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v31.1
src/validation.cpp
6 441 строка
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Lőrinc
coins: compact chainstate in background
22 июн 2026, 12:39
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22 июн 2026, 12:39
ea3b318
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// Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto // Copyright (c) 2009-present The Bitcoin Core developers // Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying // file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php. #include <bitcoin-build-config.h> // IWYU pragma: keep #include <validation.h> #include <arith_uint256.h> #include <chain.h> #include <checkqueue.h> #include <clientversion.h> #include <consensus/amount.h> #include <consensus/consensus.h> #include <consensus/merkle.h> #include <consensus/tx_check.h> #include <consensus/tx_verify.h> #include <consensus/validation.h> #include <cuckoocache.h> #include <flatfile.h> #include <hash.h> #include <kernel/chainparams.h> #include <kernel/coinstats.h> #include <kernel/disconnected_transactions.h> #include <kernel/mempool_entry.h> #include <kernel/messagestartchars.h> #include <kernel/notifications_interface.h> #include <kernel/types.h> #include <kernel/warning.h> #include <logging/timer.h> #include <node/blockstorage.h> #include <node/utxo_snapshot.h> #include <policy/ephemeral_policy.h> #include <policy/policy.h> #include <policy/rbf.h> #include <policy/settings.h> #include <policy/truc_policy.h> #include <pow.h> #include <primitives/block.h> #include <primitives/transaction.h> #include <random.h> #include <script/script.h> #include <script/sigcache.h> #include <signet.h> #include <tinyformat.h> #include <txdb.h> #include <txmempool.h> #include <uint256.h> #include <undo.h> #include <util/check.h> #include <util/fs.h> #include <util/fs_helpers.h> #include <util/hasher.h> #include <util/log.h> #include <util/moneystr.h> #include <util/rbf.h> #include <util/result.h> #include <util/signalinterrupt.h> #include <util/strencodings.h> #include <util/string.h> #include <util/time.h> #include <util/trace.h> #include <util/translation.h> #include <validationinterface.h> #include <algorithm> #include <cassert> #include <chrono> #include <deque> #include <numeric> #include <optional> #include <ranges> #include <span> #include <string> #include <tuple> #include <utility> using kernel::CCoinsStats; using kernel::ChainstateRole; using kernel::CoinStatsHashType; using kernel::ComputeUTXOStats; using kernel::Notifications; using fsbridge::FopenFn; using node::BlockManager; using node::BlockMap; using node::CBlockIndexHeightOnlyComparator; using node::CBlockIndexWorkComparator; using node::SnapshotMetadata; /** Time window to wait between writing blocks/block index and chainstate to disk. * Randomize writing time inside the window to prevent a situation where the * network over time settles into a few cohorts of synchronized writers. */ static constexpr auto DATABASE_WRITE_INTERVAL_MIN{50min}; static constexpr auto DATABASE_WRITE_INTERVAL_MAX{70min}; /** Maximum age of our tip for us to be considered current for fee estimation */ static constexpr std::chrono::hours MAX_FEE_ESTIMATION_TIP_AGE{3}; const std::vector<std::string> CHECKLEVEL_DOC { "level 0 reads the blocks from disk", "level 1 verifies block validity", "level 2 verifies undo data", "level 3 checks disconnection of tip blocks", "level 4 tries to reconnect the blocks", "each level includes the checks of the previous levels", }; /** The number of blocks to keep below the deepest prune lock. * There is nothing special about this number. It is higher than what we * expect to see in regular mainnet reorgs, but not so high that it would * noticeably interfere with the pruning mechanism. * */ static constexpr int PRUNE_LOCK_BUFFER{10}; // Return whether the completed full flush should compact chainstate static bool ShouldCompactChainstate(bool in_ibd) { static constexpr uint32_t flush_ratio{320}; // Roughly every 2 weeks with hourly flushes return !in_ibd && FastRandomContext().randrange(flush_ratio) == 0; } TRACEPOINT_SEMAPHORE(validation, block_connected); TRACEPOINT_SEMAPHORE(utxocache, flush); TRACEPOINT_SEMAPHORE(mempool, replaced); TRACEPOINT_SEMAPHORE(mempool, rejected); const CBlockIndex* Chainstate::FindForkInGlobalIndex(const CBlockLocator& locator) const { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); // Find the latest block common to locator and chain - we expect that // locator.vHave is sorted descending by height. for (const uint256& hash : locator.vHave) { const CBlockIndex* pindex{m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(hash)}; if (pindex) { if (m_chain.Contains(pindex)) { return pindex; } if (pindex->GetAncestor(m_chain.Height()) == m_chain.Tip()) { return m_chain.Tip(); } } } return m_chain.Genesis(); } bool CheckInputScripts(const CTransaction& tx, TxValidationState& state, const CCoinsViewCache& inputs, script_verify_flags flags, bool cacheSigStore, bool cacheFullScriptStore, PrecomputedTransactionData& txdata, ValidationCache& validation_cache, std::vector<CScriptCheck>* pvChecks = nullptr) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main); bool CheckFinalTxAtTip(const CBlockIndex& active_chain_tip, const CTransaction& tx) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); // CheckFinalTxAtTip() uses active_chain_tip.Height()+1 to evaluate // nLockTime because when IsFinalTx() is called within // AcceptBlock(), the height of the block *being* // evaluated is what is used. Thus if we want to know if a // transaction can be part of the *next* block, we need to call // IsFinalTx() with one more than active_chain_tip.Height(). const int nBlockHeight = active_chain_tip.nHeight + 1; // BIP113 requires that time-locked transactions have nLockTime set to // less than the median time of the previous block they're contained in. // When the next block is created its previous block will be the current // chain tip, so we use that to calculate the median time passed to // IsFinalTx(). const int64_t nBlockTime{active_chain_tip.GetMedianTimePast()}; return IsFinalTx(tx, nBlockHeight, nBlockTime); } namespace { /** * A helper which calculates heights of inputs of a given transaction. * * @param[in] tip The current chain tip. If an input belongs to a mempool * transaction, we assume it will be confirmed in the next block. * @param[in] coins Any CCoinsView that provides access to the relevant coins. * @param[in] tx The transaction being evaluated. * * @returns A vector of input heights or nullopt, in case of an error. */ std::optional<std::vector<int>> CalculatePrevHeights( const CBlockIndex& tip, const CCoinsView& coins, const CTransaction& tx) { std::vector<int> prev_heights; prev_heights.resize(tx.vin.size()); for (size_t i = 0; i < tx.vin.size(); ++i) { if (auto coin{coins.GetCoin(tx.vin[i].prevout)}) { prev_heights[i] = coin->nHeight == MEMPOOL_HEIGHT ? tip.nHeight + 1 // Assume all mempool transaction confirm in the next block. : coin->nHeight; } else { LogInfo("ERROR: %s: Missing input %d in transaction \'%s\'\n", __func__, i, tx.GetHash().GetHex()); return std::nullopt; } } return prev_heights; } } // namespace std::optional<LockPoints> CalculateLockPointsAtTip( CBlockIndex* tip, const CCoinsView& coins_view, const CTransaction& tx) { assert(tip); auto prev_heights{CalculatePrevHeights(*tip, coins_view, tx)}; if (!prev_heights.has_value()) return std::nullopt; CBlockIndex next_tip; next_tip.pprev = tip; // When SequenceLocks() is called within ConnectBlock(), the height // of the block *being* evaluated is what is used. // Thus if we want to know if a transaction can be part of the // *next* block, we need to use one more than active_chainstate.m_chain.Height() next_tip.nHeight = tip->nHeight + 1; const auto [min_height, min_time] = CalculateSequenceLocks(tx, STANDARD_LOCKTIME_VERIFY_FLAGS, prev_heights.value(), next_tip); // Also store the hash of the block with the highest height of // all the blocks which have sequence locked prevouts. // This hash needs to still be on the chain // for these LockPoint calculations to be valid // Note: It is impossible to correctly calculate a maxInputBlock // if any of the sequence locked inputs depend on unconfirmed txs, // except in the special case where the relative lock time/height // is 0, which is equivalent to no sequence lock. Since we assume // input height of tip+1 for mempool txs and test the resulting // min_height and min_time from CalculateSequenceLocks against tip+1. int max_input_height{0}; for (const int height : prev_heights.value()) { // Can ignore mempool inputs since we'll fail if they had non-zero locks if (height != next_tip.nHeight) { max_input_height = std::max(max_input_height, height); } } // tip->GetAncestor(max_input_height) should never return a nullptr // because max_input_height is always less than the tip height. // It would, however, be a bad bug to continue execution, since a // LockPoints object with the maxInputBlock member set to nullptr // signifies no relative lock time. return LockPoints{min_height, min_time, Assert(tip->GetAncestor(max_input_height))}; } bool CheckSequenceLocksAtTip(CBlockIndex* tip, const LockPoints& lock_points) { assert(tip != nullptr); CBlockIndex index; index.pprev = tip; // CheckSequenceLocksAtTip() uses active_chainstate.m_chain.Height()+1 to evaluate // height based locks because when SequenceLocks() is called within // ConnectBlock(), the height of the block *being* // evaluated is what is used. // Thus if we want to know if a transaction can be part of the // *next* block, we need to use one more than active_chainstate.m_chain.Height() index.nHeight = tip->nHeight + 1; return EvaluateSequenceLocks(index, {lock_points.height, lock_points.time}); } static void LimitMempoolSize(CTxMemPool& pool, CCoinsViewCache& coins_cache) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main, pool.cs) { AssertLockHeld(::cs_main); AssertLockHeld(pool.cs); int expired = pool.Expire(GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>() - pool.m_opts.expiry); if (expired != 0) { LogDebug(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "Expired %i transactions from the memory pool\n", expired); } std::vector<COutPoint> vNoSpendsRemaining; pool.TrimToSize(pool.m_opts.max_size_bytes, &vNoSpendsRemaining); for (const COutPoint& removed : vNoSpendsRemaining) coins_cache.Uncache(removed); } static bool IsCurrentForFeeEstimation(Chainstate& active_chainstate) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); if (active_chainstate.m_chainman.IsInitialBlockDownload()) { return false; } if (active_chainstate.m_chain.Tip()->GetBlockTime() < count_seconds(GetTime<std::chrono::seconds>() - MAX_FEE_ESTIMATION_TIP_AGE)) return false; if (active_chainstate.m_chain.Height() < active_chainstate.m_chainman.m_best_header->nHeight - 1) { return false; } return true; } void Chainstate::MaybeUpdateMempoolForReorg( DisconnectedBlockTransactions& disconnectpool, bool fAddToMempool) { if (!m_mempool) return; AssertLockHeld(cs_main); AssertLockHeld(m_mempool->cs); std::vector<Txid> vHashUpdate; { // disconnectpool is ordered so that the front is the most recently-confirmed // transaction (the last tx of the block at the tip) in the disconnected chain. // Iterate disconnectpool in reverse, so that we add transactions // back to the mempool starting with the earliest transaction that had // been previously seen in a block. const auto queuedTx = disconnectpool.take(); auto it = queuedTx.rbegin(); while (it != queuedTx.rend()) { // ignore validation errors in resurrected transactions if (!fAddToMempool || (*it)->IsCoinBase() || AcceptToMemoryPool(*this, *it, GetTime(), /*bypass_limits=*/true, /*test_accept=*/false).m_result_type != MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID) { // If the transaction doesn't make it in to the mempool, remove any // transactions that depend on it (which would now be orphans). m_mempool->removeRecursive(**it, MemPoolRemovalReason::REORG); } else if (m_mempool->exists((*it)->GetHash())) { vHashUpdate.push_back((*it)->GetHash()); } ++it; } } // AcceptToMemoryPool/addNewTransaction all assume that new mempool entries have // no in-mempool children, which is generally not true when adding // previously-confirmed transactions back to the mempool. // UpdateTransactionsFromBlock finds descendants of any transactions in // the disconnectpool that were added back and cleans up the mempool state. m_mempool->UpdateTransactionsFromBlock(vHashUpdate); // Predicate to use for filtering transactions in removeForReorg. // Checks whether the transaction is still final and, if it spends a coinbase output, mature. // Also updates valid entries' cached LockPoints if needed. // If false, the tx is still valid and its lockpoints are updated. // If true, the tx would be invalid in the next block; remove this entry and all of its descendants. // Note that TRUC rules are not applied here, so reorgs may cause violations of TRUC inheritance or // topology restrictions. const auto filter_final_and_mature = [&](CTxMemPool::txiter it) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(m_mempool->cs, ::cs_main) { AssertLockHeld(m_mempool->cs); AssertLockHeld(::cs_main); const CTransaction& tx = it->GetTx(); // The transaction must be final. if (!CheckFinalTxAtTip(*Assert(m_chain.Tip()), tx)) return true; const LockPoints& lp = it->GetLockPoints(); // CheckSequenceLocksAtTip checks if the transaction will be final in the next block to be // created on top of the new chain. if (TestLockPointValidity(m_chain, lp)) { if (!CheckSequenceLocksAtTip(m_chain.Tip(), lp)) { return true; } } else { const CCoinsViewMemPool view_mempool{&CoinsTip(), *m_mempool}; const std::optional<LockPoints> new_lock_points{CalculateLockPointsAtTip(m_chain.Tip(), view_mempool, tx)}; if (new_lock_points.has_value() && CheckSequenceLocksAtTip(m_chain.Tip(), *new_lock_points)) { // Now update the mempool entry lockpoints as well. it->UpdateLockPoints(*new_lock_points); } else { return true; } } // If the transaction spends any coinbase outputs, it must be mature. if (it->GetSpendsCoinbase()) { for (const CTxIn& txin : tx.vin) { if (m_mempool->exists(txin.prevout.hash)) continue; const Coin& coin{CoinsTip().AccessCoin(txin.prevout)}; assert(!coin.IsSpent()); const auto mempool_spend_height{m_chain.Tip()->nHeight + 1}; if (coin.IsCoinBase() && mempool_spend_height - coin.nHeight < COINBASE_MATURITY) { return true; } } } // Transaction is still valid and cached LockPoints are updated. return false; }; // We also need to remove any now-immature transactions m_mempool->removeForReorg(m_chain, filter_final_and_mature); // Re-limit mempool size, in case we added any transactions LimitMempoolSize(*m_mempool, this->CoinsTip()); } /** * Checks to avoid mempool polluting consensus critical paths since cached * signature and script validity results will be reused if we validate this * transaction again during block validation. * */ static bool CheckInputsFromMempoolAndCache(const CTransaction& tx, TxValidationState& state, const CCoinsViewCache& view, const CTxMemPool& pool, script_verify_flags flags, PrecomputedTransactionData& txdata, CCoinsViewCache& coins_tip, ValidationCache& validation_cache) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, pool.cs) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); AssertLockHeld(pool.cs); assert(!tx.IsCoinBase()); for (const CTxIn& txin : tx.vin) { const Coin& coin = view.AccessCoin(txin.prevout); // This coin was checked in PreChecks and MemPoolAccept // has been holding cs_main since then. Assume(!coin.IsSpent()); if (coin.IsSpent()) return false; // If the Coin is