src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c - master - githubmirror/postgres

src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c
1 503 строки45 KB
Nathan Bossart
Use value of scram_iterations in mock_scram_secret().
10 авг 2026, 16:37
10 авг 2026, 16:37feb8b01
/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
 *
 * auth-scram.c
 *	  Server-side implementation of the SASL SCRAM-SHA-256 mechanism.
 *
 * See the following RFCs for more details:
 * - RFC 5802: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5802
 * - RFC 5803: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5803
 * - RFC 7677: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7677
 *
 * Here are some differences:
 *
 * - Username from the authentication exchange is not used. The client
 *	 should send an empty string as the username.
 *
 * - If the password isn't valid UTF-8, or contains characters prohibited
 *	 by the SASLprep profile, we skip the SASLprep pre-processing and use
 *	 the raw bytes in calculating the hash.
 *
 * - If channel binding is used, the channel binding type is always
 *	 "tls-server-end-point".  The spec says the default is "tls-unique"
 *	 (RFC 5802, section 6.1. Default Channel Binding), but there are some
 *	 problems with that.  Firstly, not all SSL libraries provide an API to
 *	 get the TLS Finished message, required to use "tls-unique".  Secondly,
 *	 "tls-unique" is not specified for TLS v1.3, and as of this writing,
 *	 it's not clear if there will be a replacement.  We could support both
 *	 "tls-server-end-point" and "tls-unique", but for our use case,
 *	 "tls-unique" doesn't really have any advantages.  The main advantage
 *	 of "tls-unique" would be that it works even if the server doesn't
 *	 have a certificate, but PostgreSQL requires a server certificate
 *	 whenever SSL is used, anyway.
 *
 *
 * The password stored in pg_authid consists of the iteration count, salt,
 * StoredKey and ServerKey.
 *
 * SASLprep usage
 * --------------
 *
 * One notable difference to the SCRAM specification is that while the
 * specification dictates that the password is in UTF-8, and prohibits
 * certain characters, we are more lenient.  If the password isn't a valid
 * UTF-8 string, or contains prohibited characters, the raw bytes are used
 * to calculate the hash instead, without SASLprep processing.  This is
 * because PostgreSQL supports other encodings too, and the encoding being
 * used during authentication is undefined (client_encoding isn't set until
 * after authentication).  In effect, we try to interpret the password as
 * UTF-8 and apply SASLprep processing, but if it looks invalid, we assume
 * that it's in some other encoding.
 *
 * In the worst case, we misinterpret a password that's in a different
 * encoding as being Unicode, because it happens to consists entirely of
 * valid UTF-8 bytes, and we apply Unicode normalization to it.  As long
 * as we do that consistently, that will not lead to failed logins.
 * Fortunately, the UTF-8 byte sequences that are ignored by SASLprep
 * don't correspond to any commonly used characters in any of the other
 * supported encodings, so it should not lead to any significant loss in
 * entropy, even if the normalization is incorrectly applied to a
 * non-UTF-8 password.
 *
 * Error handling
 * --------------
 *
 * Don't reveal user information to an unauthenticated client.  We don't
 * want an attacker to be able to probe whether a particular username is
 * valid.  In SCRAM, the server has to read the salt and iteration count
 * from the user's stored secret, and send it to the client.  To avoid
 * revealing whether a user exists, when the client tries to authenticate
 * with a username that doesn't exist, or doesn't have a valid SCRAM
 * secret in pg_authid, we create a fake salt and iteration count
 * on-the-fly, and proceed with the authentication with that.  In the end,
 * we'll reject the attempt, as if an incorrect password was given.  When
 * we are performing a "mock" authentication, the 'doomed' flag in
 * scram_state is set.
 *
 * In the error messages, avoid printing strings from the client, unless
 * you check that they are pure ASCII.  We don't want an unauthenticated
 * attacker to be able to spam the logs with characters that are not valid
 * to the encoding being used, whatever that is.  We cannot avoid that in
 * general, after logging in, but let's do what we can here.
 *
 *
 * Portions Copyright (c) 1996-2026, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
 * Portions Copyright (c) 1994, Regents of the University of California
 *
 * src/backend/libpq/auth-scram.c
 *
 *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
 */
#include "postgres.h"

#include <unistd.h>

#include "access/xlog.h"
#include "catalog/pg_control.h"
#include "common/base64.h"
#include "common/hmac.h"
#include "common/saslprep.h"
#include "common/scram-common.h"
#include "common/sha2.h"
#include "libpq/crypt.h"
#include "libpq/sasl.h"
#include "libpq/scram.h"
#include "miscadmin.h"

static void scram_get_mechanisms(Port *port, StringInfo buf);
static void *scram_init(Port *port, const char *selected_mech,
						const char *shadow_pass);
static int	scram_exchange(void *opaq, const char *input, int inputlen,
						   char **output, int *outputlen,
						   const char **logdetail);

/* Mechanism declaration */
const pg_be_sasl_mech pg_be_scram_mech = {
	scram_get_mechanisms,
	scram_init,
	scram_exchange,

	PG_MAX_SASL_MESSAGE_LENGTH
};

/*
 * Status data for a SCRAM authentication exchange.  This should be kept
 * internal to this file.
 */
typedef enum
{
	SCRAM_AUTH_INIT,
	SCRAM_AUTH_SALT_SENT,
	SCRAM_AUTH_FINISHED,
} scram_state_enum;

typedef struct
{
	scram_state_enum state;

	Port	   *port;
	bool		channel_binding_in_use;

	/* State data depending on the hash type */
	pg_cryptohash_type hash_type;
	int			key_length;

	int			iterations;
	char	   *salt;			/* base64-encoded */
	uint8		ClientKey[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
	uint8		StoredKey[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
	uint8		ServerKey[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];

	/* Fields of the first message from client */
	char		cbind_flag;
	char	   *client_first_message_bare;
	char	   *client_username;
	char	   *client_nonce;

	/* Fields from the last message from client */
	char	   *client_final_message_without_proof;
	char	   *client_final_nonce;
	uint8		ClientProof[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];

