b6b, 0x21a19045, 0xb26eb1be, 0x6a366eb4, 0x5748ab2f, 0xbc946e79, 0xc6a376d2, 0x6549c2c8, 0x530ff8ee, 0x468dde7d, 0xd5730a1d, 0x4cd04dc6, 0x2939bbdb, 0xa9ba4650, 0xac9526e8, 0xbe5ee304, 0xa1fad5f0, 0x6a2d519a, 0x63ef8ce2, 0x9a86ee22, 0xc089c2b8, 0x43242ef6, 0xa51e03aa, 0x9cf2d0a4, 0x83c061ba, 0x9be96a4d, 0x8fe51550, 0xba645bd6, 0x2826a2f9, 0xa73a3ae1, 0x4ba99586, 0xef5562e9, 0xc72fefd3, 0xf752f7da, 0x3f046f69, 0x77fa0a59, 0x80e4a915, 0x87b08601, 0x9b09e6ad, 0x3b3ee593, 0xe990fd5a, 0x9e34d797, 0x2cf0b7d9, 0x022b8b51, 0x96d5ac3a, 0x017da67d, 0xd1cf3ed6, 0x7c7d2d28, 0x1f9f25cf, 0xadf2b89b, 0x5ad6b472, 0x5a88f54c, 0xe029ac71, 0xe019a5e6, 0x47b0acfd, 0xed93fa9b, 0xe8d3c48d, 0x283b57cc, 0xf8d56629, 0x79132e28, 0x785f0191, 0xed756055, 0xf7960e44, 0xe3d35e8c, 0x15056dd4, 0x88f46dba, 0x03a16125, 0x0564f0bd, 0xc3eb9e15, 0x3c9057a2, 0x97271aec, 0xa93a072a, 0x1b3f6d9b, 0x1e6321f5, 0xf59c66fb, 0x26dcf319, 0x7533d928, 0xb155fdf5, 0x03563482, 0x8aba3cbb, 0x28517711, 0xc20ad9f8, 0xabcc5167, 0xccad925f, 0x4de81751, 0x3830dc8e, 0x379d5862, 0x9320f991, 0xea7a90c2, 0xfb3e7bce, 0x5121ce64, 0x774fbe32, 0xa8b6e37e, 0xc3293d46, 0x48de5369, 0x6413e680, 0xa2ae0810, 0xdd6db224, 0x69852dfd, 0x09072166, 0xb39a460a, 0x6445c0dd, 0x586cdecf, 0x1c20c8ae, 0x5bbef7dd, 0x1b588d40, 0xccd2017f, 0x6bb4e3bb, 0xdda26a7e, 0x3a59ff45, 0x3e350a44, 0xbcb4cdd5, 0x72eacea8, 0xfa6484bb, 0x8d6612ae, 0xbf3c6f47, 0xd29be463, 0x542f5d9e, 0xaec2771b, 0xf64e6370, 0x740e0d8d, 0xe75b1357, 0xf8721671, 0xaf537d5d, 0x4040cb08, 0x4eb4e2cc, 0x34d2466a, 0x0115af84, 0xe1b00428, 0x95983a1d, 0x06b89fb4, 0xce6ea048, 0x6f3f3b82, 0x3520ab82, 0x011a1d4b, 0x277227f8, 0x611560b1, 0xe7933fdc, 0xbb3a792b, 0x344525bd, 0xa08839e1, 0x51ce794b, 0x2f32c9b7, 0xa01fbac9, 0xe01cc87e, 0xbcc7d1f6, 0xcf0111c3, 0xa1e8aac7, 0x1a908749, 0xd44fbd9a, 0xd0dadecb, 0xd50ada38, 0x0339c32a, 0xc6913667, 0x8df9317c, 0xe0b12b4f, 0xf79e59b7, 0x43f5bb3a, 0xf2d519ff, 0x27d9459c, 0xbf97222c, 0x15e6fc2a, 0x0f91fc71, 0x9b941525, 0xfae59361, 0xceb69ceb, 0xc2a86459, 0x12baa8d1, 0xb6c1075e, 0xe3056a0c, 0x10d25065, 0xcb03a442, 0xe0ec6e0e, 0x1698db3b, 0x4c98a0be, 0x3278e964, 0x9f1f9532, 0xe0d392df, 0xd3a0342b, 0x8971f21e, 0x1b0a7441, 0x4ba3348c, 0xc5be7120, 0xc37632d8, 0xdf359f8d, 0x9b992f2e, 0xe60b6f47, 0x0fe3f11d, 0xe54cda54, 0x1edad891, 0xce6279cf, 0xcd3e7e6f, 0x1618b166, 0xfd2c1d05, 0x848fd2c5, 0xf6fb2299, 0xf523f357, 0xa6327623, 0x93a83531, 0x56cccd02, 0xacf08162, 0x5a75ebb5, 0x6e163697, 0x88d273cc, 0xde966292, 0x81b949d0, 0x4c50901b, 0x71c65614, 0xe6c6c7bd, 0x327a140a, 0x45e1d006, 0xc3f27b9a, 0xc9aa53fd, 0x62a80f00, 0xbb25bfe2, 0x35bdd2f6, 0x71126905, 0xb2040222, 0xb6cbcf7c, 0xcd769c2b, 0x53113ec0, 0x1640e3d3, 0x38abbd60, 0x2547adf0, 0xba38209c, 0xf746ce76, 0x77afa1c5, 0x20756060, 0x85cbfe4e, 0x8ae88dd8, 0x7aaaf9b0, 0x4cf9aa7e, 0x1948c25c, 0x02fb8a8c, 0x01c36ae4, 0xd6ebe1f9, 0x90d4f869, 0xa65cdea0, 0x3f09252d, 0xc208e69f, 0xb74e6132, 0xce77e25b, 0x578fdfe3, 0x3ac372e6 } }, { 0x243f6a88, 0x85a308d3, 0x13198a2e, 0x03707344, 0xa4093822, 0x299f31d0, 0x082efa98, 0xec4e6c89, 0x452821e6, 0x38d01377, 0xbe5466cf, 0x34e90c6c, 0xc0ac29b7, 0xc97c50dd, 0x3f84d5b5, 0xb5470917, 0x9216d5d9, 0x8979fb1b } }; static unsigned char BF_itoa64[64 + 1] = "./ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"; static unsigned char BF_atoi64[0x60] = { 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 