src/doc/threat_model.dox - master - githubmirror/ipxe

src/doc/threat_model.dox
148 строк7 KB
Michael Brown
[doc] Document the threat model relevant to iPXE
04 авг 2026, 17:48
04 авг 2026, 17:48a1992fe
/** @page threat_model Threat model

@section overview Overview

iPXE is a network-capable bootloader, generally operating at ring 0
(or equivalent) with all memory protections disabled.  All data
originating from the network should be considered to be untrusted and
potentially malicious.

Under UEFI, iPXE operates before ExitBootServices() is called.  An
exploit against iPXE can therefore potentially produce a Secure Boot
compromise, requiring all existing binaries to be revoked (by
incrementing the SBAT generation in include/ipxe/sbat.h for the
official binaries that are signed via the iPXE shim).

@subsection threats Threats

The primary threat category is traffic originating from a network
peer.  All code on the receive datapath must carefully validate
received lengths and contents during parsing.

iPXE includes its own cryptographic stack (covering TLS, CMS, X.509,
etc).  This stack is used for iPXE's own security (HTTPS connections
and code-signing verification) but is entirely unrelated to UEFI
Secure Boot since iPXE defers all Secure Boot decisions to the
platform's own LoadImage() and StartImage() calls.  A compromise
within iPXE's cryptographic stack would be a compromise of iPXE's
security, but would not be a Secure Boot exploit (unless it also
allowed for e.g. arbitrary code execution or an out-of-bounds write).

@subsection secboot UEFI Secure Boot

Files may be annotated with FILE_SECBOOT() declarations to indicate
whether or not they are permitted to be included in a UEFI Secure Boot
build.  The absence of a marker is taken to prohibit inclusion.

Exclusion from a UEFI Secure Boot build does not indicate that a file
is outside the scope of the threat model, but does generally indicate
that it is a lower priority.

There are some files that are explicitly marked as FORBIDDEN, for
various reasons:

  - Some files are intrinsically insecure by design.  For example, the
    GDB debugging stub allows a remote device to read and write
    arbitrary host memory locations.

  - Some files are excluded by policy.  For example, the direct kernel
    loading capability in image/lkrn.c is marked as FORBIDDEN to
    ensure that iPXE's policy of delegating Secure Boot decisions to
    the platform firmware's LoadImage() and StartImage() is respected.

  - Some obsolete cryptographic algorithms such as MD4 and MD5 are
    excluded to prevent their accidental inclusion via configuration
    changes.

  - Some third-party code such as the 802.11 stack has previously been
    reviewed and found to contain multiple security holes (mostly
    failing to check return values for memory allocation or other
    failures), and is excluded by agreement with Microsoft.  Files in
    this category need not be reviewed for security issues: they are
    already known to contain holes and a full rewrite is required
    before it becomes worthwhile to raise individual issues.

@subsection exclusions Exclusions

Malicious locally attached hardware is explicitly outside the scope of
iPXE's threat model.  DMA-capable hardware is assumed to have write
access to all of host memory (i.e. an IOMMU is not assumed to be
present).  Device drivers are therefore not required to exhaustively
defend against incorrect or inconsistent values written by DMA-capable
hardware, since it is assumed that any such hardware could already
crash the system (or overwrite iPXE's code) without any further
assistance.

DMA-incapable hardware (such as USB devices) are on the edge of the
threat model.  It is assumed that an attacker with physical access to
attach new hardware also has the ability to take full control of the
system anyway (e.g. by disabling UEFI Secure Boot).  That said, USB
device drivers should generally guard against misbehaving USB or other
DMA-incapable hardware, since that hardware would not otherwise be
able to crash the system.

Under UEFI, other boot services code running on the same system is
similarly on the edge of the threat model.  If UEFI Secure Boot is
enabled, then any other code running on the same system must itself be
part of a signed binary (or be part of the platform firmware), and so
is by definition already at least as privileged as iPXE itself.  That
said, iPXE components that interact via UEFI protocols should be
written defensively, since experience shows that UEFI firmware code
quality is generally quite poor, especially in closed-source vendor
firmware that does not simply use the upstream EDK2 components.

Infiniband local networks are generally regarded as being within the
trust boundary, not least because iPXE includes support for remote DMA
access.  (For this reason, Infiniband device drivers are excluded from
a Secure Boot build.)

iPXE generally transfers control to whatever payload it boots at the
same privilege level held by iPXE itself (i.e. ring 0 or equivalent).
There are therefore some classes of defect that are simply not
interesting.  For example, a malformed NBI image could potentially be
able to exploit a bug in arch/x86/image/nbi.c, but this would be
utterly pointless since the exploit cannot do anything that a
well-formed NBI image could not do simply by allowing itself to be
executed.

@subsection notes Notes

There are several recurring patterns and helper functions used in iPXE
that any security reviewer should be familiar with:

  - Dynamic memory allocation via malloc() (or any other allocator
    such as realloc(), umalloc(), dma_alloc(), etc) is expected to be
    safe against malicious parameters (such as excessive allocation
    sizes), and all callers are expected to handle allocation failures
    gracefully.  The comments in core/malloc.c provide some of the
    @ref malloc "internal details".

  - Assertions via assert() are non-terminating and are no-ops in
    production builds.  See the documentation for @ref assert for more
    details.

  - Errors are generally expected to be caught (unless explicitly
    ignored) and propagated to the caller.  Error handling code should
    use the @ref composable_errors "composable structured goto"
    pattern where relevant.

  - I/O buffers are used extensively to hold transmitted and received
    packet data.  The documentation for struct @ref io_buffer
    describes the semantics and caveats for manipulating these
    buffers safely.

  - @ref xferbuf "Data transfer buffers" are often used to provide a
    bounds-checking abstraction around long-term host storage.  The
    comments in core/xferbuf.c describe the semantics.

  - ASN.1 parsing is handled by an extremely paranoid set of @ref
    asn1parse "helper functions" that should be safe to use on any
    untrusted input.

  - The non-standard ssnprintf() variation of the standard snprintf()
    C library function is often used to assemble content from a
    sequence of formatted strings, in a way that is designed to be
    safe against buffer size underflow.  See the documentation for
    @ref ssnprintf for more details.

*/