	/* Fields generated in the server */
	char	   *server_first_message;
	char	   *server_nonce;

	/*
	 * If something goes wrong during the authentication, or we are performing
	 * a "mock" authentication (see comments at top of file), the 'doomed'
	 * flag is set.  A reason for the failure, for the server log, is put in
	 * 'logdetail'.
	 */
	bool		doomed;
	char	   *logdetail;
} scram_state;

static void read_client_first_message(scram_state *state, const char *input);
static void read_client_final_message(scram_state *state, const char *input);
static char *build_server_first_message(scram_state *state);
static char *build_server_final_message(scram_state *state);
static bool verify_client_proof(scram_state *state);
static bool verify_final_nonce(scram_state *state);
static void mock_scram_secret(const char *username, pg_cryptohash_type *hash_type,
							  int *iterations, int *key_length, char **salt,
							  uint8 *stored_key, uint8 *server_key);
static bool is_scram_printable(char *p);
static char *sanitize_char(char c);
static char *sanitize_str(const char *s);
static uint8 *scram_mock_salt(const char *username,
							  pg_cryptohash_type hash_type,
							  int key_length);

/*
 * The number of iterations to use when generating new secrets.
 */
int			scram_sha_256_iterations = SCRAM_SHA_256_DEFAULT_ITERATIONS;

/*
 * Get a list of SASL mechanisms that this module supports.
 *
 * For the convenience of building the FE/BE packet that lists the
 * mechanisms, the names are appended to the given StringInfo buffer,
 * separated by '\0' bytes.
 */
static void
scram_get_mechanisms(Port *port, StringInfo buf)
{
	/*
	 * Advertise the mechanisms in decreasing order of importance.  So the
	 * channel-binding variants go first, if they are supported.  Channel
	 * binding is only supported with SSL.
	 */
#ifdef USE_SSL
	if (port->ssl_in_use)
	{
		appendStringInfoString(buf, SCRAM_SHA_256_PLUS_NAME);
		appendStringInfoChar(buf, '\0');
	}
#endif
	appendStringInfoString(buf, SCRAM_SHA_256_NAME);
	appendStringInfoChar(buf, '\0');
}

/*
 * Initialize a new SCRAM authentication exchange status tracker.  This
 * needs to be called before doing any exchange.  It will be filled later
 * after the beginning of the exchange with authentication information.
 *
 * 'selected_mech' identifies the SASL mechanism that the client selected.
 * It should be one of the mechanisms that we support, as returned by
 * scram_get_mechanisms().
 *
 * 'shadow_pass' is the role's stored secret, from pg_authid.rolpassword.
 * The username was provided by the client in the startup message, and is
 * available in port->user_name.  If 'shadow_pass' is NULL, we still perform
 * an authentication exchange, but it will fail, as if an incorrect password
 * was given.
 */
static void *
scram_init(Port *port, const char *selected_mech, const char *shadow_pass)
{
	scram_state *state;
	bool		got_secret;

	state = palloc0_object(scram_state);
	state->port = port;
	state->state = SCRAM_AUTH_INIT;

	/*
	 * Parse the selected mechanism.
	 *
	 * Note that if we don't support channel binding, or if we're not using
	 * SSL at all, we would not have advertised the PLUS variant in the first
	 * place.  If the client nevertheless tries to select it, it's a protocol
	 * violation like selecting any other SASL mechanism we don't support.
	 */
#ifdef USE_SSL
	if (strcmp(selected_mech, SCRAM_SHA_256_PLUS_NAME) == 0 && port->ssl_in_use)
		state->channel_binding_in_use = true;
	else
#endif
	if (strcmp(selected_mech, SCRAM_SHA_256_NAME) == 0)
		state->channel_binding_in_use = false;
	else
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
				 errmsg("client selected an invalid SASL authentication mechanism")));

	/*
	 * Parse the stored secret.
	 */
	if (shadow_pass)
	{
		int			password_type = get_password_type(shadow_pass);

		if (password_type == PASSWORD_TYPE_SCRAM_SHA_256)
		{
			if (parse_scram_secret(shadow_pass, &state->iterations,
								   &state->hash_type, &state->key_length,
								   &state->salt,
								   state->StoredKey,
								   state->ServerKey))
				got_secret = true;
			else
			{
				/*
				 * The password looked like a SCRAM secret, but could not be
				 * parsed.
				 */
				ereport(LOG,
						(errmsg("invalid SCRAM secret for user \"%s\"",
								state->port->user_name)));
				got_secret = false;
			}
		}
		else
		{
			/*
			 * The user doesn't have SCRAM secret. (You cannot do SCRAM
			 * authentication with an MD5 hash.)
			 */
			state->logdetail = psprintf(_("User \"%s\" does not have a valid SCRAM secret."),
										state->port->user_name);
			got_secret = false;
		}
	}
	else
	{
		/*
		 * The caller requested us to perform a dummy authentication.  This is
		 * considered normal, since the caller requested it, so don't set log
		 * detail.
		 */
		got_secret = false;
	}

	/*
	 * If the user did not have a valid SCRAM secret, we still go through the
	 * motions with a mock one, and fail as if the client supplied an
	 * incorrect password.  This is to avoid revealing information to an
	 * attacker.
	 */
	if (!got_secret)
	{
		mock_scram_secret(state->port->user_name, &state->hash_type,
						  &state->iterations, &state->key_length,
						  &state->salt,
						  state->StoredKey, state->ServerKey);
		state->doomed = true;
	}

	return state;
}

/*
 * Continue a SCRAM authentication exchange.
 *
 * 'input' is the SCRAM payload sent by the client.  On the first call,
 * 'input' contains the "Initial Client Response" that the client sent as
 * part of the SASLInitialResponse message, or NULL if no Initial Client
 * Response was given.  (The SASL specification distinguishes between an
 * empty response and non-existing one.)  On subsequent calls, 'input'
 * cannot be NULL.  For convenience in this function, the caller must
 * ensure that there is a null terminator at input[inputlen].
 *
 * The next message to send to client is saved in 'output', for a length
 * of 'outputlen'.  In the case of an error, optionally store a palloc'd
 * string at *logdetail that will be sent to the postmaster log (but not
 * the client).
 */
static int
scram_exchange(void *opaq, const char *input, int inputlen,
			   char **output, int *outputlen, const char **logdetail)
{
	scram_state *state = (scram_state *) opaq;
	int			result;