available, there are 2 possibilities: // it is available in our current ChainstateActive UTXO set, // or it's a UTXO provided by a transaction in our mempool. // Ensure the scriptPubKeys in Coins from CoinsView are correct. const CTransactionRef& txFrom = pool.get(txin.prevout.hash); if (txFrom) { assert(txFrom->GetHash() == txin.prevout.hash); assert(txFrom->vout.size() > txin.prevout.n); assert(txFrom->vout[txin.prevout.n] == coin.out); } else { const Coin& coinFromUTXOSet = coins_tip.AccessCoin(txin.prevout); assert(!coinFromUTXOSet.IsSpent()); assert(coinFromUTXOSet.out == coin.out); } } // Call CheckInputScripts() to cache signature and script validity against current tip consensus rules. return CheckInputScripts(tx, state, view, flags, /* cacheSigStore= */ true, /* cacheFullScriptStore= */ true, txdata, validation_cache); } namespace { class MemPoolAccept { public: explicit MemPoolAccept(CTxMemPool& mempool, Chainstate& active_chainstate) : m_pool(mempool), m_view(&m_dummy), m_viewmempool(&active_chainstate.CoinsTip(), m_pool), m_active_chainstate(active_chainstate) { } // We put the arguments we're handed into a struct, so we can pass them // around easier. struct ATMPArgs { const CChainParams& m_chainparams; const int64_t m_accept_time; const bool m_bypass_limits; /* * Return any outpoints which were not previously present in the coins * cache, but were added as a result of validating the tx for mempool * acceptance. This allows the caller to optionally remove the cache * additions if the associated transaction ends up being rejected by * the mempool. */ std::vector<COutPoint>& m_coins_to_uncache; /** When true, the transaction or package will not be submitted to the mempool. */ const bool m_test_accept; /** Whether we allow transactions to replace mempool transactions. If false, * any transaction spending the same inputs as a transaction in the mempool is considered * a conflict. */ const bool m_allow_replacement; /** When true, allow sibling eviction. This only occurs in single transaction package settings. */ const bool m_allow_sibling_eviction; /** Used to skip the LimitMempoolSize() call within AcceptSingleTransaction(). This should be used when multiple * AcceptSubPackage calls are expected and the mempool will be trimmed at the end of AcceptPackage(). */ const bool m_package_submission; /** When true, use package feerates instead of individual transaction feerates for fee-based * policies such as mempool min fee and min relay fee. */ const bool m_package_feerates; /** Used for local submission of transactions to catch "absurd" fees * due to fee miscalculation by wallets. std:nullopt implies unset, allowing any feerates. * Any individual transaction failing this check causes immediate failure. */ const std::optional<CFeeRate> m_client_maxfeerate; /** Parameters for single transaction mempool validation. */ static ATMPArgs SingleAccept(const CChainParams& chainparams, int64_t accept_time, bool bypass_limits, std::vector<COutPoint>& coins_to_uncache, bool test_accept) { return ATMPArgs{/*chainparams=*/ chainparams, /*accept_time=*/ accept_time, /*bypass_limits=*/ bypass_limits, /*coins_to_uncache=*/ coins_to_uncache, /*test_accept=*/ test_accept, /*allow_replacement=*/ true, /*allow_sibling_eviction=*/ true, /*package_submission=*/ false, /*package_feerates=*/ false, /*client_maxfeerate=*/ {}, // checked by caller }; } /** Parameters for test package mempool validation through testmempoolaccept. */ static ATMPArgs PackageTestAccept(const CChainParams& chainparams, int64_t accept_time, std::vector<COutPoint>& coins_to_uncache) { return ATMPArgs{/*chainparams=*/ chainparams, /*accept_time=*/ accept_time, /*bypass_limits=*/ false, /*coins_to_uncache=*/ coins_to_uncache, /*test_accept=*/ true, /*allow_replacement=*/ false, /*allow_sibling_eviction=*/ false, /*package_submission=*/ false, // not submitting to mempool /*package_feerates=*/ false, /*client_maxfeerate=*/ {}, // checked by caller }; } /** Parameters for child-with-parents package validation. */ static ATMPArgs PackageChildWithParents(const CChainParams& chainparams, int64_t accept_time, std::vector<COutPoint>& coins_to_uncache, const std::optional<CFeeRate>& client_maxfeerate) { return ATMPArgs{/*chainparams=*/ chainparams, /*accept_time=*/ accept_time, /*bypass_limits=*/ false, /*coins_to_uncache=*/ coins_to_uncache, /*test_accept=*/ false, /*allow_replacement=*/ true, /*allow_sibling_eviction=*/ false, /*package_submission=*/ true, /*package_feerates=*/ true, /*client_maxfeerate=*/ client_maxfeerate, }; } /** Parameters for a single transaction within a package. */ static ATMPArgs SingleInPackageAccept(const ATMPArgs& package_args) { return ATMPArgs{/*chainparams=*/ package_args.m_chainparams, /*accept_time=*/ package_args.m_accept_time, /*bypass_limits=*/ false, /*coins_to_uncache=*/ package_args.m_coins_to_uncache, /*test_accept=*/ package_args.m_test_accept, /*allow_replacement=*/ true, /*allow_sibling_eviction=*/ true, /*package_submission=*/ true, // trim at the end of AcceptPackage() /*package_feerates=*/ false, // only 1 transaction /*client_maxfeerate=*/ package_args.m_client_maxfeerate, }; } private: // Private ctor to avoid exposing details to clients and allowing the possibility of // mixing up the order of the arguments. Use static functions above instead. ATMPArgs(const CChainParams& chainparams, int64_t accept_time, bool bypass_limits, std::vector<COutPoint>& coins_to_uncache, bool test_accept, bool allow_replacement, bool allow_sibling_eviction, bool package_submission, bool package_feerates, std::optional<CFeeRate> client_maxfeerate) : m_chainparams{chainparams}, m_accept_time{accept_time}, m_bypass_limits{bypass_limits}, m_coins_to_uncache{coins_to_uncache}, m_test_accept{test_accept}, m_allow_replacement{allow_replacement}, m_allow_sibling_eviction{allow_sibling_eviction}, m_package_submission{package_submission}, m_package_feerates{package_feerates}, m_client_maxfeerate{client_maxfeerate} { // If we are using package feerates, we must be doing package submission. // It also means sibling eviction is not permitted. if (m_package_feerates) { Assume(m_package_submission); Assume(!m_allow_sibling_eviction); } if (m_allow_sibling_eviction) Assume(m_allow_replacement); } }; /** Clean up all non-chainstate coins from m_view and m_viewmempool. */ void CleanupTemporaryCoins() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs); // Single transaction acceptance MempoolAcceptResult AcceptSingleTransactionAndCleanup(const CTransactionRef& ptx, ATMPArgs& args) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) { LOCK(m_pool.cs); MempoolAcceptResult result = AcceptSingleTransactionInternal(ptx, args); ClearSubPackageState(); return result; } MempoolAcceptResult AcceptSingleTransactionInternal(const CTransactionRef& ptx, ATMPArgs& args) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs); /** * Multiple transaction acceptance. Transactions may or may not be interdependent, but must not * conflict with each other, and the transactions cannot already be in the mempool. Parents must * come before children if any dependencies exist. */ PackageMempoolAcceptResult AcceptMultipleTransactionsAndCleanup(const std::vector<CTransactionRef>& txns, ATMPArgs& args) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) { LOCK(m_pool.cs); PackageMempoolAcceptResult result = AcceptMultipleTransactionsInternal(txns, args); ClearSubPackageState(); return result; } PackageMempoolAcceptResult AcceptMultipleTransactionsInternal(const std::vector<CTransactionRef>& txns, ATMPArgs& args) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs); /** * Submission of a subpackage. * If subpackage size == 1, calls AcceptSingleTransaction() with adjusted ATMPArgs to * enable sibling eviction and creates a PackageMempoolAcceptResult * wrapping the result. * * If subpackage size > 1, calls AcceptMultipleTransactions() with the provided ATMPArgs. * * Also cleans up all non-chainstate coins from m_view at the end. */ PackageMempoolAcceptResult AcceptSubPackage(const std::vector<CTransactionRef>& subpackage, ATMPArgs& args) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs); /** * Package (more specific than just multiple transactions) acceptance. Package must be a child * with all of its unconfirmed parents, and topologically sorted. */ PackageMempoolAcceptResult AcceptPackage(const Package& package, ATMPArgs& args) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main); private: // All the intermediate state that gets passed between the various levels // of checking a given transaction. struct Workspace { explicit Workspace(const CTransactionRef& ptx) : m_ptx(ptx), m_hash(ptx->GetHash()) {} /** Txids of mempool transactions that this transaction directly conflicts with or may * replace via sibling eviction. */ std::set<Txid> m_conflicts; /** Iterators to mempool entries that this transaction directly conflicts with or may * replace via sibling eviction. */ CTxMemPool::setEntries m_iters_conflicting; /** All mempool parents of this transaction. */ std::vector<CTxMemPoolEntry::CTxMemPoolEntryRef> m_parents; /* Handle to the tx in the changeset */ CTxMemPool::ChangeSet::TxHandle m_tx_handle; /** Whether RBF-related data structures (m_conflicts, m_iters_conflicting, * m_replaced_transactions) include a sibling in addition to txns with conflicting inputs. */ bool m_sibling_eviction{false}; /** Virtual size of the transaction as used by the mempool, calculated using serialized size * of the transaction and sigops. */ int64_t m_vsize; /** Fees paid by this transaction: total input amounts subtracted by total output amounts. */ CAmount m_base_fees; /** Base fees + any fee delta set by the user with prioritisetransaction. */ CAmount m_modified_fees; /** If we're doing package validation (i.e. m_package_feerates=true), the "effective" * package feerate of this transaction is the total fees divided by the total size of * transactions (which may include its ancestors and/or descendants). */ CFeeRate m_package_feerate{0}; const CTransactionRef& m_ptx; /** Txid. */ const Txid& m_hash; TxValidationState m_state; /** A temporary cache containing serialized transaction data for signature verification. * Reused across PolicyScriptChecks and ConsensusScriptChecks. */ PrecomputedTransactionData m_precomputed_txdata; }; // Run the policy checks on a given transaction, excluding any script checks. // Looks up inputs, calculates feerate, considers replacement, evaluates // package limits, etc. As this function can be invoked for "free" by a peer, // only tests that are fast should be done here (to avoid CPU DoS). bool PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs); // Run checks for mempool replace-by-fee, only used in AcceptSingleTransaction. bool ReplacementChecks(Workspace& ws) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs); bool PackageRBFChecks(const std::vector<CTransactionRef>& txns, std::vector<Workspace>& workspaces, int64_t total_vsize, PackageValidationState& package_state) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs); // Run the script checks using our policy flags. As this can be slow, we should // only invoke this on transactions that have otherwise passed policy checks. bool PolicyScriptChecks(const ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs); // Re-run the script checks, using consensus flags, and try to cache the // result in the scriptcache. This should be done after // PolicyScriptChecks(). This requires that all inputs either be in our // utxo set or in the mempool. bool ConsensusScriptChecks(const ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs); // Try to add the transaction to the mempool, removing any conflicts first. void FinalizeSubpackage(const ATMPArgs& args) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs); // Submit all transactions to the mempool and call ConsensusScriptChecks to add to the script // cache - should only be called after successful validation of all transactions in the package. // Does not call LimitMempoolSize(), so mempool max_size_bytes may be temporarily exceeded. bool SubmitPackage(const ATMPArgs& args, std::vector<Workspace>& workspaces, PackageValidationState& package_state, std::map<Wtxid, MempoolAcceptResult>& results) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs); // Compare a package's feerate against minimum allowed. bool CheckFeeRate(size_t package_size, CAmount package_fee, TxValidationState& state) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main, m_pool.cs) { AssertLockHeld(::cs_main); AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs); CAmount mempoolRejectFee = m_pool.GetMinFee().GetFee(package_size); if (mempoolRejectFee > 0 && package_fee < mempoolRejectFee) { return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_RECONSIDERABLE, "mempool min fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", package_fee, mempoolRejectFee)); } if (package_fee < m_pool.m_opts.min_relay_feerate.GetFee(package_size)) { return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_RECONSIDERABLE, "min relay fee not met", strprintf("%d < %d", package_fee, m_pool.m_opts.min_relay_feerate.GetFee(package_size))); } return true; } ValidationCache& GetValidationCache() { return m_active_chainstate.m_chainman.m_validation_cache; } private: CTxMemPool& m_pool; /** Holds a cached view of available coins from the UTXO set, mempool, and artificial temporary coins (to enable package validation). * The view doesn't track whether a coin previously existed but has now been spent. We detect conflicts in other ways: * - conflicts within a transaction are checked in CheckTransaction (bad-txns-inputs-duplicate) * - conflicts within a package are checked in IsWellFormedPackage (conflict-in-package) * - conflicts with an existing mempool transaction are found in CTxMemPool::GetConflictTx and replacements are allowed * The temporary coins should persist between individual transaction checks so that package validation is possible, * but must be cleaned up when we finish validating a subpackage, whether accepted or rejected. The cache must also * be cleared when mempool contents change (when a changeset is applied or when the mempool trims itself) because it * can return cached coins that no longer exist in the backend. Use CleanupTemporaryCoins() anytime you are finished * with a SubPackageState or call LimitMempoolSize(). */ CCoinsViewCache m_view; // These are the two possible backends for m_view. /** When m_view is connected to m_viewmempool as its backend, it can pull coins from the mempool and from the UTXO * set. This is also where temporary coins are stored. */ CCoinsViewMemPool m_viewmempool; /** When m_view is connected to m_dummy, it can no longer look up coins from the mempool or UTXO set (meaning no disk * operations happen), but can still return coins it accessed previously. Useful for keeping track of which coins * were pulled from disk. */ CCoinsView m_dummy; Chainstate& m_active_chainstate; // Fields below are per *sub*package state and must be reset prior to subsequent // AcceptSingleTransaction and AcceptMultipleTransactions invocations struct SubPackageState { /** Aggregated modified fees of all transactions, used to calculate package feerate. */ CAmount m_total_modified_fees{0}; /** Aggregated virtual size of all transactions, used to calculate package feerate. */ int64_t m_total_vsize{0}; // RBF-related members /** Whether the transaction(s) would replace any mempool transactions and/or evict any siblings. * If so, RBF rules apply. */ bool m_rbf{false}; /** Mempool transactions that were replaced. */ std::list<CTransactionRef> m_replaced_transactions; /* Changeset representing adding transactions and