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docs/security.rst
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José Carlos García
Change to Pallets project
04 апр 2016, 00:11
04 апр 2016, 00:11
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Security Considerations ======================= Web applications usually face all kinds of security problems and it's very hard to get everything right. Flask tries to solve a few of these things for you, but there are a couple more you have to take care of yourself. .. _xss: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) -------------------------- Cross site scripting is the concept of injecting arbitrary HTML (and with it JavaScript) into the context of a website. To remedy this, developers have to properly escape text so that it cannot include arbitrary HTML tags. For more information on that have a look at the Wikipedia article on `Cross-Site Scripting <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cross-site_scripting>`_. Flask configures Jinja2 to automatically escape all values unless explicitly told otherwise. This should rule out all XSS problems caused in templates, but there are still other places where you have to be careful: - generating HTML without the help of Jinja2 - calling :class:`~flask.Markup` on data submitted by users - sending out HTML from uploaded files, never do that, use the ``Content-Disposition: attachment`` header to prevent that problem. - sending out textfiles from uploaded files. Some browsers are using content-type guessing based on the first few bytes so users could trick a browser to execute HTML. Another thing that is very important are unquoted attributes. While Jinja2 can protect you from XSS issues by escaping HTML, there is one thing it cannot protect you from: XSS by attribute injection. To counter this possible attack vector, be sure to always quote your attributes with either double or single quotes when using Jinja expressions in them: .. sourcecode:: html+jinja <a href="{{ href }}">the text</a> Why is this necessary? Because if you would not be doing that, an attacker could easily inject custom JavaScript handlers. For example an attacker could inject this piece of HTML+JavaScript: .. sourcecode:: html onmouseover=alert(document.cookie) When the user would then move with the mouse over the link, the cookie would be presented to the user in an alert window. But instead of showing the cookie to the user, a good attacker might also execute any other JavaScript code. In combination with CSS injections the attacker might even make the element fill out the entire page so that the user would just have to have the mouse anywhere on the page to trigger the attack. Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) --------------------------------- Another big problem is CSRF. This is a very complex topic and I won't outline it here in detail just mention what it is and how to theoretically prevent it. If your authentication information is stored in cookies, you have implicit state management. The state of "being logged in" is controlled by a cookie, and that cookie is sent with each request to a page. Unfortunately that includes requests triggered by 3rd party sites. If you don't keep that in mind, some people might be able to trick your application's users with social engineering to do stupid things without them knowing. Say you have a specific URL that, when you sent ``POST`` requests to will delete a user's profile (say ``http://example.com/user/delete``). If an attacker now creates a page that sends a post request to that page with some JavaScript they just have to trick some users to load that page and their profiles will end up being deleted. Imagine you were to run Facebook with millions of concurrent users and someone would send out links to images of little kittens. When users would go to that page, their profiles would get deleted while they are looking at images of fluffy cats. How can you prevent that? Basically for each request that modifies content on the server you would have to either use a one-time token and store that in the cookie **and** also transmit it with the form data. After receiving the data on the server again, you would then have to compare the two tokens and ensure they are equal. Why does Flask not do that for you? The ideal place for this to happen is the form validation framework, which does not exist in Flask. .. _json-security: JSON Security ------------- In Flask 0.10 and lower, :func:`~flask.jsonify` did not serialize top-level arrays to JSON. This was because of a security vulnerability in ECMAScript 4. ECMAScript 5 closed this vulnerability, so only extremely old browsers are still vulnerable. All of these browsers have `other more serious vulnerabilities <https://github.com/pallets/flask/issues/248#issuecomment-59934857>`_, so this behavior was changed and :func:`~flask.jsonify` now supports serializing arrays.