	*output = NULL;

	/*
	 * If the client didn't include an "Initial Client Response" in the
	 * SASLInitialResponse message, send an empty challenge, to which the
	 * client will respond with the same data that usually comes in the
	 * Initial Client Response.
	 */
	if (input == NULL)
	{
		Assert(state->state == SCRAM_AUTH_INIT);

		*output = pstrdup("");
		*outputlen = 0;
		return PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_CONTINUE;
	}

	/*
	 * Check that the input length agrees with the string length of the input.
	 * We can ignore inputlen after this.
	 */
	if (inputlen == 0)
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
				 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
				 errdetail("The message is empty.")));
	if (inputlen != strlen(input))
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
				 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
				 errdetail("Message length does not match input length.")));

	switch (state->state)
	{
		case SCRAM_AUTH_INIT:

			/*
			 * Initialization phase.  Receive the first message from client
			 * and be sure that it parsed correctly.  Then send the challenge
			 * to the client.
			 */
			read_client_first_message(state, input);

			/* prepare message to send challenge */
			*output = build_server_first_message(state);

			state->state = SCRAM_AUTH_SALT_SENT;
			result = PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_CONTINUE;
			break;

		case SCRAM_AUTH_SALT_SENT:

			/*
			 * Final phase for the server.  Receive the response to the
			 * challenge previously sent, verify, and let the client know that
			 * everything went well (or not).
			 */
			read_client_final_message(state, input);

			if (!verify_final_nonce(state))
				ereport(ERROR,
						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
						 errmsg("invalid SCRAM response"),
						 errdetail("Nonce does not match.")));

			/*
			 * Now check the final nonce and the client proof.
			 *
			 * If we performed a "mock" authentication that we knew would fail
			 * from the get go, this is where we fail.
			 *
			 * The SCRAM specification includes an error code,
			 * "invalid-proof", for authentication failure, but it also allows
			 * erroring out in an application-specific way.  We choose to do
			 * the latter, so that the error message for invalid password is
			 * the same for all authentication methods.  The caller will call
			 * ereport(), when we return PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_FAILURE with no
			 * output.
			 *
			 * NB: the order of these checks is intentional.  We calculate the
			 * client proof even in a mock authentication, even though it's
			 * bound to fail, to thwart timing attacks to determine if a role
			 * with the given name exists or not.
			 */
			if (!verify_client_proof(state) || state->doomed)
			{
				result = PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_FAILURE;
				break;
			}

			/* Build final message for client */
			*output = build_server_final_message(state);

			/* Success! */
			result = PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_SUCCESS;
			state->state = SCRAM_AUTH_FINISHED;
			break;

		default:
			elog(ERROR, "invalid SCRAM exchange state");
			result = PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_FAILURE;
	}

	if (result == PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_FAILURE && state->logdetail && logdetail)
		*logdetail = state->logdetail;

	if (*output)
		*outputlen = strlen(*output);

	if (result == PG_SASL_EXCHANGE_SUCCESS && state->state == SCRAM_AUTH_FINISHED)
	{
		memcpy(MyProcPort->scram_ClientKey, state->ClientKey, sizeof(MyProcPort->scram_ClientKey));
		memcpy(MyProcPort->scram_ServerKey, state->ServerKey, sizeof(MyProcPort->scram_ServerKey));
		MyProcPort->has_scram_keys = true;
	}

	return result;
}

/*
 * Construct a SCRAM secret, for storing in pg_authid.rolpassword.
 *
 * The result is palloc'd, so caller is responsible for freeing it.
 */
char *
pg_be_scram_build_secret(const char *password)
{
	char	   *prep_password;
	pg_saslprep_rc rc;
	uint8		saltbuf[SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN];
	char	   *result;
	const char *errstr = NULL;

	/*
	 * Normalize the password with SASLprep.  If that doesn't work, because
	 * the password isn't valid UTF-8 or contains prohibited characters, just
	 * proceed with the original password.  (See comments at top of file.)
	 */
	rc = pg_saslprep(password, &prep_password);
	if (rc == SASLPREP_SUCCESS)
		password = (const char *) prep_password;

	/* Generate random salt */
	if (!pg_strong_random(saltbuf, SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN))
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_INTERNAL_ERROR),
				 errmsg("could not generate random salt")));

	result = scram_build_secret(PG_SHA256, SCRAM_SHA_256_KEY_LEN,
								saltbuf, SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN,
								scram_sha_256_iterations, password,
								&errstr);

	if (prep_password)
		pfree(prep_password);

	return result;
}

/*
 * Verify a plaintext password against a SCRAM secret.  This is used when
 * performing plaintext password authentication for a user that has a SCRAM
 * secret stored in pg_authid.
 */
bool
scram_verify_plain_password(const char *username, const char *password,
							const char *secret)
{
	char	   *encoded_salt;
	uint8	   *salt;
	int			saltlen;
	int			iterations;
	int			key_length = 0;
	pg_cryptohash_type hash_type;
	uint8		salted_password[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
	uint8		stored_key[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
	uint8		server_key[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
	uint8		computed_key[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
	char	   *prep_password;
	pg_saslprep_rc rc;
	const char *errstr = NULL;

	if (!parse_scram_secret(secret, &iterations, &hash_type, &key_length,
							&encoded_salt, stored_key, server_key))
	{
		/*
		 * The password looked like a SCRAM secret, but could not be parsed.
		 */
		ereport(LOG,
				(errmsg("invalid SCRAM secret for user \"%s\"", username)));
		return false;
	}

	saltlen = pg_b64_dec_len(strlen(encoded_salt));
	salt = palloc(saltlen);
	saltlen = pg_b64_decode(encoded_salt, strlen(encoded_salt), salt,
							saltlen);
	if (saltlen < 0)
	{
		ereport(LOG,
				(errmsg("invalid SCRAM secret for user \"%s\"", username)));
		return false;
	}