removing their conflicts. */ std::unique_ptr<CTxMemPool::ChangeSet> m_changeset; /** Total modified fees of mempool transactions being replaced. */ CAmount m_conflicting_fees{0}; /** Total size (in virtual bytes) of mempool transactions being replaced. */ size_t m_conflicting_size{0}; }; struct SubPackageState m_subpackage; /** Re-set sub-package state to not leak between evaluations */ void ClearSubPackageState() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main, m_pool.cs) { m_subpackage = SubPackageState{}; // And clean coins while at it CleanupTemporaryCoins(); } }; bool MemPoolAccept::PreChecks(ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs); const CTransactionRef& ptx = ws.m_ptx; const CTransaction& tx = *ws.m_ptx; const Txid& hash = ws.m_hash; // Copy/alias what we need out of args const int64_t nAcceptTime = args.m_accept_time; const bool bypass_limits = args.m_bypass_limits; std::vector<COutPoint>& coins_to_uncache = args.m_coins_to_uncache; // Alias what we need out of ws TxValidationState& state = ws.m_state; if (!CheckTransaction(tx, state)) { return false; // state filled in by CheckTransaction } // Coinbase is only valid in a block, not as a loose transaction if (tx.IsCoinBase()) return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "coinbase"); // Rather not work on nonstandard transactions (unless -testnet/-regtest) std::string reason; if (m_pool.m_opts.require_standard && !IsStandardTx(tx, m_pool.m_opts.max_datacarrier_bytes, m_pool.m_opts.permit_bare_multisig, m_pool.m_opts.dust_relay_feerate, reason)) { return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, reason); } // Transactions smaller than 65 non-witness bytes are not relayed to mitigate CVE-2017-12842. if (::GetSerializeSize(TX_NO_WITNESS(tx)) < MIN_STANDARD_TX_NONWITNESS_SIZE) return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, "tx-size-small"); // Only accept nLockTime-using transactions that can be mined in the next // block; we don't want our mempool filled up with transactions that can't // be mined yet. if (!CheckFinalTxAtTip(*Assert(m_active_chainstate.m_chain.Tip()), tx)) { return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, "non-final"); } if (m_pool.exists(tx.GetWitnessHash())) { // Exact transaction already exists in the mempool. return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONFLICT, "txn-already-in-mempool"); } else if (m_pool.exists(tx.GetHash())) { // Transaction with the same non-witness data but different witness (same txid, different // wtxid) already exists in the mempool. return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONFLICT, "txn-same-nonwitness-data-in-mempool"); } // Check for conflicts with in-memory transactions for (const CTxIn &txin : tx.vin) { const CTransaction* ptxConflicting = m_pool.GetConflictTx(txin.prevout); if (ptxConflicting) { if (!args.m_allow_replacement) { // Transaction conflicts with a mempool tx, but we're not allowing replacements in this context. return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "bip125-replacement-disallowed"); } ws.m_conflicts.insert(ptxConflicting->GetHash()); } } m_view.SetBackend(m_viewmempool); const CCoinsViewCache& coins_cache = m_active_chainstate.CoinsTip(); // do all inputs exist? for (const CTxIn& txin : tx.vin) { if (!coins_cache.HaveCoinInCache(txin.prevout)) { coins_to_uncache.push_back(txin.prevout); } // Note: this call may add txin.prevout to the coins cache // (coins_cache.cacheCoins) by way of FetchCoin(). It should be removed // later (via coins_to_uncache) if this tx turns out to be invalid. if (!m_view.HaveCoin(txin.prevout)) { // Are inputs missing because we already have the tx? for (size_t out = 0; out < tx.vout.size(); out++) { // Optimistically just do efficient check of cache for outputs if (coins_cache.HaveCoinInCache(COutPoint(hash, out))) { return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONFLICT, "txn-already-known"); } } // Otherwise assume this might be an orphan tx for which we just haven't seen parents yet return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS, "bad-txns-inputs-missingorspent"); } } // This is const, but calls into the back end CoinsViews. The CCoinsViewDB at the bottom of the // hierarchy brings the best block into scope. See CCoinsViewDB::GetBestBlock(). m_view.GetBestBlock(); // we have all inputs cached now, so switch back to dummy (to protect // against bugs where we pull more inputs from disk that miss being added // to coins_to_uncache) m_view.SetBackend(m_dummy); assert(m_active_chainstate.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(m_view.GetBestBlock()) == m_active_chainstate.m_chain.Tip()); // Only accept BIP68 sequence locked transactions that can be mined in the next // block; we don't want our mempool filled up with transactions that can't // be mined yet. // Pass in m_view which has all of the relevant inputs cached. Note that, since m_view's // backend was removed, it no longer pulls coins from the mempool. const std::optional<LockPoints> lock_points{CalculateLockPointsAtTip(m_active_chainstate.m_chain.Tip(), m_view, tx)}; if (!lock_points.has_value() || !CheckSequenceLocksAtTip(m_active_chainstate.m_chain.Tip(), *lock_points)) { return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_PREMATURE_SPEND, "non-BIP68-final"); } // The mempool holds txs for the next block, so pass height+1 to CheckTxInputs if (!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, state, m_view, m_active_chainstate.m_chain.Height() + 1, ws.m_base_fees)) { return false; // state filled in by CheckTxInputs } if (m_pool.m_opts.require_standard && !AreInputsStandard(tx, m_view)) { return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD, "bad-txns-nonstandard-inputs"); } // Check for non-standard witnesses. if (tx.HasWitness() && m_pool.m_opts.require_standard && !IsWitnessStandard(tx, m_view)) { return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_MUTATED, "bad-witness-nonstandard"); } int64_t nSigOpsCost = GetTransactionSigOpCost(tx, m_view, STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS); // Keep track of transactions that spend a coinbase, which we re-scan // during reorgs to ensure COINBASE_MATURITY is still met. bool fSpendsCoinbase = false; for (const CTxIn &txin : tx.vin) { const Coin &coin = m_view.AccessCoin(txin.prevout); if (coin.IsCoinBase()) { fSpendsCoinbase = true; break; } } // Set entry_sequence to 0 when bypass_limits is used; this allows txs from a block // reorg to be marked earlier than any child txs that were already in the mempool. const uint64_t entry_sequence = bypass_limits ? 0 : m_pool.GetSequence(); if (!m_subpackage.m_changeset) { m_subpackage.m_changeset = m_pool.GetChangeSet(); } ws.m_tx_handle = m_subpackage.m_changeset->StageAddition(ptx, ws.m_base_fees, nAcceptTime, m_active_chainstate.m_chain.Height(), entry_sequence, fSpendsCoinbase, nSigOpsCost, lock_points.value()); // ws.m_modified_fees includes any fee deltas from PrioritiseTransaction ws.m_modified_fees = ws.m_tx_handle->GetModifiedFee(); ws.m_vsize = ws.m_tx_handle->GetTxSize(); // Enforces 0-fee for dust transactions, no incentive to be mined alone if (m_pool.m_opts.require_standard) { if (!PreCheckEphemeralTx(*ptx, m_pool.m_opts.dust_relay_feerate, ws.m_base_fees, ws.m_modified_fees, state)) { return false; // state filled in by PreCheckEphemeralTx } } if (nSigOpsCost > MAX_STANDARD_TX_SIGOPS_COST) return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, "bad-txns-too-many-sigops", strprintf("%d", nSigOpsCost)); // No individual transactions are allowed below the mempool min feerate except from disconnected // blocks and transactions in a package. Package transactions will be checked using package // feerate later. if (!bypass_limits && !args.m_package_feerates && !CheckFeeRate(ws.m_vsize, ws.m_modified_fees, state)) return false; ws.m_iters_conflicting = m_pool.GetIterSet(ws.m_conflicts); ws.m_parents = m_pool.GetParents(*ws.m_tx_handle); if (!args.m_bypass_limits) { // Perform the TRUC checks, using the in-mempool parents. if (const auto err{SingleTRUCChecks(m_pool, ws.m_ptx, ws.m_parents, ws.m_conflicts, ws.m_vsize)}) { // Single transaction contexts only. if (args.m_allow_sibling_eviction && err->second != nullptr) { // We should only be considering where replacement is considered valid as well. Assume(args.m_allow_replacement); // Potential sibling eviction. Add the sibling to our list of mempool conflicts to be // included in RBF checks. ws.m_conflicts.insert(err->second->GetHash()); // Adding the sibling to m_iters_conflicting here means that it doesn't count towards // RBF Carve Out above. This is correct, since removing to-be-replaced transactions from // the descendant count is done separately in SingleTRUCChecks for TRUC transactions. ws.m_iters_conflicting.insert(m_pool.GetIter(err->second->GetHash()).value()); ws.m_sibling_eviction = true; // The sibling will be treated as part of the to-be-replaced set in ReplacementChecks. // Note that we are not checking whether it opts in to replaceability via BIP125 or TRUC // (which is normally done in PreChecks). However, the only way a TRUC transaction can // have a non-TRUC and non-BIP125 descendant is due to a reorg. } else { return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "TRUC-violation", err->first); } } } // We want to detect conflicts in any tx in a package to trigger package RBF logic m_subpackage.m_rbf |= !ws.m_conflicts.empty(); return true; } bool MemPoolAccept::ReplacementChecks(Workspace& ws) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs); const CTransaction& tx = *ws.m_ptx; const Txid& hash = ws.m_hash; TxValidationState& state = ws.m_state; CFeeRate newFeeRate(ws.m_modified_fees, ws.m_vsize); CTxMemPool::setEntries all_conflicts; // Calculate all conflicting entries and enforce Rule #5. if (const auto err_string{GetEntriesForConflicts(tx, m_pool, ws.m_iters_conflicting, all_conflicts)}) { return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, strprintf("too many potential replacements%s", ws.m_sibling_eviction ? " (including sibling eviction)" : ""), *err_string); } // Check if it's economically rational to mine this transaction rather than the ones it // replaces and pays for its own relay fees. Enforce Rules #3 and #4. for (CTxMemPool::txiter it : all_conflicts) { m_subpackage.m_conflicting_fees += it->GetModifiedFee(); m_subpackage.m_conflicting_size += it->GetTxSize(); } if (const auto err_string{PaysForRBF(m_subpackage.m_conflicting_fees, ws.m_modified_fees, ws.m_vsize, m_pool.m_opts.incremental_relay_feerate, hash)}) { // Result may change in a package context return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_RECONSIDERABLE, strprintf("insufficient fee%s", ws.m_sibling_eviction ? " (including sibling eviction)" : ""), *err_string); } // Add all the to-be-removed transactions to the changeset. for (auto it : all_conflicts) { m_subpackage.m_changeset->StageRemoval(it); } // Run cluster size limit checks and fail if we exceed them. if (!m_subpackage.m_changeset->CheckMemPoolPolicyLimits()) { return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "too-large-cluster", ""); } if (const auto err_string{ImprovesFeerateDiagram(*m_subpackage.m_changeset)}) { // We checked above for the cluster size limits being respected, so a // failure here can only be due to an insufficient fee. Assume(err_string->first == DiagramCheckError::FAILURE); return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_RECONSIDERABLE, "replacement-failed", err_string->second); } return true; } bool MemPoolAccept::PackageRBFChecks(const std::vector<CTransactionRef>& txns, std::vector<Workspace>& workspaces, const int64_t total_vsize, PackageValidationState& package_state) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs); assert(std::all_of(txns.cbegin(), txns.cend(), [this](const auto& tx) { return !m_pool.exists(tx->GetHash());})); assert(txns.size() == workspaces.size()); // We're in package RBF context; replacement proposal must be size 2 if (workspaces.size() != 2 || !Assume(IsChildWithParents(txns))) { return package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_POLICY, "package RBF failed: package must be 1-parent-1-child"); } // If the package has in-mempool parents, we won't consider a package RBF // since it would result in a cluster larger than 2. // N.B. To relax this constraint we will need to revisit how CCoinsViewMemPool::PackageAddTransaction // is being used inside AcceptMultipleTransactions to track available inputs while processing a package. // Specifically we would need to check that the ancestors of the new // transactions don't intersect with the set of transactions to be removed // due to RBF, which is not checked at all in the package acceptance // context. for (const auto& ws : workspaces) { if (!ws.m_parents.empty()) { return package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_POLICY, "package RBF failed: new transaction cannot have mempool ancestors"); } } // Aggregate all conflicts into one set. CTxMemPool::setEntries direct_conflict_iters; for (Workspace& ws : workspaces) { // Aggregate all conflicts into one set. direct_conflict_iters.merge(ws.m_iters_conflicting); } const auto& parent_ws = workspaces[0]; const auto& child_ws = workspaces[1]; // Don't consider replacements that would cause us to remove a large number of mempool entries. // This limit is not increased in a package RBF. Use the aggregate number of transactions. CTxMemPool::setEntries all_conflicts; if (const auto err_string{GetEntriesForConflicts(*child_ws.m_ptx, m_pool, direct_conflict_iters, all_conflicts)}) { return package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_POLICY, "package RBF failed: too many potential replacements", *err_string); } for (CTxMemPool::txiter it : all_conflicts) { m_subpackage.m_changeset->StageRemoval(it); m_subpackage.m_conflicting_fees += it->GetModifiedFee(); m_subpackage.m_conflicting_size += it->GetTxSize(); } // Use the child as the transaction for attributing errors to. const Txid& child_hash = child_ws.m_ptx->GetHash(); if (const auto err_string{PaysForRBF(/*original_fees=*/m_subpackage.m_conflicting_fees, /*replacement_fees=*/m_subpackage.m_total_modified_fees, /*replacement_vsize=*/m_subpackage.m_total_vsize, m_pool.m_opts.incremental_relay_feerate, child_hash)}) { return package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_POLICY, "package RBF failed: insufficient anti-DoS fees", *err_string); } // Ensure this two transaction package is a "chunk" on its own; we don't want the child // to be only paying anti-DoS fees const CFeeRate parent_feerate(parent_ws.m_modified_fees, parent_ws.m_vsize); const CFeeRate package_feerate(m_subpackage.m_total_modified_fees, m_subpackage.m_total_vsize); if (package_feerate <= parent_feerate) { return package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_POLICY, "package RBF failed: package feerate is less than or equal to parent feerate", strprintf("package feerate %s <= parent feerate is %s", package_feerate.ToString(), parent_feerate.ToString())); } // Run cluster size limit checks and fail if we exceed them. if (!m_subpackage.m_changeset->CheckMemPoolPolicyLimits()) { return package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_POLICY, "too-large-cluster", ""); } // Check if it's economically rational to mine this package rather than the ones it replaces. if (const auto err_tup{ImprovesFeerateDiagram(*m_subpackage.m_changeset)}) { Assume(err_tup->first == DiagramCheckError::FAILURE); return package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_POLICY, "package RBF failed: " + err_tup.value().second, ""); } LogDebug(BCLog::TXPACKAGES, "package