0, 1, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 64, 64, 64, 64, 64 }; #define BF_safe_atoi64(dst, src) \ { \ tmp = (unsigned char)(src); \ if ((unsigned int)(tmp -= 0x20) >= 0x60) return -1; \ tmp = BF_atoi64[tmp]; \ if (tmp > 63) return -1; \ (dst) = tmp; \ } static int BF_decode(BF_word *dst, const char *src, int size) { unsigned char *dptr = (unsigned char *)dst; unsigned char *end = dptr + size; const unsigned char *sptr = (const unsigned char *)src; unsigned int tmp, c1, c2, c3, c4; do { BF_safe_atoi64(c1, *sptr++); BF_safe_atoi64(c2, *sptr++); *dptr++ = (c1 << 2) | ((c2 & 0x30) >> 4); if (dptr >= end) break; BF_safe_atoi64(c3, *sptr++); *dptr++ = ((c2 & 0x0F) << 4) | ((c3 & 0x3C) >> 2); if (dptr >= end) break; BF_safe_atoi64(c4, *sptr++); *dptr++ = ((c3 & 0x03) << 6) | c4; } while (dptr < end); return 0; } static void BF_encode(char *dst, const BF_word *src, int size) { const unsigned char *sptr = (const unsigned char *)src; const unsigned char *end = sptr + size; unsigned char *dptr = (unsigned char *)dst; unsigned int c1, c2; do { c1 = *sptr++; *dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1 >> 2]; c1 = (c1 & 0x03) << 4; if (sptr >= end) { *dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1]; break; } c2 = *sptr++; c1 |= c2 >> 4; *dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1]; c1 = (c2 & 0x0f) << 2; if (sptr >= end) { *dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1]; break; } c2 = *sptr++; c1 |= c2 >> 6; *dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c1]; *dptr++ = BF_itoa64[c2 & 0x3f]; } while (sptr < end); } static void BF_swap(BF_word *x, int count) { static int endianness_check = 1; char *is_little_endian = (char *)&endianness_check; BF_word tmp; if (*is_little_endian) do { tmp = *x; tmp = (tmp << 16) | (tmp >> 16); *x++ = ((tmp & 0x00FF00FF) << 8) | ((tmp >> 8) & 0x00FF00FF); } while (--count); } /* Architectures which can shift addresses left by 2 bits with no extra cost */ #define BF_ROUND(L, R, N) \ tmp1 = L & 0xFF; \ tmp2 = L >> 8; \ tmp2 &= 0xFF; \ tmp3 = L >> 16; \ tmp3 &= 0xFF; \ tmp4 = L >> 24; \ tmp1 = data.ctx.S[3][tmp1]; \ tmp2 = data.ctx.S[2][tmp2]; \ tmp3 = data.ctx.S[1][tmp3]; \ tmp3 += data.ctx.S[0][tmp4]; \ tmp3 ^= tmp2; \ R ^= data.ctx.P[N + 1]; \ tmp3 += tmp1; \ R ^= tmp3; /* * Encrypt one block, BF_N is hardcoded here. */ #define BF_ENCRYPT \ L ^= data.ctx.P[0]; \ BF_ROUND(L, R, 0); \ BF_ROUND(R, L, 1); \ BF_ROUND(L, R, 2); \ BF_ROUND(R, L, 3); \ BF_ROUND(L, R, 4); \ BF_ROUND(R, L, 5); \ BF_ROUND(L, R, 6); \ BF_ROUND(R, L, 7); \ BF_ROUND(L, R, 8); \ BF_ROUND(R, L, 9); \ BF_ROUND(L, R, 10); \ BF_ROUND(R, L, 11); \ BF_ROUND(L, R, 12); \ BF_ROUND(R, L, 13); \ BF_ROUND(L, R, 14); \ BF_ROUND(R, L, 15); \ tmp4 = R; \ R = L; \ L = tmp4 ^ data.ctx.P[BF_N + 1]; #define BF_body() \ L = R = 0; \ ptr = data.ctx.P; \ do { \ ptr += 2; \ BF_ENCRYPT; \ *(ptr - 2) = L; \ *(ptr - 1) = R; \ } while (ptr < &data.ctx.P[BF_N + 2]); \ \ ptr = data.ctx.S[0]; \ do { \ ptr += 2; \ BF_ENCRYPT; \ *(ptr - 2) = L; \ *(ptr - 1) = R; \ } while (ptr < &data.ctx.S[3][0xFF]); static void BF_set_key(const char *key, BF_key expanded, BF_key initial, unsigned char flags) { const char *ptr = key; unsigned int bug, i, j; BF_word safety, sign, diff, tmp[2]; /* * There was a sign extension