	/* Normalize the password */
	rc = pg_saslprep(password, &prep_password);
	if (rc == SASLPREP_SUCCESS)
		password = prep_password;

	/* Compute Server Key based on the user-supplied plaintext password */
	if (scram_SaltedPassword(password, hash_type, key_length,
							 salt, saltlen, iterations,
							 salted_password, &errstr) < 0 ||
		scram_ServerKey(salted_password, hash_type, key_length,
						computed_key, &errstr) < 0)
	{
		elog(ERROR, "could not compute server key: %s", errstr);
	}

	if (prep_password)
		pfree(prep_password);

	/*
	 * Compare the secret's Server Key with the one computed from the
	 * user-supplied password.
	 */
	return timingsafe_bcmp(computed_key, server_key, key_length) == 0;
}


/*
 * Parse and validate format of given SCRAM secret.
 *
 * On success, the iteration count, salt, stored key, and server key are
 * extracted from the secret, and returned to the caller.  For 'stored_key'
 * and 'server_key', the caller must pass pre-allocated buffers of size
 * SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN.  Salt is returned as a base64-encoded, null-terminated
 * string.  The buffer for the salt is palloc'd by this function.
 *
 * Returns true if the SCRAM secret has been parsed, and false otherwise.
 */
bool
parse_scram_secret(const char *secret, int *iterations,
				   pg_cryptohash_type *hash_type, int *key_length,
				   char **salt, uint8 *stored_key, uint8 *server_key)
{
	char	   *v;
	char	   *p;
	char	   *scheme_str;
	char	   *salt_str;
	char	   *iterations_str;
	char	   *storedkey_str;
	char	   *serverkey_str;
	int			decoded_len;
	uint8	   *decoded_salt_buf;
	uint8	   *decoded_stored_buf;
	uint8	   *decoded_server_buf;

	/*
	 * The secret is of form:
	 *
	 * SCRAM-SHA-256$<iterations>:<salt>$<storedkey>:<serverkey>
	 */
	v = pstrdup(secret);
	scheme_str = strsep(&v, "$");
	if (v == NULL)
		goto invalid_secret;
	iterations_str = strsep(&v, ":");
	if (v == NULL)
		goto invalid_secret;
	salt_str = strsep(&v, "$");
	if (v == NULL)
		goto invalid_secret;
	storedkey_str = strsep(&v, ":");
	if (v == NULL)
		goto invalid_secret;
	serverkey_str = v;

	/* Parse the fields */
	if (strcmp(scheme_str, "SCRAM-SHA-256") != 0)
		goto invalid_secret;
	*hash_type = PG_SHA256;
	*key_length = SCRAM_SHA_256_KEY_LEN;

	errno = 0;
	*iterations = strtol(iterations_str, &p, 10);
	if (*p || errno != 0)
		goto invalid_secret;

	/*
	 * Verify that the salt is in Base64-encoded format, by decoding it,
	 * although we return the encoded version to the caller.
	 */
	decoded_len = pg_b64_dec_len(strlen(salt_str));
	decoded_salt_buf = palloc(decoded_len);
	decoded_len = pg_b64_decode(salt_str, strlen(salt_str),
								decoded_salt_buf, decoded_len);
	if (decoded_len < 0)
		goto invalid_secret;
	*salt = pstrdup(salt_str);

	/*
	 * Decode StoredKey and ServerKey.
	 */
	decoded_len = pg_b64_dec_len(strlen(storedkey_str));
	decoded_stored_buf = palloc(decoded_len);
	decoded_len = pg_b64_decode(storedkey_str, strlen(storedkey_str),
								decoded_stored_buf, decoded_len);
	if (decoded_len != *key_length)
		goto invalid_secret;
	memcpy(stored_key, decoded_stored_buf, *key_length);

	decoded_len = pg_b64_dec_len(strlen(serverkey_str));
	decoded_server_buf = palloc(decoded_len);
	decoded_len = pg_b64_decode(serverkey_str, strlen(serverkey_str),
								decoded_server_buf, decoded_len);
	if (decoded_len != *key_length)
		goto invalid_secret;
	memcpy(server_key, decoded_server_buf, *key_length);

	return true;

invalid_secret:
	*salt = NULL;
	return false;
}

/*
 * Generate plausible SCRAM secret parameters for mock authentication.
 *
 * In a normal authentication, these are extracted from the secret
 * stored in the server.  This function generates values that look
 * realistic, for when there is no stored secret, using SCRAM-SHA-256.
 *
 * Like in parse_scram_secret(), for 'stored_key' and 'server_key', the
 * caller must pass pre-allocated buffers of size SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN, and
 * the buffer for the salt is palloc'd by this function.
 */
static void
mock_scram_secret(const char *username, pg_cryptohash_type *hash_type,
				  int *iterations, int *key_length, char **salt,
				  uint8 *stored_key, uint8 *server_key)
{
	uint8	   *raw_salt;
	char	   *encoded_salt;
	int			encoded_len;

	/* Enforce the use of SHA-256, which would be realistic enough */
	*hash_type = PG_SHA256;
	*key_length = SCRAM_SHA_256_KEY_LEN;

	/*
	 * Generate deterministic salt.
	 *
	 * Note that we cannot reveal any information to an attacker here so the
	 * error messages need to remain generic.  This should never fail anyway
	 * as the salt generated for mock authentication uses the cluster's nonce
	 * value.
	 */
	raw_salt = scram_mock_salt(username, *hash_type, *key_length);
	if (raw_salt == NULL)
		elog(ERROR, "could not encode salt");

	encoded_len = pg_b64_enc_len(SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN);
	/* don't forget the zero-terminator */
	encoded_salt = (char *) palloc(encoded_len + 1);
	encoded_len = pg_b64_encode(raw_salt, SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN, encoded_salt,
								encoded_len);

	if (encoded_len < 0)
		elog(ERROR, "could not encode salt");
	encoded_salt[encoded_len] = '\0';