RBF checks passed: parent %s (wtxid=%s), child %s (wtxid=%s), package hash (%s)\n", txns.front()->GetHash().ToString(), txns.front()->GetWitnessHash().ToString(), txns.back()->GetHash().ToString(), txns.back()->GetWitnessHash().ToString(), GetPackageHash(txns).ToString()); return true; } bool MemPoolAccept::PolicyScriptChecks(const ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs); const CTransaction& tx = *ws.m_ptx; TxValidationState& state = ws.m_state; constexpr script_verify_flags scriptVerifyFlags = STANDARD_SCRIPT_VERIFY_FLAGS; // Check input scripts and signatures. // This is done last to help prevent CPU exhaustion denial-of-service attacks. if (!CheckInputScripts(tx, state, m_view, scriptVerifyFlags, true, false, ws.m_precomputed_txdata, GetValidationCache())) { // Detect a failure due to a missing witness so that p2p code can handle rejection caching appropriately. if (!tx.HasWitness() && SpendsNonAnchorWitnessProg(tx, m_view)) { state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_WITNESS_STRIPPED, state.GetRejectReason(), state.GetDebugMessage()); } return false; // state filled in by CheckInputScripts } return true; } bool MemPoolAccept::ConsensusScriptChecks(const ATMPArgs& args, Workspace& ws) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs); const CTransaction& tx = *ws.m_ptx; const Txid& hash = ws.m_hash; TxValidationState& state = ws.m_state; // Check again against the current block tip's script verification // flags to cache our script execution flags. This is, of course, // useless if the next block has different script flags from the // previous one, but because the cache tracks script flags for us it // will auto-invalidate and we'll just have a few blocks of extra // misses on soft-fork activation. // // This is also useful in case of bugs in the standard flags that cause // transactions to pass as valid when they're actually invalid. For // instance the STRICTENC flag was incorrectly allowing certain // CHECKSIG NOT scripts to pass, even though they were invalid. // // There is a similar check in CreateNewBlock() to prevent creating // invalid blocks (using TestBlockValidity), however allowing such // transactions into the mempool can be exploited as a DoS attack. script_verify_flags currentBlockScriptVerifyFlags{GetBlockScriptFlags(*m_active_chainstate.m_chain.Tip(), m_active_chainstate.m_chainman)}; if (!CheckInputsFromMempoolAndCache(tx, state, m_view, m_pool, currentBlockScriptVerifyFlags, ws.m_precomputed_txdata, m_active_chainstate.CoinsTip(), GetValidationCache())) { LogError("BUG! PLEASE REPORT THIS! CheckInputScripts failed against latest-block but not STANDARD flags %s, %s", hash.ToString(), state.ToString()); return Assume(false); } return true; } void MemPoolAccept::FinalizeSubpackage(const ATMPArgs& args) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs); if (!m_subpackage.m_changeset->GetRemovals().empty()) Assume(args.m_allow_replacement); // Remove conflicting transactions from the mempool for (CTxMemPool::txiter it : m_subpackage.m_changeset->GetRemovals()) { std::string log_string = strprintf("replacing mempool tx %s (wtxid=%s, fees=%s, vsize=%s). ", it->GetTx().GetHash().ToString(), it->GetTx().GetWitnessHash().ToString(), it->GetFee(), it->GetTxSize()); FeeFrac feerate{m_subpackage.m_total_modified_fees, int32_t(m_subpackage.m_total_vsize)}; uint256 tx_or_package_hash{}; const bool replaced_with_tx{m_subpackage.m_changeset->GetTxCount() == 1}; if (replaced_with_tx) { const CTransaction& tx = m_subpackage.m_changeset->GetAddedTxn(0); tx_or_package_hash = tx.GetHash().ToUint256(); log_string += strprintf("New tx %s (wtxid=%s, fees=%s, vsize=%s)", tx.GetHash().ToString(), tx.GetWitnessHash().ToString(), feerate.fee, feerate.size); } else { tx_or_package_hash = GetPackageHash(m_subpackage.m_changeset->GetAddedTxns()); log_string += strprintf("New package %s with %lu txs, fees=%s, vsize=%s", tx_or_package_hash.ToString(), m_subpackage.m_changeset->GetTxCount(), feerate.fee, feerate.size); } LogDebug(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "%s\n", log_string); TRACEPOINT(mempool, replaced, it->GetTx().GetHash().data(), it->GetTxSize(), it->GetFee(), std::chrono::duration_cast<std::chrono::duration<std::uint64_t>>(it->GetTime()).count(), tx_or_package_hash.data(), feerate.size, feerate.fee, replaced_with_tx ); m_subpackage.m_replaced_transactions.push_back(it->GetSharedTx()); } m_subpackage.m_changeset->Apply(); m_subpackage.m_changeset.reset(); } bool MemPoolAccept::SubmitPackage(const ATMPArgs& args, std::vector<Workspace>& workspaces, PackageValidationState& package_state, std::map<Wtxid, MempoolAcceptResult>& results) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs); // Sanity check: none of the transactions should be in the mempool, and none of the transactions // should have a same-txid-different-witness equivalent in the mempool. assert(std::all_of(workspaces.cbegin(), workspaces.cend(), [this](const auto& ws) { return !m_pool.exists(ws.m_ptx->GetHash()); })); bool all_submitted = true; FinalizeSubpackage(args); // ConsensusScriptChecks adds to the script cache and is therefore consensus-critical; // CheckInputsFromMempoolAndCache asserts that transactions only spend coins available from the // mempool or UTXO set. Submit each transaction to the mempool immediately after calling // ConsensusScriptChecks to make the outputs available for subsequent transactions. for (Workspace& ws : workspaces) { if (!ConsensusScriptChecks(args, ws)) { results.emplace(ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash(), MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state)); // Since PolicyScriptChecks() passed, this should never fail. Assume(false); all_submitted = false; package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_MEMPOOL_ERROR, strprintf("BUG! PolicyScriptChecks succeeded but ConsensusScriptChecks failed: %s", ws.m_ptx->GetHash().ToString())); // Remove the transaction from the mempool. if (!m_subpackage.m_changeset) m_subpackage.m_changeset = m_pool.GetChangeSet(); m_subpackage.m_changeset->StageRemoval(m_pool.GetIter(ws.m_ptx->GetHash()).value()); } } if (!all_submitted) { Assume(m_subpackage.m_changeset); // This code should be unreachable; it's here as belt-and-suspenders // to try to ensure we have no consensus-invalid transactions in the // mempool. m_subpackage.m_changeset->Apply(); m_subpackage.m_changeset.reset(); return false; } std::vector<Wtxid> all_package_wtxids; all_package_wtxids.reserve(workspaces.size()); std::transform(workspaces.cbegin(), workspaces.cend(), std::back_inserter(all_package_wtxids), [](const auto& ws) { return ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash(); }); if (!m_subpackage.m_replaced_transactions.empty()) { LogDebug(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "replaced %u mempool transactions with %u new one(s) for %s additional fees, %d delta bytes\n", m_subpackage.m_replaced_transactions.size(), workspaces.size(), m_subpackage.m_total_modified_fees - m_subpackage.m_conflicting_fees, m_subpackage.m_total_vsize - static_cast<int>(m_subpackage.m_conflicting_size)); } // Add successful results. The returned results may change later if LimitMempoolSize() evicts them. for (Workspace& ws : workspaces) { auto iter = m_pool.GetIter(ws.m_ptx->GetHash()); Assume(iter.has_value()); const auto effective_feerate = args.m_package_feerates ? ws.m_package_feerate : CFeeRate{ws.m_modified_fees, static_cast<int32_t>(ws.m_vsize)}; const auto effective_feerate_wtxids = args.m_package_feerates ? all_package_wtxids : std::vector<Wtxid>{ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash()}; results.emplace(ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash(), MempoolAcceptResult::Success(std::move(m_subpackage.m_replaced_transactions), ws.m_vsize, ws.m_base_fees, effective_feerate, effective_feerate_wtxids)); if (!m_pool.m_opts.signals) continue; const CTransaction& tx = *ws.m_ptx; const auto tx_info = NewMempoolTransactionInfo(ws.m_ptx, ws.m_base_fees, ws.m_vsize, (*iter)->GetHeight(), args.m_bypass_limits, args.m_package_submission, IsCurrentForFeeEstimation(m_active_chainstate), m_pool.HasNoInputsOf(tx)); m_pool.m_opts.signals->TransactionAddedToMempool(tx_info, m_pool.GetAndIncrementSequence()); } return all_submitted; } MempoolAcceptResult MemPoolAccept::AcceptSingleTransactionInternal(const CTransactionRef& ptx, ATMPArgs& args) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs); Workspace ws(ptx); const std::vector<Wtxid> single_wtxid{ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash()}; if (!PreChecks(args, ws)) { if (ws.m_state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_RECONSIDERABLE) { // Failed for fee reasons. Provide the effective feerate and which tx was included. return MempoolAcceptResult::FeeFailure(ws.m_state, CFeeRate(ws.m_modified_fees, ws.m_vsize), single_wtxid); } return MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state); } if (m_subpackage.m_rbf && !ReplacementChecks(ws)) { if (ws.m_state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_RECONSIDERABLE) { // Failed for incentives-based fee reasons. Provide the effective feerate and which tx was included. return MempoolAcceptResult::FeeFailure(ws.m_state, CFeeRate(ws.m_modified_fees, ws.m_vsize), single_wtxid); } return MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state); } // Check if the transaction would exceed the cluster size limit. if (!m_subpackage.m_changeset->CheckMemPoolPolicyLimits()) { ws.m_state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "too-large-cluster", ""); return MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state); } // Now that we've verified the cluster limit is respected, we can perform // calculations involving the full ancestors of the tx. if (ws.m_conflicts.size()) { auto ancestors = m_subpackage.m_changeset->CalculateMemPoolAncestors(ws.m_tx_handle); // A transaction that spends outputs that would be replaced by it is invalid. Now // that we have the set of all ancestors we can detect this // pathological case by making sure ws.m_conflicts and this tx's ancestors don't // intersect. if (const auto err_string{EntriesAndTxidsDisjoint(ancestors, ws.m_conflicts, ptx->GetHash())}) { // We classify this as a consensus error because a transaction depending on something it // conflicts with would be inconsistent. ws.m_state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-spends-conflicting-tx", *err_string); return MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state); } } m_subpackage.m_total_vsize = ws.m_vsize; m_subpackage.m_total_modified_fees = ws.m_modified_fees; // Individual modified feerate exceeded caller-defined max; abort if (args.m_client_maxfeerate && CFeeRate(ws.m_modified_fees, ws.m_vsize) > args.m_client_maxfeerate.value()) { ws.m_state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "max feerate exceeded", ""); return MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state); } if (!args.m_bypass_limits && m_pool.m_opts.require_standard) { Wtxid dummy_wtxid; if (!CheckEphemeralSpends(/*package=*/{ptx}, m_pool.m_opts.dust_relay_feerate, m_pool, ws.m_state, dummy_wtxid)) { return MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state); } } // Perform the inexpensive checks first and avoid hashing and signature verification unless // those checks pass, to mitigate CPU exhaustion denial-of-service attacks. if (!PolicyScriptChecks(args, ws)) return MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state); if (!ConsensusScriptChecks(args, ws)) return MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state); const CFeeRate effective_feerate{ws.m_modified_fees, static_cast<int32_t>(ws.m_vsize)}; // Tx was accepted, but not added if (args.m_test_accept) { return MempoolAcceptResult::Success(std::move(m_subpackage.m_replaced_transactions), ws.m_vsize, ws.m_base_fees, effective_feerate, single_wtxid); } FinalizeSubpackage(args); // Limit the mempool, if appropriate. if (!args.m_package_submission && !args.m_bypass_limits) { LimitMempoolSize(m_pool, m_active_chainstate.CoinsTip()); // If mempool contents change, then the m_view cache is dirty. Given this isn't a package // submission, we won't be using the cache anymore, but clear it anyway for clarity. CleanupTemporaryCoins(); if (!m_pool.exists(ws.m_hash)) { // The tx no longer meets our (new) mempool minimum feerate but could be reconsidered in a package. ws.m_state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_RECONSIDERABLE, "mempool full"); return MempoolAcceptResult::FeeFailure(ws.m_state, CFeeRate(ws.m_modified_fees, ws.m_vsize), {ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash()}); } } if (m_pool.m_opts.signals) { const CTransaction& tx = *ws.m_ptx; auto iter = m_pool.GetIter(tx.GetHash()); Assume(iter.has_value()); const auto tx_info = NewMempoolTransactionInfo(ws.m_ptx, ws.m_base_fees, ws.m_vsize, (*iter)->GetHeight(), args.m_bypass_limits, args.m_package_submission, IsCurrentForFeeEstimation(m_active_chainstate), m_pool.HasNoInputsOf(tx)); m_pool.m_opts.signals->TransactionAddedToMempool(tx_info, m_pool.GetAndIncrementSequence()); } if (!m_subpackage.m_replaced_transactions.empty()) { LogDebug(BCLog::MEMPOOL, "replaced %u mempool transactions with 1 new transaction for %s additional fees, %d delta bytes\n", m_subpackage.m_replaced_transactions.size(), ws.m_modified_fees - m_subpackage.m_conflicting_fees, ws.m_vsize - static_cast<int>(m_subpackage.m_conflicting_size)); } return MempoolAcceptResult::Success(std::move(m_subpackage.m_replaced_transactions), ws.m_vsize, ws.m_base_fees, effective_feerate, single_wtxid); } PackageMempoolAcceptResult MemPoolAccept::AcceptMultipleTransactionsInternal(const std::vector<CTransactionRef>& txns, ATMPArgs& args) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs); // These context-free package limits can be done before taking the mempool lock. PackageValidationState package_state; if (!IsWellFormedPackage(txns, package_state)) return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state, {}); std::vector<Workspace> workspaces{}; workspaces.reserve(txns.size()); std::transform(txns.cbegin(), txns.cend(), std::back_inserter(workspaces), [](const auto& tx) { return Workspace(tx); }); std::map<Wtxid, MempoolAcceptResult> results; // Do all PreChecks first and fail fast to avoid running expensive script checks when unnecessary. for (Workspace& ws : workspaces) { if (!PreChecks(args, ws)) { package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX, "transaction failed"); // Exit early to avoid doing pointless work. Update the failed tx result; the rest are unfinished. results.emplace(ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash(), MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state)); return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state, std::move(results)); } // Individual modified feerate exceeded caller-defined max; abort // N.B. this doesn't take into account CPFPs. Chunk-aware validation may be more robust. if (args.m_client_maxfeerate && CFeeRate(ws.m_modified_fees, ws.m_vsize) > args.m_client_maxfeerate.value()) { // Need to set failure here both individually and at package level ws.m_state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "max feerate exceeded", ""); package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX, "transaction failed"); // Exit early to avoid doing pointless work. Update the failed tx result; the rest are unfinished. results.emplace(ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash(), MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state)); return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state, std::move(results)); } // Make