bug in older revisions of this function. While * we would have liked to simply fix the bug and move on, we have to provide * a backwards compatibility feature (essentially the bug) for some systems and * a safety measure for some others. The latter is needed because for certain * multiple inputs to the buggy algorithm there exist easily found inputs to * the correct algorithm that produce the same hash. Thus, we optionally * deviate from the correct algorithm just enough to avoid such collisions. * While the bug itself affected the majority of passwords containing * characters with the 8th bit set (although only a percentage of those in a * collision-producing way), the anti-collision safety measure affects * only a subset of passwords containing the '\xff' character (not even all of * those passwords, just some of them). This character is not found in valid * UTF-8 sequences and is rarely used in popular 8-bit character encodings. * Thus, the safety measure is unlikely to cause much annoyance, and is a * reasonable tradeoff to use when authenticating against existing hashes that * are not reliably known to have been computed with the correct algorithm. * * We use an approach that tries to minimize side-channel leaks of password * information - that is, we mostly use fixed-cost bitwise operations instead * of branches or table lookups. (One conditional branch based on password * length remains. It is not part of the bug aftermath, though, and is * difficult and possibly unreasonable to avoid given the use of C strings by * the caller, which results in similar timing leaks anyway.) * * For actual implementation, we set an array index in the variable "bug" * (0 means no bug, 1 means sign extension bug emulation) and a flag in the * variable "safety" (bit 16 is set when the safety measure is requested). * Valid combinations of settings are: * * Prefix "$2a$": bug = 0, safety = 0x10000 * Prefix "$2x$": bug = 1, safety = 0 * Prefix "$2y$": bug = 0, safety = 0 */ bug = (unsigned int)flags & 1; safety = ((BF_word)flags & 2) << 15; sign = diff = 0; for (i = 0; i < BF_N + 2; i++) { tmp[0] = tmp[1] = 0; for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) { tmp[0] <<= 8; tmp[0] |= (unsigned char)*ptr; /* correct */ tmp[1] <<= 8; tmp[1] |= (BF_word_signed)(signed char)*ptr; /* bug */ /* * Sign extension in the first char has no effect - nothing to overwrite yet, * and those extra 24 bits will be fully shifted out of the 32-bit word. For * chars 2, 3, 4 in each four-char block, we set bit 7 of "sign" if sign * extension in tmp[1] occurs. Once this flag is set, it remains set. */ if (j) sign |= tmp[1] & 0x80; if (!*ptr) ptr = key; else ptr++; } diff |= tmp[0] ^ tmp[1]; /* Non-zero on any differences */ expanded[i] = tmp[bug]; initial[i] = BF_init_state.P[i] ^ tmp[bug]; } /* * At this point, "diff" is zero iff the correct and buggy algorithms produced * exactly the same result. If so and if "sign" is non-zero, which indicates * that there was a non-benign sign extension, this means that we have a * collision between the correctly computed hash for this password and a set of * passwords that could be supplied to the buggy algorithm. Our safety measure * is meant to protect from such many-buggy to one-correct collisions, by * deviating from the correct algorithm in such