	*salt = encoded_salt;
	*iterations = scram_sha_256_iterations;

	/* StoredKey and ServerKey are not used in a doomed authentication */
	memset(stored_key, 0, SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN);
	memset(server_key, 0, SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN);
}

/*
 * Read the value in a given SCRAM exchange message for given attribute.
 */
static char *
read_attr_value(char **input, char attr)
{
	char	   *begin = *input;
	char	   *end;

	if (*begin != attr)
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
				 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
				 errdetail("Expected attribute \"%c\" but found \"%s\".",
						   attr, sanitize_char(*begin))));
	begin++;

	if (*begin != '=')
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
				 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
				 errdetail("Expected character \"=\" for attribute \"%c\".", attr)));
	begin++;

	end = begin;
	while (*end && *end != ',')
		end++;

	if (*end)
	{
		*end = '\0';
		*input = end + 1;
	}
	else
		*input = end;

	return begin;
}

static bool
is_scram_printable(char *p)
{
	/*------
	 * Printable characters, as defined by SCRAM spec: (RFC 5802)
	 *
	 *	printable		= %x21-2B / %x2D-7E
	 *					  ;; Printable ASCII except ",".
	 *					  ;; Note that any "printable" is also
	 *					  ;; a valid "value".
	 *------
	 */
	for (; *p; p++)
	{
		if (*p < 0x21 || *p > 0x7E || *p == 0x2C /* comma */ )
			return false;
	}
	return true;
}

/*
 * Convert an arbitrary byte to printable form.  For error messages.
 *
 * If it's a printable ASCII character, print it as a single character.
 * otherwise, print it in hex.
 *
 * The returned pointer points to a static buffer.
 */
static char *
sanitize_char(char c)
{
	static char buf[5];

	if (c >= 0x21 && c <= 0x7E)
		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "'%c'", c);
	else
		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "0x%02x", (unsigned char) c);
	return buf;
}

/*
 * Convert an arbitrary string to printable form, for error messages.
 *
 * Anything that's not a printable ASCII character is replaced with
 * '?', and the string is truncated at 30 characters.
 *
 * The returned pointer points to a static buffer.
 */
static char *
sanitize_str(const char *s)
{
	static char buf[30 + 1];
	int			i;

	for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++)
	{
		char		c = s[i];

		if (c == '\0')
			break;

		if (c >= 0x21 && c <= 0x7E)
			buf[i] = c;
		else
			buf[i] = '?';
	}
	buf[i] = '\0';
	return buf;
}

/*
 * Read the next attribute and value in a SCRAM exchange message.
 *
 * The attribute character is set in *attr_p, the attribute value is the
 * return value.
 */
static char *
read_any_attr(char **input, char *attr_p)
{
	char	   *begin = *input;
	char	   *end;
	char		attr = *begin;

	if (attr == '\0')
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
				 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
				 errdetail("Attribute expected, but found end of string.")));

	/*------
	 * attr-val		   = ALPHA "=" value
	 *					 ;; Generic syntax of any attribute sent
	 *					 ;; by server or client
	 *------
	 */
	if (!((attr >= 'A' && attr <= 'Z') ||
		  (attr >= 'a' && attr <= 'z')))
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
				 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
				 errdetail("Attribute expected, but found invalid character \"%s\".",
						   sanitize_char(attr))));
	if (attr_p)
		*attr_p = attr;
	begin++;

	if (*begin != '=')
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
				 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
				 errdetail("Expected character \"=\" for attribute \"%c\".", attr)));
	begin++;

	end = begin;
	while (*end && *end != ',')
		end++;

	if (*end)
	{
		*end = '\0';
		*input = end + 1;
	}
	else
		*input = end;

	return begin;
}

/*
 * Read and parse the first message from client in the context of a SCRAM
 * authentication exchange message.
 *
 * At this stage, any errors will be reported directly with ereport(ERROR).
 */
static void
read_client_first_message(scram_state *state, const char *input)
{
	char	   *p = pstrdup(input);
	char	   *channel_binding_type;


	/*------
	 * The syntax for the client-first-message is: (RFC 5802)
	 *
	 * saslname		   = 1*(value-safe-char / "=2C" / "=3D")
	 *					 ;; Conforms to <value>.
	 *
	 * authzid		   = "a=" saslname
	 *					 ;; Protocol specific.
	 *
	 * cb-name		   = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "." / "-")
	 *					  ;; See RFC 5056, Section 7.
	 *					  ;; E.g., "tls-server-end-point" or
	 *					  ;; "tls-unique".
	 *
	 * gs2-cbind-flag  = ("p=" cb-name) / "n" / "y"
	 *					 ;; "n" -> client doesn't support channel binding.
	 *					 ;; "y" -> client does support channel binding
	 *					 ;;		   but thinks the server does not.
	 *					 ;; "p" -> client requires channel binding.
	 *					 ;; The selected channel binding follows "p=".
	 *
	 * gs2-header	   = gs2-cbind-flag "," [ authzid ] ","
	 *					 ;; GS2 header for SCRAM
	 *					 ;; (the actual GS2 header includes an optional
	 *					 ;; flag to indicate that the GSS mechanism is not
	 *					 ;; "standard", but since SCRAM is "standard", we
	 *					 ;; don't include that flag).
	 *
	 * username		   = "n=" saslname
	 *					 ;; Usernames are prepared using SASLprep.
	 *
	 * reserved-mext  = "m=" 1*(value-char)
	 *					 ;; Reserved for signaling mandatory extensions.
	 *					 ;; The exact syntax will be defined in
	 *					 ;; the future.
	 *
	 * nonce		   = "r=" c-nonce [s-nonce]
	 *					 ;; Second part provided by server.
	 *
	 * c-nonce		   = printable
	 *
	 * client-first-message-bare =
	 *					 [reserved-mext ","]
	 *					 username "," nonce ["," extensions]
	 *
	 * client-first-message =
	 *					 gs2-header client-first-message-bare
	 *
	 * For example:
	 * n,,n=user,r=fyko+d2lbbFgONRv9qkxdawL
	 *
	 * The "n,," in the beginning means that the client doesn't support
	 * channel binding, and no authzid is given.  "n=user" is the username.
	 * However, in PostgreSQL the username is sent in the startup packet, and
	 * the username in the SCRAM exchange is ignored.  libpq always sends it
	 * as an empty string.  The last part, "r=fyko+d2lbbFgONRv9qkxdawL" is
	 * the client nonce.
	 *------
	 */