the coins created by this transaction available for subsequent transactions in the // package to spend. If there are no conflicts within the package, no transaction can spend a coin // needed by another transaction in the package. We also need to make sure that no package // tx replaces (or replaces the ancestor of) the parent of another package tx. As long as we // check these two things, we don't need to track the coins spent. // If a package tx conflicts with a mempool tx, PackageRBFChecks() ensures later that any package RBF attempt // has *no* in-mempool ancestors, so we don't have to worry about subsequent transactions in // same package spending the same in-mempool outpoints. This needs to be revisited for general // package RBF. m_viewmempool.PackageAddTransaction(ws.m_ptx); } // At this point we have all in-mempool parents, and we know every transaction's vsize. // Run the TRUC checks on the package. for (Workspace& ws : workspaces) { if (auto err{PackageTRUCChecks(m_pool, ws.m_ptx, ws.m_vsize, txns, ws.m_parents)}) { package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_POLICY, "TRUC-violation", err.value()); return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state, {}); } } // Transactions must meet two minimum feerates: the mempool minimum fee and min relay fee. // For transactions consisting of exactly one child and its parents, it suffices to use the // package feerate (total modified fees / total virtual size) to check this requirement. // Note that this is an aggregate feerate; this function has not checked that there are transactions // too low feerate to pay for themselves, or that the child transactions are higher feerate than // their parents. Using aggregate feerate may allow "parents pay for child" behavior and permit // a child that is below mempool minimum feerate. To avoid these behaviors, callers of // AcceptMultipleTransactions need to restrict txns topology (e.g. to ancestor sets) and check // the feerates of individuals and subsets. m_subpackage.m_total_vsize = std::accumulate(workspaces.cbegin(), workspaces.cend(), int64_t{0}, [](int64_t sum, auto& ws) { return sum + ws.m_vsize; }); m_subpackage.m_total_modified_fees = std::accumulate(workspaces.cbegin(), workspaces.cend(), CAmount{0}, [](CAmount sum, auto& ws) { return sum + ws.m_modified_fees; }); const CFeeRate package_feerate(m_subpackage.m_total_modified_fees, m_subpackage.m_total_vsize); std::vector<Wtxid> all_package_wtxids; all_package_wtxids.reserve(workspaces.size()); std::transform(workspaces.cbegin(), workspaces.cend(), std::back_inserter(all_package_wtxids), [](const auto& ws) { return ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash(); }); TxValidationState placeholder_state; if (args.m_package_feerates && !CheckFeeRate(m_subpackage.m_total_vsize, m_subpackage.m_total_modified_fees, placeholder_state)) { package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX, "transaction failed"); return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state, {{workspaces.back().m_ptx->GetWitnessHash(), MempoolAcceptResult::FeeFailure(placeholder_state, CFeeRate(m_subpackage.m_total_modified_fees, m_subpackage.m_total_vsize), all_package_wtxids)}}); } // Apply package mempool RBF checks. if (m_subpackage.m_rbf && !PackageRBFChecks(txns, workspaces, m_subpackage.m_total_vsize, package_state)) { return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state, std::move(results)); } // Check if the transactions would exceed the cluster size limit. if (!m_subpackage.m_changeset->CheckMemPoolPolicyLimits()) { package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_POLICY, "too-large-cluster", ""); return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state, std::move(results)); } // Now that we've bounded the resulting possible ancestry count, check package for dust spends if (m_pool.m_opts.require_standard) { TxValidationState child_state; Wtxid child_wtxid; if (!CheckEphemeralSpends(txns, m_pool.m_opts.dust_relay_feerate, m_pool, child_state, child_wtxid)) { package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX, "unspent-dust"); results.emplace(child_wtxid, MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(child_state)); return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state, std::move(results)); } } for (Workspace& ws : workspaces) { ws.m_package_feerate = package_feerate; if (!PolicyScriptChecks(args, ws)) { // Exit early to avoid doing pointless work. Update the failed tx result; the rest are unfinished. package_state.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX, "transaction failed"); results.emplace(ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash(), MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(ws.m_state)); return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state, std::move(results)); } if (args.m_test_accept) { const auto effective_feerate = args.m_package_feerates ? ws.m_package_feerate : CFeeRate{ws.m_modified_fees, static_cast<int32_t>(ws.m_vsize)}; const auto effective_feerate_wtxids = args.m_package_feerates ? all_package_wtxids : std::vector<Wtxid>{ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash()}; results.emplace(ws.m_ptx->GetWitnessHash(), MempoolAcceptResult::Success(std::move(m_subpackage.m_replaced_transactions), ws.m_vsize, ws.m_base_fees, effective_feerate, effective_feerate_wtxids)); } } if (args.m_test_accept) return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state, std::move(results)); if (!SubmitPackage(args, workspaces, package_state, results)) { // PackageValidationState filled in by SubmitPackage(). return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state, std::move(results)); } return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state, std::move(results)); } void MemPoolAccept::CleanupTemporaryCoins() { // There are 3 kinds of coins in m_view: // (1) Temporary coins from the transactions in subpackage, constructed by m_viewmempool. // (2) Mempool coins from transactions in the mempool, constructed by m_viewmempool. // (3) Confirmed coins fetched from our current UTXO set. // // (1) Temporary coins need to be removed, regardless of whether the transaction was submitted. // If the transaction was submitted to the mempool, m_viewmempool will be able to fetch them from // there. If it wasn't submitted to mempool, it is incorrect to keep them - future calls may try // to spend those coins that don't actually exist. // (2) Mempool coins also need to be removed. If the mempool contents have changed as a result // of submitting or replacing transactions, coins previously fetched from mempool may now be // spent or nonexistent. Those coins need to be deleted from m_view. // (3) Confirmed coins don't need to be removed. The chainstate has not changed (we are // holding cs_main and no blocks have been processed) so the confirmed tx cannot disappear like // a mempool tx can. The coin may now be spent after we submitted a tx to mempool, but // we have already checked that the package does not have 2 transactions spending the same coin // and we check whether a mempool transaction spends conflicting coins (CTxMemPool::GetConflictTx). // Keeping them in m_view is an optimization to not re-fetch confirmed coins if we later look up // inputs for this transaction again. for (const auto& outpoint : m_viewmempool.GetNonBaseCoins()) { // In addition to resetting m_viewmempool, we also need to manually delete these coins from // m_view because it caches copies of the coins it fetched from m_viewmempool previously. m_view.Uncache(outpoint); } // This deletes the temporary and mempool coins. m_viewmempool.Reset(); } PackageMempoolAcceptResult MemPoolAccept::AcceptSubPackage(const std::vector<CTransactionRef>& subpackage, ATMPArgs& args) { AssertLockHeld(::cs_main); AssertLockHeld(m_pool.cs); auto result = [&]() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main, m_pool.cs) { if (subpackage.size() > 1) { return AcceptMultipleTransactionsInternal(subpackage, args); } const auto& tx = subpackage.front(); ATMPArgs single_args = ATMPArgs::SingleInPackageAccept(args); const auto single_res = AcceptSingleTransactionInternal(tx, single_args); PackageValidationState package_state_wrapped; if (single_res.m_result_type != MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID) { package_state_wrapped.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX, "transaction failed"); } return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state_wrapped, {{tx->GetWitnessHash(), single_res}}); }(); // Clean up m_view and m_viewmempool so that other subpackage evaluations don't have access to // coins they shouldn't. Keep some coins in order to minimize re-fetching coins from the UTXO set. // Clean up package feerate and rbf calculations ClearSubPackageState(); return result; } PackageMempoolAcceptResult MemPoolAccept::AcceptPackage(const Package& package, ATMPArgs& args) { Assert(!package.empty()); AssertLockHeld(cs_main); // Used if returning a PackageMempoolAcceptResult directly from this function. PackageValidationState package_state_quit_early; // There are two topologies we are able to handle through this function: // (1) A single transaction // (2) A child-with-parents package. // Check that the package is well-formed. If it isn't, we won't try to validate any of the // transactions and thus won't return any MempoolAcceptResults, just a package-wide error. // Context-free package checks. if (!IsWellFormedPackage(package, package_state_quit_early)) { return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state_quit_early, {}); } if (package.size() > 1 && !IsChildWithParents(package)) { // All transactions in the package must be a parent of the last transaction. This is just an // opportunity for us to fail fast on a context-free check without taking the mempool lock. package_state_quit_early.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_POLICY, "package-not-child-with-parents"); return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state_quit_early, {}); } LOCK(m_pool.cs); // Stores results from which we will create the returned PackageMempoolAcceptResult. // A result may be changed if a mempool transaction is evicted later due to LimitMempoolSize(). std::map<Wtxid, MempoolAcceptResult> results_final; // Results from individual validation which will be returned if no other result is available for // this transaction. "Nonfinal" because if a transaction fails by itself but succeeds later // (i.e. when evaluated with a fee-bumping child), the result in this map may be discarded. std::map<Wtxid, MempoolAcceptResult> individual_results_nonfinal; // Tracks whether we think package submission could result in successful entry to the mempool bool quit_early{false}; std::vector<CTransactionRef> txns_package_eval; for (const auto& tx : package) { const auto& wtxid = tx->GetWitnessHash(); const auto& txid = tx->GetHash(); // There are 3 possibilities: already in mempool, same-txid-diff-wtxid already in mempool, // or not in mempool. An already confirmed tx is treated as one not in mempool, because all // we know is that the inputs aren't available. if (m_pool.exists(wtxid)) { // Exact transaction already exists in the mempool. // Node operators are free to set their mempool policies however they please, nodes may receive // transactions in different orders, and malicious counterparties may try to take advantage of // policy differences to pin or delay propagation of transactions. As such, it's possible for // some package transaction(s) to already be in the mempool, and we don't want to reject the // entire package in that case (as that could be a censorship vector). De-duplicate the // transactions that are already in the mempool, and only call AcceptMultipleTransactions() with // the new transactions. This ensures we don't double-count transaction counts and sizes when // checking ancestor/descendant limits, or double-count transaction fees for fee-related policy. const auto& entry{*Assert(m_pool.GetEntry(txid))}; results_final.emplace(wtxid, MempoolAcceptResult::MempoolTx(entry.GetTxSize(), entry.GetFee())); } else if (m_pool.exists(txid)) { // Transaction with the same non-witness data but different witness (same txid, // different wtxid) already exists in the mempool. // // We don't allow replacement transactions right now, so just swap the package // transaction for the mempool one. Note that we are ignoring the validity of the // package transaction passed in. // TODO: allow witness replacement in packages. const auto& entry{*Assert(m_pool.GetEntry(txid))}; // Provide the wtxid of the mempool tx so that the caller can look it up in the mempool. results_final.emplace(wtxid, MempoolAcceptResult::MempoolTxDifferentWitness(entry.GetTx().GetWitnessHash())); } else { // Transaction does not already exist in the mempool. // Try submitting the transaction on its own. const auto single_package_res = AcceptSubPackage({tx}, args); const auto& single_res = single_package_res.m_tx_results.at(wtxid); if (single_res.m_result_type == MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID) { // The transaction succeeded on its own and is now in the mempool. Don't include it // in package validation, because its fees should only be "used" once. assert(m_pool.exists(wtxid)); results_final.emplace(wtxid, single_res); } else if (package.size() == 1 || // If there is only one transaction, no need to retry it "as a package" (single_res.m_state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_RECONSIDERABLE && single_res.m_state.GetResult() != TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS)) { // Package validation policy only differs from individual policy in its evaluation // of feerate. For example, if a transaction fails here due to violation of a // consensus rule, the result will not change when it is submitted as part of a // package. To minimize the amount of repeated work, unless the transaction fails // due to feerate or missing inputs (its parent is a previous transaction in the // package that failed due to feerate), don't run package validation. Note that this // decision might not make sense if different types of packages are allowed in the // future. Continue individually validating the rest of the transactions, because // some of them may still be valid. quit_early = true; package_state_quit_early.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX, "transaction failed"); individual_results_nonfinal.emplace(wtxid, single_res); } else { individual_results_nonfinal.emplace(wtxid, single_res); txns_package_eval.push_back(tx); } } } auto multi_submission_result = quit_early || txns_package_eval.empty() ? PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state_quit_early, {}) : AcceptSubPackage(txns_package_eval, args); PackageValidationState& package_state_final = multi_submission_result.m_state; // This is invoked by AcceptSubPackage() already, so this is just here for // clarity (since it's not permitted to invoke LimitMempoolSize() while a // changeset is outstanding). ClearSubPackageState(); // Make sure we haven't exceeded max mempool size. // Package transactions that were submitted to mempool or already in mempool may be evicted. // If mempool contents change, then the m_view cache is dirty. It has already been cleared above. LimitMempoolSize(m_pool, m_active_chainstate.CoinsTip()); for (const auto& tx : package) { const auto& wtxid = tx->GetWitnessHash(); if (multi_submission_result.m_tx_results.contains(wtxid)) { // We shouldn't have re-submitted if the tx result was already in results_final. Assume(!results_final.contains(wtxid)); // If it was submitted, check to see if the tx is still in the mempool. It could have // been evicted due to LimitMempoolSize() above. const auto& txresult = multi_submission_result.m_tx_results.at(wtxid); if (txresult.m_result_type == MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID && !m_pool.exists(wtxid)) { package_state_final.