cases. Let's check for this. */ diff |= diff >> 16; /* still zero iff exact match */ diff &= 0xffff; /* ditto */ diff += 0xffff; /* bit 16 set iff "diff" was non-zero (on non-match) */ sign <<= 9; /* move the non-benign sign extension flag to bit 16 */ sign &= ~diff & safety; /* action needed? */ /* * If we have determined that we need to deviate from the correct algorithm, * flip bit 16 in initial expanded key. (The choice of 16 is arbitrary, but * let's stick to it now. It came out of the approach we used above, and it's * not any worse than any other choice we could make.) * * It is crucial that we don't do the same to the expanded key used in the main * Eksblowfish loop. By doing it to only one of these two, we deviate from a * state that could be directly specified by a password to the buggy algorithm * (and to the fully correct one as well, but that's a side-effect). */ initial[0] ^= sign; } static char *BF_crypt(const char *key, const char *setting, char *output, int size, BF_word min) { static const unsigned char flags_by_subtype[26] = {2, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 4, 0}; struct { BF_ctx ctx; BF_key expanded_key; union { BF_word salt[4]; BF_word output[6]; } binary; } data; BF_word L, R; BF_word tmp1, tmp2, tmp3, tmp4; BF_word *ptr; BF_word count; int i; if (size < 7 + 22 + 31 + 1) { return NULL; } if (setting[0] != '$' || setting[1] != '2' || setting[2] < 'a' || setting[2] > 'z' || !flags_by_subtype[(unsigned int)(unsigned char)setting[2] - 'a'] || setting[3] != '$' || setting[4] < '0' || setting[4] > '3' || setting[5] < '0' || setting[5] > '9' || (setting[4] == '3' && setting[5] > '1') || setting[6] != '$') { return NULL; } count = (BF_word)1 << ((setting[4] - '0') * 10 + (setting[5] - '0')); if (count < min || BF_decode(data.binary.salt, &setting[7], 16)) { return NULL; } BF_swap(data.binary.salt, 4); BF_set_key(key, data.expanded_key, data.ctx.P, flags_by_subtype[(unsigned int)(unsigned char)setting[2] - 'a']); CopyMem(data.ctx.S, BF_init_state.S, sizeof(data.ctx.S)); L = R = 0; for (i = 0; i < BF_N + 2; i += 2) { L ^= data.binary.salt[i & 2]; R ^= data.binary.salt[(i & 2) + 1]; BF_ENCRYPT; data.ctx.P[i] = L; data.ctx.P[i + 1] = R; } ptr = data.ctx.S[0]; do { ptr += 4; L ^= data.binary.salt[(BF_N + 2) & 3]; R ^= data.binary.salt[(BF_N + 3) & 3]; BF_ENCRYPT; *(ptr - 4) = L; *(ptr - 3) = R; L ^= data.binary.salt[(BF_N + 4) & 3]; R ^= data.binary.salt[(BF_N + 5) & 3]; BF_ENCRYPT; *(ptr - 2) = L; *(ptr - 1) = R; } while (ptr < &data.ctx.S[3][0xFF]); do { int done; for (i = 0; i < BF_N + 2; i += 2) { data.ctx.P[i] ^= data.expanded_key[i]; data.ctx.P[i + 1] ^= data.expanded_key[i + 1]; } done = 0; do { BF_body(); if (done) break; done = 1; tmp1 = data.binary.salt[0]; tmp2 = data.binary.salt[1]; tmp3 = data.binary.salt[2]; tmp4 = data.binary.salt[3]; for (i = 0; i < BF_N; i += 4) { data.ctx.P[i] ^= tmp1; data.ctx.P[i + 1] ^= tmp2; data.ctx.P[i + 2] ^= tmp3; data.ctx.P[i + 3] ^= tmp4; } data.ctx.P[16] ^= tmp1; data.ctx.P[17] ^= tmp2; } while (1); } while (--count); for (i = 0; i < 6; i += 2) { L = BF_magic_w[i]; R = BF_magic_w[i + 1]; count = 64; do { BF_ENCRYPT; } while (--count); data.binary.output[i] = L; data.binary.output[i + 1] = R; } CopyMem(output, (void *)setting, 7 + 22 - 1); output[7 + 22 - 1] = BF_itoa64[(int) BF_atoi64[(int)setting[7 + 22 - 1] - 0x20] & 0x30]; /* This has to be bug-compatible with the original implementation, so * only encode 23 of the 24 bytes. :-) */ BF_swap(data.binary.output, 6); BF_encode(&output[7 + 22], data.binary.output, 23); output[7 + 22 + 31] = '\0'; return output; } int _crypt_output_magic(const char *setting, char *output, int size) { if (size < 3) return -1; output[0] = '*'; output[1] = '0'; output[2] = '\0'; if (setting[0] == '*' && setting[1] == '0') output[1] = '1'; return 0; } /* * Please preserve the runtime self-test. It serves two purposes at once: * * 1. We really can't afford the risk of producing incompatible hashes e.g. * when there's something like gcc bug 26587 again, whereas an application or * library integrating this code might not also integrate our external tests or * it might not run them after every build. Even if it does, the miscompile * might only occur on the production build, but not on a testing build (such * as because of different optimization settings). It is painful to recover * from incorrectly-computed hashes - merely fixing whatever broke is not * enough. Thus, a proactive measure like this self-test is needed. * * 2. We don't want to leave sensitive data from our actual password hash * computation on the stack or in registers. Previous revisions of the code * would do explicit cleanups, but simply running the self-test after hash * computation is more reliable. * * The performance cost of this quick self-test is around 0.6% at the "$2a$08" * setting. */ char *crypt_blowfish_rn(const char *key, const char *setting, char *output, int size) { const char *test_key = "8b \xd0\xc1\xd2\xcf\xcc\xd8"; const char *test_setting = "$2a$00$abcdefghijklmnopqrstuu"; static const char * const test_hash[2] = {"VUrPmXD6q/nVSSp7pNDhCR9071IfIRe\0\x55", /* $2x$ */ "i1D709vfamulimlGcq0qq3UvuUasvEa\0\x55"}; /* $2a$, $2y$ */ char *retval; const char *p; int ok; struct { char s[7 + 22 + 1]; char o[7 + 22 + 31 + 1 + 1 + 1]; } buf; /* Hash the supplied password */ _crypt_output_magic(setting, output, size); retval = BF_crypt(key, setting, output, size, 16); /* * Do a quick self-test. It is important that we make both calls to BF_crypt() * from the same scope such that they likely use the same stack locations, * which makes the second call overwrite the first call's sensitive data on the * stack and makes it more likely that any alignment related issues would be * detected by the self-test. */ CopyMem(buf.s, (void *)test_setting, sizeof(buf.s)); if (retval) buf.s[2] = setting[2]; SetMem(buf.o, sizeof(buf.o), 0x55); buf.o[sizeof(buf.o) - 1] = 0; p = BF_crypt(test_key, buf.s, buf.o, sizeof(buf.o) - (1 + 1), 1); ok = (p == buf.o && !CompareMem((void *)p, (void *)buf.s, 7 + 22) && !CompareMem((void *)(p + (7 + 22)), (void *)test_hash[(unsigned int)(unsigned char)buf.s[2] & 1], 31 + 1 + 1 + 1)); { const char *k = "\xff\xa3" "34" "\xff\xff\xff\xa3" "345"; BF_key ae, ai, ye, yi; BF_set_key(k, ae, ai, 2); /* $2a$ */ BF_set_key(k, ye, yi, 4); /* $2y$ */ ai[0] ^= 0x10000; /* undo the safety (for comparison) */ ok = ok && ai[0] == 0xdb9c59bc && ye[17] == 0x33343500 && !CompareMem(ae, ye, sizeof(ae)) && !CompareMem(ai, yi, sizeof(ai)); } if (ok) return retval; /* Should not happen */ _crypt_output_magic(setting, output, size); return NULL; }