	/*
	 * Read gs2-cbind-flag.  (For details see also RFC 5802 Section 6 "Channel
	 * Binding".)
	 */
	state->cbind_flag = *p;
	switch (*p)
	{
		case 'n':

			/*
			 * The client does not support channel binding or has simply
			 * decided to not use it.  In that case just let it go.
			 */
			if (state->channel_binding_in_use)
				ereport(ERROR,
						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
						 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
						 errdetail("The client selected SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS, but the SCRAM message does not include channel binding data.")));

			p++;
			if (*p != ',')
				ereport(ERROR,
						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
						 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
						 errdetail("Comma expected, but found character \"%s\".",
								   sanitize_char(*p))));
			p++;
			break;
		case 'y':

			/*
			 * The client supports channel binding and thinks that the server
			 * does not.  In this case, the server must fail authentication if
			 * it supports channel binding.
			 */
			if (state->channel_binding_in_use)
				ereport(ERROR,
						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
						 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
						 errdetail("The client selected SCRAM-SHA-256-PLUS, but the SCRAM message does not include channel binding data.")));

#ifdef USE_SSL
			if (state->port->ssl_in_use)
				ereport(ERROR,
						(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
						 errmsg("SCRAM channel binding negotiation error"),
						 errdetail("The client supports SCRAM channel binding but thinks the server does not.  "
								   "However, this server does support channel binding.")));
#endif
			p++;
			if (*p != ',')
				ereport(ERROR,
						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
						 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
						 errdetail("Comma expected, but found character \"%s\".",
								   sanitize_char(*p))));
			p++;
			break;
		case 'p':

			/*
			 * The client requires channel binding.  Channel binding type
			 * follows, e.g., "p=tls-server-end-point".
			 */
			if (!state->channel_binding_in_use)
				ereport(ERROR,
						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
						 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
						 errdetail("The client selected SCRAM-SHA-256 without channel binding, but the SCRAM message includes channel binding data.")));

			channel_binding_type = read_attr_value(&p, 'p');

			/*
			 * The only channel binding type we support is
			 * tls-server-end-point.
			 */
			if (strcmp(channel_binding_type, "tls-server-end-point") != 0)
				ereport(ERROR,
						(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
						 errmsg("unsupported SCRAM channel-binding type \"%s\"",
								sanitize_str(channel_binding_type))));
			break;
		default:
			ereport(ERROR,
					(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
					 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
					 errdetail("Unexpected channel-binding flag \"%s\".",
							   sanitize_char(*p))));
	}

	/*
	 * Forbid optional authzid (authorization identity).  We don't support it.
	 */
	if (*p == 'a')
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
				 errmsg("client uses authorization identity, but it is not supported")));
	if (*p != ',')
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
				 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
				 errdetail("Unexpected attribute \"%s\" in client-first-message.",
						   sanitize_char(*p))));
	p++;

	state->client_first_message_bare = pstrdup(p);

	/*
	 * Any mandatory extensions would go here.  We don't support any.
	 *
	 * RFC 5802 specifies error code "e=extensions-not-supported" for this,
	 * but it can only be sent in the server-final message.  We prefer to fail
	 * immediately (which the RFC also allows).
	 */
	if (*p == 'm')
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_FEATURE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
				 errmsg("client requires an unsupported SCRAM extension")));

	/*
	 * Read username.  Note: this is ignored.  We use the username from the
	 * startup message instead, still it is kept around if provided as it
	 * proves to be useful for debugging purposes.
	 */
	state->client_username = read_attr_value(&p, 'n');

	/* read nonce and check that it is made of only printable characters */
	state->client_nonce = read_attr_value(&p, 'r');
	if (!is_scram_printable(state->client_nonce))
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
				 errmsg("non-printable characters in SCRAM nonce")));

	/*
	 * There can be any number of optional extensions after this.  We don't
	 * support any extensions, so ignore them.
	 */
	while (*p != '\0')
		read_any_attr(&p, NULL);

	/* success! */
}

/*
 * Verify the final nonce contained in the last message received from
 * client in an exchange.
 */
static bool
verify_final_nonce(scram_state *state)
{
	int			client_nonce_len = strlen(state->client_nonce);
	int			server_nonce_len = strlen(state->server_nonce);
	int			final_nonce_len = strlen(state->client_final_nonce);

	if (final_nonce_len != client_nonce_len + server_nonce_len)
		return false;
	if (timingsafe_bcmp(state->client_final_nonce, state->client_nonce, client_nonce_len) != 0)
		return false;
	if (timingsafe_bcmp(state->client_final_nonce + client_nonce_len, state->server_nonce, server_nonce_len) != 0)
		return false;

	return true;
}

/*
 * Verify the client proof contained in the last message received from
 * client in an exchange.  Returns true if the verification is a success,
 * or false for a failure.
 */
static bool
verify_client_proof(scram_state *state)
{
	uint8		ClientSignature[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
	uint8		client_StoredKey[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
	pg_hmac_ctx *ctx = pg_hmac_create(state->hash_type);
	int			i;
	const char *errstr = NULL;