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX, "transaction failed"); TxValidationState mempool_full_state; mempool_full_state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "mempool full"); results_final.emplace(wtxid, MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(mempool_full_state)); } else { results_final.emplace(wtxid, txresult); } } else if (const auto it{results_final.find(wtxid)}; it != results_final.end()) { // Already-in-mempool transaction. Check to see if it's still there, as it could have // been evicted when LimitMempoolSize() was called. Assume(it->second.m_result_type != MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::INVALID); Assume(!individual_results_nonfinal.contains(wtxid)); // Query by txid to include the same-txid-different-witness ones. if (!m_pool.exists(tx->GetHash())) { package_state_final.Invalid(PackageValidationResult::PCKG_TX, "transaction failed"); TxValidationState mempool_full_state; mempool_full_state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY, "mempool full"); // Replace the previous result. results_final.erase(wtxid); results_final.emplace(wtxid, MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(mempool_full_state)); } } else if (const auto it{individual_results_nonfinal.find(wtxid)}; it != individual_results_nonfinal.end()) { Assume(it->second.m_result_type == MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::INVALID); // Interesting result from previous processing. results_final.emplace(wtxid, it->second); } } Assume(results_final.size() == package.size()); return PackageMempoolAcceptResult(package_state_final, std::move(results_final)); } } // anon namespace MempoolAcceptResult AcceptToMemoryPool(Chainstate& active_chainstate, const CTransactionRef& tx, int64_t accept_time, bool bypass_limits, bool test_accept) { AssertLockHeld(::cs_main); const CChainParams& chainparams{active_chainstate.m_chainman.GetParams()}; assert(active_chainstate.GetMempool() != nullptr); CTxMemPool& pool{*active_chainstate.GetMempool()}; std::vector<COutPoint> coins_to_uncache; auto args = MemPoolAccept::ATMPArgs::SingleAccept(chainparams, accept_time, bypass_limits, coins_to_uncache, test_accept); MempoolAcceptResult result = MemPoolAccept(pool, active_chainstate).AcceptSingleTransactionAndCleanup(tx, args); if (result.m_result_type != MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID) { // Remove coins that were not present in the coins cache before calling // AcceptSingleTransaction(); this is to prevent memory DoS in case we receive a large // number of invalid transactions that attempt to overrun the in-memory coins cache // (`CCoinsViewCache::cacheCoins`). for (const COutPoint& hashTx : coins_to_uncache) active_chainstate.CoinsTip().Uncache(hashTx); TRACEPOINT(mempool, rejected, tx->GetHash().data(), result.m_state.GetRejectReason().c_str() ); } // After we've (potentially) uncached entries, ensure our coins cache is still within its size limits BlockValidationState state_dummy; active_chainstate.FlushStateToDisk(state_dummy, FlushStateMode::PERIODIC); return result; } PackageMempoolAcceptResult ProcessNewPackage(Chainstate& active_chainstate, CTxMemPool& pool, const Package& package, bool test_accept, const std::optional<CFeeRate>& client_maxfeerate) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); assert(!package.empty()); assert(std::all_of(package.cbegin(), package.cend(), [](const auto& tx){return tx != nullptr;})); std::vector<COutPoint> coins_to_uncache; const CChainParams& chainparams = active_chainstate.m_chainman.GetParams(); auto result = [&]() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); if (test_accept) { auto args = MemPoolAccept::ATMPArgs::PackageTestAccept(chainparams, GetTime(), coins_to_uncache); return MemPoolAccept(pool, active_chainstate).AcceptMultipleTransactionsAndCleanup(package, args); } else { auto args = MemPoolAccept::ATMPArgs::PackageChildWithParents(chainparams, GetTime(), coins_to_uncache, client_maxfeerate); return MemPoolAccept(pool, active_chainstate).AcceptPackage(package, args); } }(); // Uncache coins pertaining to transactions that were not submitted to the mempool. if (test_accept || result.m_state.IsInvalid()) { for (const COutPoint& hashTx : coins_to_uncache) { active_chainstate.CoinsTip().Uncache(hashTx); } } // Ensure the coins cache is still within limits. BlockValidationState state_dummy; active_chainstate.FlushStateToDisk(state_dummy, FlushStateMode::PERIODIC); return result; } CAmount GetBlockSubsidy(int nHeight, const Consensus::Params& consensusParams) { int halvings = nHeight / consensusParams.nSubsidyHalvingInterval; // Force block reward to zero when right shift is undefined. if (halvings >= 64) return 0; CAmount nSubsidy = 50 * COIN; // Subsidy is cut in half every 210,000 blocks which will occur approximately every 4 years. nSubsidy >>= halvings; return nSubsidy; } CoinsViews::CoinsViews(DBParams db_params, CoinsViewOptions options) : m_dbview{std::move(db_params), std::move(options)}, m_catcherview(&m_dbview) {} void CoinsViews::InitCache() { AssertLockHeld(::cs_main); m_cacheview = std::make_unique<CCoinsViewCache>(&m_catcherview); m_connect_block_view = std::make_unique<CoinsViewOverlay>(&*m_cacheview); } Chainstate::Chainstate( CTxMemPool* mempool, BlockManager& blockman, ChainstateManager& chainman, std::optional<uint256> from_snapshot_blockhash) : m_mempool(mempool), m_blockman(blockman), m_chainman(chainman), m_assumeutxo(from_snapshot_blockhash ? Assumeutxo::UNVALIDATED : Assumeutxo::VALIDATED), m_from_snapshot_blockhash(from_snapshot_blockhash) {} fs::path Chainstate::StoragePath() const { fs::path path{m_chainman.m_options.datadir / "chainstate"}; if (m_from_snapshot_blockhash) { path += node::SNAPSHOT_CHAINSTATE_SUFFIX; } return path; } const CBlockIndex* Chainstate::SnapshotBase() const { if (!m_from_snapshot_blockhash) return nullptr; if (!m_cached_snapshot_base) m_cached_snapshot_base = Assert(m_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(*m_from_snapshot_blockhash)); return m_cached_snapshot_base; } const CBlockIndex* Chainstate::TargetBlock() const { if (!m_target_blockhash) return nullptr; if (!m_cached_target_block) m_cached_target_block = Assert(m_chainman.m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(*m_target_blockhash)); return m_cached_target_block; } void Chainstate::SetTargetBlock(CBlockIndex* block) { if (block) { m_target_blockhash = block->GetBlockHash(); } else { m_target_blockhash.reset(); } m_cached_target_block = block; } void Chainstate::SetTargetBlockHash(uint256 block_hash) { m_target_blockhash = block_hash; m_cached_target_block = nullptr; } void Chainstate::InitCoinsDB( size_t cache_size_bytes, bool in_memory, bool should_wipe) { m_coins_views = std::make_unique<CoinsViews>( DBParams{ .path = StoragePath(), .cache_bytes = cache_size_bytes, .memory_only = in_memory, .wipe_data = should_wipe, .obfuscate = true, .options = m_chainman.m_options.coins_db}, m_chainman.m_options.coins_view); m_coinsdb_cache_size_bytes = cache_size_bytes; } void Chainstate::InitCoinsCache(size_t cache_size_bytes) { AssertLockHeld(::cs_main); assert(m_coins_views != nullptr); m_coinstip_cache_size_bytes = cache_size_bytes; m_coins_views->InitCache(); } // Lock-free: depends on `m_cached_is_ibd`, which is latched by `UpdateIBDStatus()`. bool ChainstateManager::IsInitialBlockDownload() const noexcept { return m_cached_is_ibd.load(std::memory_order_relaxed); } void Chainstate::CheckForkWarningConditions() { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); if (this->GetRole().historical) { return; } if (m_chainman.m_best_invalid && m_chainman.m_best_invalid->nChainWork > m_chain.Tip()->nChainWork + (GetBlockProof(*m_chain.Tip()) * 6)) { LogWarning("Found invalid chain more than 6 blocks longer than our best chain. This could be due to database corruption or consensus incompatibility with peers."); m_chainman.GetNotifications().warningSet( kernel::Warning::LARGE_WORK_INVALID_CHAIN, _("Warning: Found invalid chain more than 6 blocks longer than our best chain. This could be due to database corruption or consensus incompatibility with peers.")); } else { m_chainman.GetNotifications().warningUnset(kernel::Warning::LARGE_WORK_INVALID_CHAIN); } } // Called both upon regular invalid block discovery *and* InvalidateBlock void Chainstate::InvalidChainFound(CBlockIndex* pindexNew) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); if (!m_chainman.m_best_invalid || pindexNew->nChainWork > m_chainman.m_best_invalid->nChainWork) { m_chainman.m_best_invalid = pindexNew; } SetBlockFailureFlags(pindexNew); if (m_chainman.m_best_header != nullptr && m_chainman.m_best_header->GetAncestor(pindexNew->nHeight) == pindexNew) { m_chainman.RecalculateBestHeader(); } LogInfo("%s: invalid block=%s height=%d log2_work=%f date=%s\n", __func__, pindexNew->GetBlockHash().ToString(), pindexNew->nHeight, log(pindexNew->nChainWork.getdouble())/log(2.0), FormatISO8601DateTime(pindexNew->GetBlockTime())); CBlockIndex *tip = m_chain.Tip(); assert (tip); LogInfo("%s: current best=%s height=%d log2_work=%f date=%s\n", __func__, tip->GetBlockHash().ToString(), m_chain.Height(), log(tip->nChainWork.getdouble())/log(2.0), FormatISO8601DateTime(tip->GetBlockTime())); CheckForkWarningConditions(); } // Same as InvalidChainFound, above, except not called directly from InvalidateBlock, // which does its own setBlockIndexCandidates management. void Chainstate::InvalidBlockFound(CBlockIndex* pindex, const BlockValidationState& state) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); if (state.GetResult() != BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED) { pindex->nStatus |= BLOCK_FAILED_VALID; m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(pindex); setBlockIndexCandidates.erase(pindex); InvalidChainFound(pindex); } } void UpdateCoins(const CTransaction& tx, CCoinsViewCache& inputs, CTxUndo &txundo, int nHeight) { // mark inputs spent if (!tx.IsCoinBase()) { txundo.vprevout.reserve(tx.vin.size()); for (const CTxIn &txin : tx.vin) { txundo.vprevout.emplace_back(); bool is_spent = inputs.SpendCoin(txin.prevout, &txundo.vprevout.back()); assert(is_spent); } } // add outputs AddCoins(inputs, tx, nHeight); } std::optional<std::pair<ScriptError, std::string>> CScriptCheck::operator()() { const CScript &scriptSig = ptxTo->vin[nIn].scriptSig; const CScriptWitness *witness = &ptxTo->vin[nIn].scriptWitness; ScriptError error{SCRIPT_ERR_UNKNOWN_ERROR}; if (VerifyScript(scriptSig, m_tx_out.scriptPubKey, witness, m_flags, CachingTransactionSignatureChecker(ptxTo, nIn, m_tx_out.nValue, cacheStore, *m_signature_cache, *txdata), &error)) { return std::nullopt; } else { auto debug_str = strprintf("input %i of %s (wtxid %s), spending %s:%i", nIn, ptxTo->GetHash().ToString(), ptxTo->GetWitnessHash().ToString(), ptxTo->vin[nIn].prevout.hash.ToString(), ptxTo->vin[nIn].prevout.n); return std::make_pair(error, std::move(debug_str)); } } ValidationCache::ValidationCache(const size_t script_execution_cache_bytes, const size_t signature_cache_bytes) : m_signature_cache{signature_cache_bytes} { // Setup the salted hasher uint256 nonce = GetRandHash(); // We want the nonce to be 64 bytes long to force the hasher to process // this chunk, which makes later hash computations more efficient. We // just write our 32-byte entropy twice to fill the 64 bytes. m_script_execution_cache_hasher.Write(nonce.begin(), 32); m_script_execution_cache_hasher.Write(nonce.begin(), 32); const auto [num_elems, approx_size_bytes] = m_script_execution_cache.setup_bytes(script_execution_cache_bytes); LogInfo("Using %zu MiB out of %zu MiB requested for script execution cache, able to store %zu elements", approx_size_bytes >> 20, script_execution_cache_bytes >> 20, num_elems); } /** * Check whether all of this transaction's input scripts succeed. * * This involves ECDSA signature checks so can be computationally intensive. This function should * only be called after the cheap sanity checks in CheckTxInputs passed. * * If pvChecks is not nullptr, script checks are pushed onto it instead of being performed inline. Any * script checks which are not necessary (eg due to script execution cache hits) are, obviously, * not pushed onto pvChecks/run. * * Setting cacheSigStore/cacheFullScriptStore to false will remove elements from the corresponding cache * which are matched. This is useful for checking blocks where we will likely never need the cache * entry again. * * Note that we may set state.reason to NOT_STANDARD for extra soft-fork flags in flags, block-checking * callers should probably reset it to CONSENSUS in such cases. * * Non-static (and redeclared) in src/test/txvalidationcache_tests.cpp */ bool CheckInputScripts(const CTransaction& tx, TxValidationState& state, const CCoinsViewCache& inputs, script_verify_flags flags, bool cacheSigStore, bool cacheFullScriptStore, PrecomputedTransactionData& txdata, ValidationCache& validation_cache, std::vector<CScriptCheck>* pvChecks) { if (tx.IsCoinBase()) return true; if (pvChecks) { pvChecks->reserve(tx.vin.size()); } // First check if script executions have been cached with the same // flags. Note that this assumes that the inputs provided are // correct (ie that the transaction hash which is in tx's prevouts // properly commits to the scriptPubKey in the inputs view of that // transaction). uint256 hashCacheEntry; CSHA256 hasher = validation_cache.ScriptExecutionCacheHasher(); hasher.Write(UCharCast(tx.GetWitnessHash().begin()), 32).Write((unsigned char*)&flags, sizeof(flags)).Finalize(hashCacheEntry.begin()); AssertLockHeld(cs_main); //TODO: Remove this requirement by making CuckooCache not require external locks if (validation_cache.m_script_execution_cache.contains(hashCacheEntry, !cacheFullScriptStore)) { return true; } if (!txdata.m_spent_outputs_ready) { std::vector<CTxOut> spent_outputs; spent_outputs.reserve(tx.vin.size()); for (const auto& txin : tx.vin) { const COutPoint& prevout = txin.prevout; const Coin& coin = inputs.AccessCoin(prevout); assert(!coin.IsSpent()); spent_outputs.emplace_back(coin.out); } txdata.Init(tx, std::move(spent_outputs)); } assert(txdata.m_spent_outputs.size() == tx.vin.size()); for (unsigned int i = 0; i < tx.vin.size(); i++) { // We very carefully only pass in things to CScriptCheck which // are clearly committed to by tx' witness hash. This provides // a sanity check that our caching is not introducing consensus // failures through additional data in, eg, the coins being // spent being checked as a part of CScriptCheck. // Verify signature CScriptCheck check(txdata.m_spent_outputs[i], tx, validation_cache.m_signature_cache, i, flags, cacheSigStore, &txdata); if (pvChecks) { pvChecks->emplace_back(std::move(check)); } else if (auto result = check(); result.has_value()) { // Tx failures never trigger disconnections/bans. // This is so that network splits aren't triggered // either due to non-consensus relay policies (such as // non-standard DER encodings or non-null dummy // arguments) or due to new consensus rules introduced in // soft forks. if (flags & STANDARD_NOT_MANDATORY_VERIFY_FLAGS) { return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NOT_STANDARD, strprintf("mempool-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(result->first)), result->second); } else { return state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS, strprintf("block-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(result->first)), result->second); } } } if (cacheFullScriptStore && !pvChecks) { // We executed all of the provided scripts, and were told to // cache the result. Do so now. validation_cache.m_script_execution_cache.insert(hashCacheEntry); } return true; } bool FatalError(Notifications& notifications, BlockValidationState& state, const bilingual_str& message) { notifications.fatalError(message); return state.Error(message.original); } /** * Restore the UTXO in a Coin at a given COutPoint * @param undo The Coin to be restored. * @param view The coins view to which to apply the changes. * @param out The out point that corresponds to the tx input. * @return A DisconnectResult as an int */ int ApplyTxInUndo(Coin&& undo, CCoinsViewCache& view, const COutPoint& out) { bool fClean = true; if (view.HaveCoin(out)) fClean = false; // overwriting transaction output if (undo.nHeight == 0) { // Missing undo metadata (height and coinbase). Older versions included this // information only in undo records for the last spend of a transactions' // outputs. This implies that it must be present for some other output of the same tx. const Coin& alternate = AccessByTxid(view, out.hash); if (!alternate.IsSpent()) { undo.nHeight = alternate.nHeight; undo.fCoinBase = alternate.fCoinBase; } else { return DISCONNECT_FAILED; // adding output for transaction without known metadata } } // If the coin already exists as an unspent coin in the cache, then the // possible_overwrite parameter to AddCoin must be set to true. We have // already checked whether an unspent coin exists above using HaveCoin, so // we don't need to guess. When fClean is false, an unspent coin already // existed and it is an overwrite. view.AddCoin(out, std::move(undo), !fClean); return fClean ? DISCONNECT_OK : DISCONNECT_UNCLEAN; } /** Undo the effects of this block (with given index) on the UTXO set represented by coins. * When FAILED is returned, view is left in an indeterminate state. */ DisconnectResult Chainstate::DisconnectBlock(const CBlock& block, const CBlockIndex* pindex, CCoinsViewCache& view) { AssertLockHeld(::cs_main); bool fClean = true; CBlockUndo blockUndo; if (!m_blockman.ReadBlockUndo(blockUndo, *pindex)) { LogError("DisconnectBlock(): failure reading undo data\n"); return DISCONNECT_FAILED; } if (blockUndo.vtxundo.size() + 1 != block.vtx.size()) { LogError("DisconnectBlock(): block and undo data inconsistent\n"); return DISCONNECT_FAILED; } // Ignore blocks that contain transactions which are 'overwritten' by later transactions, // unless those are already completely spent. // See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/22596 for additional information. // Note: the blocks specified here are different than the ones used in ConnectBlock because DisconnectBlock // unwinds the blocks in reverse. As a result, the inconsistency is not discovered until the earlier // blocks with the duplicate coinbase transactions are disconnected. bool fEnforceBIP30 = !((pindex->nHeight==91722 && pindex->GetBlockHash() == uint256{"00000000000271a2dc26e7667f8419f2e15416dc6955e5a6c6cdf3f2574dd08e"}) || (pindex->nHeight==91812 && pindex->GetBlockHash() == uint256{"00000000000af0aed4792b1acee3d966af36cf5def14935db8de83d6f9306f2f"})); // undo transactions in reverse order for (int i = block.vtx.size() - 1; i >= 0; i--) { const CTransaction &tx = *(block.vtx[i]); Txid hash = tx.GetHash(); bool is_coinbase = tx.IsCoinBase(); bool is_bip30_exception = (is_coinbase && !fEnforceBIP30); // Check that all outputs are available and match the outputs in the block itself // exactly. for (size_t o = 0; o < tx.vout.size(); o++) { if (!tx.vout[o].scriptPubKey.IsUnspendable()) { COutPoint out(hash, o); Coin coin; bool is_spent = view.SpendCoin(out, &coin); if (!is_spent || tx.vout[o] != coin.out || pindex->nHeight != coin.nHeight || is_coinbase != coin.fCoinBase) { if (!is_bip30_exception) { fClean = false; // transaction output mismatch } } } } // restore inputs if (i > 0) { // not coinbases CTxUndo &txundo = blockUndo.vtxundo[i-1]; if (txundo.vprevout.size() != tx.vin.size()) { LogError("DisconnectBlock(): transaction and undo data inconsistent\n"); return DISCONNECT_FAILED; } for (unsigned int j = tx.vin.size(); j > 0;) { --j; const COutPoint& out = tx.vin[j].prevout; int res = ApplyTxInUndo(std::move(txundo.vprevout[j]), view, out); if (res == DISCONNECT_FAILED) return DISCONNECT_FAILED; fClean = fClean && res != DISCONNECT_UNCLEAN; } // At this point, all of txundo.vprevout should have been moved out. } } // move best block pointer to prevout block view.SetBestBlock(pindex->pprev->GetBlockHash()); return fClean ? DISCONNECT_OK : DISCONNECT_UNCLEAN; } script_verify_flags GetBlockScriptFlags(const CBlockIndex& block_index, const ChainstateManager& chainman) { const Consensus::Params& consensusparams = chainman.GetConsensus(); // BIP16 didn't become active until Apr 1 2012 (on mainnet, and // retroactively applied to testnet) // However, only one historical block violated the P2SH rules (on both // mainnet and testnet). // Similarly, only one historical block violated the TAPROOT rules on // mainnet. // For simplicity, always leave P2SH+WITNESS+TAPROOT on except for the two // violating blocks. script_verify_flags flags{SCRIPT_VERIFY_P2SH | SCRIPT_VERIFY_WITNESS | SCRIPT_VERIFY_TAPROOT}; const auto it{consensusparams.script_flag_exceptions.find(*Assert(block_index.phashBlock))}; if (it != consensusparams.script_flag_exceptions.end()) { flags = it->second; } // Enforce the DERSIG (BIP66) rule if (DeploymentActiveAt(block_index, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_DERSIG)) { flags |= SCRIPT_VERIFY_DERSIG; } // Enforce CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY (BIP65) if (DeploymentActiveAt(block_index, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_CLTV)) { flags |= SCRIPT_VERIFY_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY; } // Enforce CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY (BIP112) if (DeploymentActiveAt(block_index, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_CSV)) { flags |= SCRIPT_VERIFY_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY; } // Enforce BIP147 NULLDUMMY (activated simultaneously with segwit) if (DeploymentActiveAt(block_index, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT)) { flags |= SCRIPT_VERIFY_NULLDUMMY; } return flags; } /** Apply the effects of this block (with given index) on the UTXO set represented by coins. * Validity checks that depend on the UTXO set are also done; ConnectBlock() * can fail if those validity checks fail (among other reasons). */ bool Chainstate::ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pindex, CCoinsViewCache& view, bool fJustCheck) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); assert(pindex); uint256 block_hash{block.GetHash()}; assert(*pindex->phashBlock == block_hash); const auto time_start{SteadyClock::now()}; const CChainParams& params{m_chainman.GetParams()}; // Check it again in case a previous version let a bad block in // NOTE: We don't currently (re-)invoke ContextualCheckBlock() or // ContextualCheckBlockHeader() here. This means that if we add a new // consensus rule that is enforced in one of those two functions, then we // may have let in a block that violates the rule prior to updating the // software, and we would NOT be enforcing the rule here. Fully solving // upgrade from one software version to the next after a consensus rule // change is potentially tricky and issue-specific (see NeedsRedownload() // for one approach that was used for BIP 141 deployment). // Also, currently the rule against blocks more than 2 hours in the future // is enforced in ContextualCheckBlockHeader(); we wouldn't want to // re-enforce that rule here (at least until we make it impossible for // the clock to go backward). if (!CheckBlock(block, state, params.GetConsensus(), !fJustCheck, !fJustCheck)) { if (state.GetResult() == BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED) { // We don't write down blocks to disk if they may have been // corrupted, so this should be impossible unless we're having hardware // problems. return FatalError(m_chainman.GetNotifications(), state, _("Corrupt block found indicating potential hardware failure.")); } LogError("%s: Consensus::CheckBlock: %s\n", __func__, state.ToString()); return false; } // verify that the view's current state corresponds to the previous block uint256 hashPrevBlock = pindex->pprev == nullptr ? uint256() : pindex->pprev->GetBlockHash(); assert(hashPrevBlock == view.GetBestBlock()); m_chainman.num_blocks_total++; // Special case for the genesis block, skipping connection of its transactions // (its coinbase is unspendable) if (block_hash == params.GetConsensus().hashGenesisBlock) { if (!fJustCheck) view.SetBestBlock(pindex->GetBlockHash()); return true; } const char* script_check_reason; if (m_chainman.AssumedValidBlock().IsNull()) { script_check_reason = "assumevalid=0 (always verify)"; } else { constexpr int64_t TWO_WEEKS_IN_SECONDS{60 * 60 * 24 * 7 * 2}; // We've been configured with the hash of a block which has been externally verified to have a valid history. // A suitable default value is included with the software and updated from time to time. Because validity // relative to a piece of software is an objective fact these defaults can be easily reviewed. // This setting doesn't force the selection of any particular chain but makes validating some faster by // effectively caching the result of part of the verification. BlockMap::const_iterator it{m_blockman.m_block_index.find(m_chainman.AssumedValidBlock())}; if (it == m_blockman.m_block_index.end()) { script_check_reason = "assumevalid hash not in headers"; } else if (it->second.GetAncestor(pindex->nHeight) != pindex) { script_check_reason = (pindex->nHeight > it->second.nHeight) ? "block height above assumevalid height" : "block not in assumevalid chain"; } else if (m_chainman.m_best_header->GetAncestor(pindex->nHeight) != pindex) { script_check_reason = "block not in best header chain"; } else if (m_chainman.m_best_header->nChainWork < m_chainman.MinimumChainWork()) { script_check_reason = "best header chainwork below minimumchainwork"; } else if (GetBlockProofEquivalentTime(*m_chainman.m_best_header, *pindex, *m_chainman.m_best_header, params.GetConsensus()) <= TWO_WEEKS_IN_SECONDS) { script_check_reason = "block too recent relative to best header"; } else { // This block is a member of the assumed verified chain and an ancestor of the best header. // Script verification is skipped when connecting blocks under the // assumevalid block. Assuming the assumevalid block is valid this // is safe because block merkle hashes are still computed and checked, // Of course, if an assumed valid block is invalid due to false scriptSigs // this optimization would allow an invalid chain to be accepted. // The equivalent time check discourages hash power from extorting the network via DOS attack // into accepting an invalid block through telling users they must manually set assumevalid. // Requiring a software change or burying the invalid block, regardless of the setting, makes // it hard to hide the implication of the demand. This also avoids having release candidates // that are hardly doing any signature verification at all in testing without having to // artificially set the default assumed verified block further back. // The test against the minimum chain work prevents the skipping when denied access to any chain at // least as good as the expected chain. script_check_reason = nullptr; } } const auto time_1{SteadyClock::now()}; m_chainman.time_check += time_1 - time_start; LogDebug(BCLog::BENCH, " - Sanity checks: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n", Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_1 - time_start), Ticks<SecondsDouble>(m_chainman.time_check), Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(m_chainman.time_check) / m_chainman.num_blocks_total); // Do not allow blocks that contain transactions which 'overwrite' older transactions, // unless those are already completely spent. // If such overwrites are allowed, coinbases and transactions depending upon those // can be duplicated to remove the ability to spend the first instance -- even after // being sent to another address. // See BIP30, CVE-2012-1909, and https://r6.ca/blog/20120206T005236Z.html for more information. // This rule was originally applied to all blocks with a timestamp after March 15, 2012, 0:00 UTC. // Now that the whole chain is irreversibly beyond that time it is applied to all blocks except the // two in the chain that violate it. This prevents exploiting the issue against nodes during their // initial block download. bool fEnforceBIP30 = !IsBIP30Repeat(*pindex); // Once BIP34 activated it was not possible to create new duplicate coinbases and thus other than starting // with the 2 existing duplicate coinbase pairs, not possible to create overwriting txs. But by the // time BIP34 activated, in each of the existing pairs the duplicate coinbase had overwritten the first // before the first had been spent. Since those coinbases are sufficiently buried it's no longer possible to create further // duplicate transactions descending from the known pairs either. // If we're on the known chain at height greater than where BIP34 activated, we can save the db accesses needed for the BIP30 check. // BIP34 requires that a block at height X (block X) has its coinbase // scriptSig start with a CScriptNum of X (indicated height X). The above // logic of no longer requiring BIP30 once BIP34 activates is flawed in the // case that there is a block X before the BIP34 height of 227,931 which has // an indicated height Y where Y is greater than X. The coinbase for block // X would also be a valid coinbase for block Y, which could be a BIP30 // violation. An exhaustive search of all mainnet coinbases before the // BIP34 height which have an indicated height greater than the block height // reveals many occurrences. The 3 lowest indicated heights found are // 209,921, 490,897, and 1,983,702 and thus coinbases for blocks at these 3 // heights would be the first opportunity for BIP30 to be violated. // The search reveals a great many blocks which have an indicated height // greater than 1,983,702, so we simply remove the optimization to skip // BIP30 checking for blocks at height 1,983,702 or higher. Before we reach // that block in another 25 years or so, we should take advantage of a // future consensus change to do a new and improved version of BIP34 that // will actually prevent ever creating any duplicate coinbases in the // future. static constexpr int BIP34_IMPLIES_BIP30_LIMIT = 1983702; // There is no potential to create a duplicate coinbase at block 209,921 // because this is still before the BIP34 height and so explicit BIP30 // checking is still active. // The final case is block 176,684 which has an indicated height of // 490,897. Unfortunately, this issue was not discovered until about 2 weeks // before block 490,897 so there was not much opportunity to address this // case other than to carefully analyze it and determine it would not be a // problem. Block 490,897 was, in fact, mined with a different coinbase than // block 176,684, but it is important to note that even if it hadn't been or // is remined on an alternate fork with a duplicate coinbase, we would still // not run into a BIP30 violation. This is because the coinbase for 176,684 // is spent in block 185,956 in transaction // d4f7fbbf92f4a3014a230b2dc70b8058d02eb36ac06b4a0736d9d60eaa9e8781. This // spending transaction can't be duplicated because it also spends coinbase // 0328dd85c331237f18e781d692c92de57649529bd5edf1d01036daea32ffde29. This // coinbase has an indicated height of over 4.2 billion, and wouldn't be // duplicatable until that height, and it's currently impossible to create a // chain that long. Nevertheless we may wish to consider a future soft fork // which retroactively prevents block 490,897 from creating a duplicate // coinbase. The two historical BIP30 violations often provide a confusing // edge case when manipulating the UTXO and it would be simpler not to have // another edge case to deal with. // testnet3 has no blocks before the BIP34 height with indicated heights // post BIP34 before approximately height 486,000,000. After block // 1,983,702 testnet3 starts doing unnecessary BIP30 checking again. assert(pindex->pprev); CBlockIndex* pindexBIP34height = pindex->pprev->GetAncestor(params.GetConsensus().BIP34Height); //Only continue to enforce if we're below BIP34 activation height or the block hash at that height doesn't correspond. fEnforceBIP30 = fEnforceBIP30 && (!pindexBIP34height || !