	/*
	 * Calculate ClientSignature.  Note that we don't log directly a failure
	 * here even when processing the calculations as this could involve a mock
	 * authentication.
	 */
	if (pg_hmac_init(ctx, state->StoredKey, state->key_length) < 0 ||
		pg_hmac_update(ctx,
					   (uint8 *) state->client_first_message_bare,
					   strlen(state->client_first_message_bare)) < 0 ||
		pg_hmac_update(ctx, (uint8 *) ",", 1) < 0 ||
		pg_hmac_update(ctx,
					   (uint8 *) state->server_first_message,
					   strlen(state->server_first_message)) < 0 ||
		pg_hmac_update(ctx, (uint8 *) ",", 1) < 0 ||
		pg_hmac_update(ctx,
					   (uint8 *) state->client_final_message_without_proof,
					   strlen(state->client_final_message_without_proof)) < 0 ||
		pg_hmac_final(ctx, ClientSignature, state->key_length) < 0)
	{
		elog(ERROR, "could not calculate client signature: %s",
			 pg_hmac_error(ctx));
	}

	pg_hmac_free(ctx);

	/* Extract the ClientKey that the client calculated from the proof */
	for (i = 0; i < state->key_length; i++)
		state->ClientKey[i] = state->ClientProof[i] ^ ClientSignature[i];

	/* Hash it one more time, and compare with StoredKey */
	if (scram_H(state->ClientKey, state->hash_type, state->key_length,
				client_StoredKey, &errstr) < 0)
		elog(ERROR, "could not hash stored key: %s", errstr);

	if (timingsafe_bcmp(client_StoredKey, state->StoredKey, state->key_length) != 0)
		return false;

	return true;
}

/*
 * Build the first server-side message sent to the client in a SCRAM
 * communication exchange.
 */
static char *
build_server_first_message(scram_state *state)
{
	/*------
	 * The syntax for the server-first-message is: (RFC 5802)
	 *
	 * server-first-message =
	 *					 [reserved-mext ","] nonce "," salt ","
	 *					 iteration-count ["," extensions]
	 *
	 * nonce		   = "r=" c-nonce [s-nonce]
	 *					 ;; Second part provided by server.
	 *
	 * c-nonce		   = printable
	 *
	 * s-nonce		   = printable
	 *
	 * salt			   = "s=" base64
	 *
	 * iteration-count = "i=" posit-number
	 *					 ;; A positive number.
	 *
	 * Example:
	 *
	 * r=fyko+d2lbbFgONRv9qkxdawL3rfcNHYJY1ZVvWVs7j,s=QSXCR+Q6sek8bf92,i=4096
	 *------
	 */

	/*
	 * Per the spec, the nonce may consist of any printable ASCII characters.
	 * For convenience, however, we don't use the whole range available,
	 * rather, we generate some random bytes, and base64 encode them.
	 */
	uint8		raw_nonce[SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN];
	int			encoded_len;

	if (!pg_strong_random(raw_nonce, SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN))
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_INTERNAL_ERROR),
				 errmsg("could not generate random nonce")));

	encoded_len = pg_b64_enc_len(SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN);
	/* don't forget the zero-terminator */
	state->server_nonce = palloc(encoded_len + 1);
	encoded_len = pg_b64_encode(raw_nonce, SCRAM_RAW_NONCE_LEN,
								state->server_nonce, encoded_len);
	if (encoded_len < 0)
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_INTERNAL_ERROR),
				 errmsg("could not encode random nonce")));
	state->server_nonce[encoded_len] = '\0';

	state->server_first_message =
		psprintf("r=%s%s,s=%s,i=%d",
				 state->client_nonce, state->server_nonce,
				 state->salt, state->iterations);

	return pstrdup(state->server_first_message);
}


/*
 * Read and parse the final message received from client.
 */
static void
read_client_final_message(scram_state *state, const char *input)
{
	char		attr;
	char	   *channel_binding;
	char	   *value;
	char	   *begin,
			   *proof;
	char	   *p;
	uint8	   *client_proof;
	int			client_proof_len;

	begin = p = pstrdup(input);

	/*------
	 * The syntax for the server-first-message is: (RFC 5802)
	 *
	 * gs2-header	   = gs2-cbind-flag "," [ authzid ] ","
	 *					 ;; GS2 header for SCRAM
	 *					 ;; (the actual GS2 header includes an optional
	 *					 ;; flag to indicate that the GSS mechanism is not
	 *					 ;; "standard", but since SCRAM is "standard", we
	 *					 ;; don't include that flag).
	 *
	 * cbind-input	 = gs2-header [ cbind-data ]
	 *					 ;; cbind-data MUST be present for
	 *					 ;; gs2-cbind-flag of "p" and MUST be absent
	 *					 ;; for "y" or "n".
	 *
	 * channel-binding = "c=" base64
	 *					 ;; base64 encoding of cbind-input.
	 *
	 * proof		   = "p=" base64
	 *
	 * client-final-message-without-proof =
	 *					 channel-binding "," nonce [","
	 *					 extensions]
	 *
	 * client-final-message =
	 *					 client-final-message-without-proof "," proof
	 *------
	 */

	/*
	 * Read channel binding.  This repeats the channel-binding flags and is
	 * then followed by the actual binding data depending on the type.
	 */
	channel_binding = read_attr_value(&p, 'c');
	if (state->channel_binding_in_use)
	{
#ifdef USE_SSL
		const char *cbind_data = NULL;
		size_t		cbind_data_len = 0;
		size_t		cbind_header_len;
		char	   *cbind_input;
		size_t		cbind_input_len;
		char	   *b64_message;
		int			b64_message_len;

		Assert(state->cbind_flag == 'p');

		/* Fetch hash data of server's SSL certificate */
		cbind_data = be_tls_get_certificate_hash(state->port,
												 &cbind_data_len);

		/* should not happen */
		if (cbind_data == NULL || cbind_data_len == 0)
			elog(ERROR, "could not get server certificate hash");

		cbind_header_len = strlen("p=tls-server-end-point,,");	/* p=type,, */
		cbind_input_len = cbind_header_len + cbind_data_len;
		cbind_input = palloc(cbind_input_len);
		snprintf(cbind_input, cbind_input_len, "p=tls-server-end-point,,");
		memcpy(cbind_input + cbind_header_len, cbind_data, cbind_data_len);

		b64_message_len = pg_b64_enc_len(cbind_input_len);
		/* don't forget the zero-terminator */
		b64_message = palloc(b64_message_len + 1);
		b64_message_len = pg_b64_encode((uint8 *) cbind_input, cbind_input_len,
										b64_message, b64_message_len);
		if (b64_message_len < 0)
			elog(ERROR, "could not encode channel binding data");
		b64_message[b64_message_len] = '\0';

		/*
		 * Compare the value sent by the client with the value expected by the
		 * server.
		 */
		if (strcmp(channel_binding, b64_message) != 0)
			ereport(ERROR,
					(errcode(ERRCODE_INVALID_AUTHORIZATION_SPECIFICATION),
					 errmsg("SCRAM channel binding check failed")));
#else
		/* shouldn't happen, because we checked this earlier already */
		elog(ERROR, "channel binding not supported by this build");
#endif
	}
	else
	{
		/*
		 * If we are not using channel binding, the binding data is expected
		 * to always be "biws", which is "n,," base64-encoded, or "eSws",
		 * which is "y,,".  We also have to check whether the flag is the same
		 * one that the client originally sent.
		 */
		if (!(strcmp(channel_binding, "biws") == 0 && state->cbind_flag == 'n') &&
			!(strcmp(channel_binding, "eSws") == 0 && state->cbind_flag == 'y'))
			ereport(ERROR,
					(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
					 errmsg("unexpected SCRAM channel-binding attribute in client-final-message")));
	}

	state->client_final_nonce = read_attr_value(&p, 'r');

	/* ignore optional extensions, read until we find "p" attribute */
	do
	{
		proof = p - 1;
		value = read_any_attr(&p, &attr);
	} while (attr != 'p');

	client_proof_len = pg_b64_dec_len(strlen(value));
	client_proof = palloc(client_proof_len);
	if (pg_b64_decode(value, strlen(value), client_proof,
					  client_proof_len) != state->key_length)
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
				 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
				 errdetail("Malformed proof in client-final-message.")));
	memcpy(state->ClientProof, client_proof, state->key_length);
	pfree(client_proof);

	if (*p != '\0')
		ereport(ERROR,
				(errcode(ERRCODE_PROTOCOL_VIOLATION),
				 errmsg("malformed SCRAM message"),
				 errdetail("Garbage found at the end of client-final-message.")));

	state->client_final_message_without_proof = palloc(proof - begin + 1);
	memcpy(state->client_final_message_without_proof, input, proof - begin);
	state->client_final_message_without_proof[proof - begin] = '\0';
}

/*
 * Build the final server-side message of an exchange.
 */
static char *
build_server_final_message(scram_state *state)
{
	uint8		ServerSignature[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
	char	   *server_signature_base64;
	int			siglen;
	pg_hmac_ctx *ctx = pg_hmac_create(state->hash_type);

	/* calculate ServerSignature */
	if (pg_hmac_init(ctx, state->ServerKey, state->key_length) < 0 ||
		pg_hmac_update(ctx,
					   (uint8 *) state->client_first_message_bare,
					   strlen(state->client_first_message_bare)) < 0 ||
		pg_hmac_update(ctx, (uint8 *) ",", 1) < 0 ||
		pg_hmac_update(ctx,
					   (uint8 *) state->server_first_message,
					   strlen(state->server_first_message)) < 0 ||
		pg_hmac_update(ctx, (uint8 *) ",", 1) < 0 ||
		pg_hmac_update(ctx,
					   (uint8 *) state->client_final_message_without_proof,
					   strlen(state->client_final_message_without_proof)) < 0 ||
		pg_hmac_final(ctx, ServerSignature, state->key_length) < 0)
	{
		elog(ERROR, "could not calculate server signature: %s",
			 pg_hmac_error(ctx));
	}

	pg_hmac_free(ctx);

	siglen = pg_b64_enc_len(state->key_length);
	/* don't forget the zero-terminator */
	server_signature_base64 = palloc(siglen + 1);
	siglen = pg_b64_encode(ServerSignature,
						   state->key_length, server_signature_base64,
						   siglen);
	if (siglen < 0)
		elog(ERROR, "could not encode server signature");
	server_signature_base64[siglen] = '\0';

	/*------
	 * The syntax for the server-final-message is: (RFC 5802)
	 *
	 * verifier		   = "v=" base64
	 *					 ;; base-64 encoded ServerSignature.
	 *
	 * server-final-message = (server-error / verifier)
	 *					 ["," extensions]
	 *
	 *------
	 */
	return psprintf("v=%s", server_signature_base64);
}


/*
 * Deterministically generate salt for mock authentication, using a SHA256
 * hash based on the username and a cluster-level secret key.  Returns a
 * pointer to a static buffer of size SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN, or NULL.
 */
static uint8 *
scram_mock_salt(const char *username, pg_cryptohash_type hash_type,
				int key_length)
{
	pg_cryptohash_ctx *ctx;
	static uint8 sha_digest[SCRAM_MAX_KEY_LEN];
	char	   *mock_auth_nonce = GetMockAuthenticationNonce();

	/*
	 * Generate salt using a SHA256 hash of the username and the cluster's
	 * mock authentication nonce.  (This works as long as the salt length is
	 * not larger than the SHA256 digest length.  If the salt is smaller, the
	 * caller will just ignore the extra data.)
	 */
	StaticAssertDecl(PG_SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH >= SCRAM_DEFAULT_SALT_LEN,
					 "salt length greater than SHA256 digest length");

	/*
	 * This may be worth refreshing if support for more hash methods is\
	 * added.
	 */
	Assert(hash_type == PG_SHA256);

	ctx = pg_cryptohash_create(hash_type);
	if (pg_cryptohash_init(ctx) < 0 ||
		pg_cryptohash_update(ctx, (const uint8 *) username, strlen(username)) < 0 ||
		pg_cryptohash_update(ctx, (const uint8 *) mock_auth_nonce, MOCK_AUTH_NONCE_LEN) < 0 ||
		pg_cryptohash_final(ctx, sha_digest, key_length) < 0)
	{
		pg_cryptohash_free(ctx);
		return NULL;
	}
	pg_cryptohash_free(ctx);

	return sha_digest;
}