(pindexBIP34height->GetBlockHash() == params.GetConsensus().BIP34Hash)); // TODO: Remove BIP30 checking from block height 1,983,702 on, once we have a // consensus change that ensures coinbases at those heights cannot // duplicate earlier coinbases. if (fEnforceBIP30 || pindex->nHeight >= BIP34_IMPLIES_BIP30_LIMIT) { for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) { for (size_t o = 0; o < tx->vout.size(); o++) { if (view.HaveCoin(COutPoint(tx->GetHash(), o))) { state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-BIP30", "tried to overwrite transaction"); } } } } // Enforce BIP68 (sequence locks) int nLockTimeFlags = 0; if (DeploymentActiveAt(*pindex, m_chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_CSV)) { nLockTimeFlags |= LOCKTIME_VERIFY_SEQUENCE; } // Get the script flags for this block script_verify_flags flags{GetBlockScriptFlags(*pindex, m_chainman)}; const auto time_2{SteadyClock::now()}; m_chainman.time_forks += time_2 - time_1; LogDebug(BCLog::BENCH, " - Fork checks: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n", Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_2 - time_1), Ticks<SecondsDouble>(m_chainman.time_forks), Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(m_chainman.time_forks) / m_chainman.num_blocks_total); const bool fScriptChecks{!!script_check_reason}; const kernel::ChainstateRole role{GetRole()}; if (script_check_reason != m_last_script_check_reason_logged && role.validated && !role.historical) { if (fScriptChecks) { LogInfo("Enabling script verification at block #%d (%s): %s.", pindex->nHeight, block_hash.ToString(), script_check_reason); } else { LogInfo("Disabling script verification at block #%d (%s).", pindex->nHeight, block_hash.ToString()); } m_last_script_check_reason_logged = script_check_reason; } CBlockUndo blockundo; // Precomputed transaction data pointers must not be invalidated // until after `control` has run the script checks (potentially // in multiple threads). Preallocate the vector size so a new allocation // doesn't invalidate pointers into the vector, and keep txsdata in scope // for as long as `control`. std::vector<PrecomputedTransactionData> txsdata(block.vtx.size()); std::optional<CCheckQueueControl<CScriptCheck>> control; if (auto& queue = m_chainman.GetCheckQueue(); queue.HasThreads() && fScriptChecks) control.emplace(queue); std::vector<int> prevheights; CAmount nFees = 0; int nInputs = 0; int64_t nSigOpsCost = 0; blockundo.vtxundo.reserve(block.vtx.size() - 1); for (unsigned int i = 0; i < block.vtx.size(); i++) { if (!state.IsValid()) break; const CTransaction &tx = *(block.vtx[i]); nInputs += tx.vin.size(); if (!tx.IsCoinBase()) { CAmount txfee = 0; TxValidationState tx_state; if (!Consensus::CheckTxInputs(tx, tx_state, view, pindex->nHeight, txfee)) { // Any transaction validation failure in ConnectBlock is a block consensus failure state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, tx_state.GetRejectReason(), tx_state.GetDebugMessage() + " in transaction " + tx.GetHash().ToString()); break; } nFees += txfee; if (!MoneyRange(nFees)) { state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-accumulated-fee-outofrange", "accumulated fee in the block out of range"); break; } // Check that transaction is BIP68 final // BIP68 lock checks (as opposed to nLockTime checks) must // be in ConnectBlock because they require the UTXO set prevheights.resize(tx.vin.size()); for (size_t j = 0; j < tx.vin.size(); j++) { prevheights[j] = view.AccessCoin(tx.vin[j].prevout).nHeight; } if (!SequenceLocks(tx, nLockTimeFlags, prevheights, *pindex)) { state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-nonfinal", "contains a non-BIP68-final transaction " + tx.GetHash().ToString()); break; } } // GetTransactionSigOpCost counts 3 types of sigops: // * legacy (always) // * p2sh (when P2SH enabled in flags and excludes coinbase) // * witness (when witness enabled in flags and excludes coinbase) nSigOpsCost += GetTransactionSigOpCost(tx, view, flags); if (nSigOpsCost > MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS_COST) { state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-blk-sigops", "too many sigops"); break; } if (!tx.IsCoinBase() && fScriptChecks) { bool fCacheResults = fJustCheck; /* Don't cache results if we're actually connecting blocks (still consult the cache, though) */ bool tx_ok; TxValidationState tx_state; // If CheckInputScripts is called with a pointer to a checks vector, the resulting checks are appended to it. In that case // they need to be added to control which runs them asynchronously. Otherwise, CheckInputScripts runs the checks before returning. if (control) { std::vector<CScriptCheck> vChecks; tx_ok = CheckInputScripts(tx, tx_state, view, flags, fCacheResults, fCacheResults, txsdata[i], m_chainman.m_validation_cache, &vChecks); if (tx_ok) control->Add(std::move(vChecks)); } else { tx_ok = CheckInputScripts(tx, tx_state, view, flags, fCacheResults, fCacheResults, txsdata[i], m_chainman.m_validation_cache); } if (!tx_ok) { // Any transaction validation failure in ConnectBlock is a block consensus failure state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, tx_state.GetRejectReason(), tx_state.GetDebugMessage()); break; } } CTxUndo undoDummy; if (i > 0) { blockundo.vtxundo.emplace_back(); } UpdateCoins(tx, view, i == 0 ? undoDummy : blockundo.vtxundo.back(), pindex->nHeight); } const auto time_3{SteadyClock::now()}; m_chainman.time_connect += time_3 - time_2; LogDebug(BCLog::BENCH, " - Connect %u transactions: %.2fms (%.3fms/tx, %.3fms/txin) [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n", (unsigned)block.vtx.size(), Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_3 - time_2), Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_3 - time_2) / block.vtx.size(), nInputs <= 1 ? 0 : Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_3 - time_2) / (nInputs - 1), Ticks<SecondsDouble>(m_chainman.time_connect), Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(m_chainman.time_connect) / m_chainman.num_blocks_total); CAmount blockReward = nFees + GetBlockSubsidy(pindex->nHeight, params.GetConsensus()); if (block.vtx[0]->GetValueOut() > blockReward && state.IsValid()) { state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-cb-amount", strprintf("coinbase pays too much (actual=%d vs limit=%d)", block.vtx[0]->GetValueOut(), blockReward)); } if (control) { auto parallel_result = control->Complete(); if (parallel_result.has_value() && state.IsValid()) { state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, strprintf("block-script-verify-flag-failed (%s)", ScriptErrorString(parallel_result->first)), parallel_result->second); } } if (!state.IsValid()) { LogInfo("Block validation error: %s", state.ToString()); return false; } const auto time_4{SteadyClock::now()}; m_chainman.time_verify += time_4 - time_2; LogDebug(BCLog::BENCH, " - Verify %u txins: %.2fms (%.3fms/txin) [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n", nInputs - 1, Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_4 - time_2), nInputs <= 1 ? 0 : Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_4 - time_2) / (nInputs - 1), Ticks<SecondsDouble>(m_chainman.time_verify), Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(m_chainman.time_verify) / m_chainman.num_blocks_total); if (fJustCheck) { return true; } if (!m_blockman.WriteBlockUndo(blockundo, state, *pindex)) { return false; } const auto time_5{SteadyClock::now()}; m_chainman.time_undo += time_5 - time_4; LogDebug(BCLog::BENCH, " - Write undo data: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n", Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_5 - time_4), Ticks<SecondsDouble>(m_chainman.time_undo), Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(m_chainman.time_undo) / m_chainman.num_blocks_total); if (!pindex->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_SCRIPTS)) { pindex->RaiseValidity(BLOCK_VALID_SCRIPTS); m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(pindex); } // add this block to the view's block chain view.SetBestBlock(pindex->GetBlockHash()); const auto time_6{SteadyClock::now()}; m_chainman.time_index += time_6 - time_5; LogDebug(BCLog::BENCH, " - Index writing: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n", Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_6 - time_5), Ticks<SecondsDouble>(m_chainman.time_index), Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(m_chainman.time_index) / m_chainman.num_blocks_total); TRACEPOINT(validation, block_connected, block_hash.data(), pindex->nHeight, block.vtx.size(), nInputs, nSigOpsCost, Ticks<std::chrono::nanoseconds>(time_5 - time_start) ); return true; } CoinsCacheSizeState Chainstate::GetCoinsCacheSizeState() { AssertLockHeld(::cs_main); return this->GetCoinsCacheSizeState( m_coinstip_cache_size_bytes, m_mempool ? m_mempool->m_opts.max_size_bytes : 0); } CoinsCacheSizeState Chainstate::GetCoinsCacheSizeState( size_t max_coins_cache_size_bytes, size_t max_mempool_size_bytes) { AssertLockHeld(::cs_main); const int64_t nMempoolUsage = m_mempool ? m_mempool->DynamicMemoryUsage() : 0; int64_t cacheSize = CoinsTip().DynamicMemoryUsage(); int64_t nTotalSpace = max_coins_cache_size_bytes + std::max<int64_t>(int64_t(max_mempool_size_bytes) - nMempoolUsage, 0); if (cacheSize > nTotalSpace) { LogInfo("Cache size (%s) exceeds total space (%s)\n", cacheSize, nTotalSpace); return CoinsCacheSizeState::CRITICAL; } else if (cacheSize > LargeCoinsCacheThreshold(nTotalSpace)) { return CoinsCacheSizeState::LARGE; } return CoinsCacheSizeState::OK; } bool Chainstate::FlushStateToDisk( BlockValidationState &state, FlushStateMode mode, int nManualPruneHeight) { LOCK(cs_main); assert(this->CanFlushToDisk()); std::set<int> setFilesToPrune; bool full_flush_completed = false; [[maybe_unused]] const size_t coins_count{CoinsTip().GetCacheSize()}; [[maybe_unused]] const size_t coins_mem_usage{CoinsTip().DynamicMemoryUsage()}; try { { bool fFlushForPrune = false; CoinsCacheSizeState cache_state = GetCoinsCacheSizeState(); LOCK(m_blockman.cs_LastBlockFile); if (m_blockman.IsPruneMode() && (m_blockman.m_check_for_pruning || nManualPruneHeight > 0) && m_chainman.m_blockman.m_blockfiles_indexed) { // make sure we don't prune above any of the prune locks bestblocks // pruning is height-based int last_prune{m_chain.Height()}; // last height we can prune std::optional<std::string> limiting_lock; // prune lock that actually was the limiting factor, only used for logging for (const auto& prune_lock : m_blockman.m_prune_locks) { if (prune_lock.second.height_first == std::numeric_limits<int>::max()) continue; // Remove the buffer and one additional block here to get actual height that is outside of the buffer const int lock_height{prune_lock.second.height_first - PRUNE_LOCK_BUFFER - 1}; last_prune = std::max(1, std::min(last_prune, lock_height)); if (last_prune == lock_height) { limiting_lock = prune_lock.first; } } if (limiting_lock) { LogDebug(BCLog::PRUNE, "%s limited pruning to height %d\n", limiting_lock.value(), last_prune); } if (nManualPruneHeight > 0) { LOG_TIME_MILLIS_WITH_CATEGORY("find files to prune (manual)", BCLog::BENCH); m_blockman.FindFilesToPruneManual( setFilesToPrune, std::min(last_prune, nManualPruneHeight), *this); } else { LOG_TIME_MILLIS_WITH_CATEGORY("find files to prune", BCLog::BENCH); m_blockman.FindFilesToPrune(setFilesToPrune, last_prune, *this, m_chainman); m_blockman.m_check_for_pruning = false; } if (!setFilesToPrune.empty()) { fFlushForPrune = true; if (!m_blockman.m_have_pruned) { m_blockman.m_block_tree_db->WriteFlag("prunedblockfiles", true); m_blockman.m_have_pruned = true; } } } const auto nNow{NodeClock::now()}; // The cache is large and we're within 10% and 10 MiB of the limit, but we have time now (not in the middle of a block processing). bool fCacheLarge = mode == FlushStateMode::PERIODIC && cache_state >= CoinsCacheSizeState::LARGE; // The cache is over the limit, we have to write now. bool fCacheCritical = mode == FlushStateMode::IF_NEEDED && cache_state >= CoinsCacheSizeState::CRITICAL; // It's been a while since we wrote the block index and chain state to disk. Do this frequently, so we don't need to redownload or reindex after a crash. bool fPeriodicWrite = mode == FlushStateMode::PERIODIC && nNow >= m_next_write; const auto empty_cache{(mode == FlushStateMode::FORCE_FLUSH) || fCacheLarge || fCacheCritical}; // Combine all conditions that result in a write to disk. bool should_write = (mode == FlushStateMode::FORCE_SYNC) || empty_cache || fPeriodicWrite || fFlushForPrune; // Write blocks, block index and best chain related state to disk. if (should_write) { LogDebug(BCLog::COINDB, "Writing chainstate to disk: flush mode=%s, prune=%d, large=%d, critical=%d, periodic=%d", FlushStateModeNames[size_t(mode)], fFlushForPrune, fCacheLarge, fCacheCritical, fPeriodicWrite); // Ensure we can write block index if (!CheckDiskSpace(m_blockman.m_opts.blocks_dir)) { return FatalError(m_chainman.GetNotifications(), state, _("Disk space is too low!")); } { LOG_TIME_MILLIS_WITH_CATEGORY("write block and undo data to disk", BCLog::BENCH); // First make sure all block and undo data is flushed to disk. // TODO: Handle return error, or add detailed comment why it is // safe to not return an error upon failure. if (!m_blockman.FlushChainstateBlockFile(m_chain.Height())) { LogWarning("%s: Failed to flush block file.\n", __func__); } } // Then update all block file information (which may refer to block and undo files). { LOG_TIME_MILLIS_WITH_CATEGORY("write block index to disk", BCLog::BENCH); m_blockman.WriteBlockIndexDB(); } // Finally remove any pruned files if (fFlushForPrune) { LOG_TIME_MILLIS_WITH_CATEGORY("unlink pruned files", BCLog::BENCH); m_blockman.UnlinkPrunedFiles(setFilesToPrune); } if (!CoinsTip().GetBestBlock().IsNull()) { // Typical Coin structures on disk are around 48 bytes in size. // Pushing a new one to the database can cause it to be written // twice (once in the log, and once in the tables). This is already // an overestimation, as most will delete an existing entry or // overwrite one. Still, use a conservative safety factor of 2. if (!CheckDiskSpace(m_chainman.m_options.datadir, 48 * 2 * 2 * CoinsTip().GetDirtyCount())) { return FatalError(m_chainman.GetNotifications(), state, _("Disk space is too low!")); } // Flush the chainstate (which may refer to block index entries). empty_cache ? CoinsTip().Flush() : CoinsTip().Sync(); full_flush_completed = true; TRACEPOINT(utxocache, flush, int64_t{Ticks<std::chrono::microseconds>(NodeClock::now() - nNow)}, (uint32_t)mode, (uint64_t)coins_count, (uint64_t)coins_mem_usage, (bool)fFlushForPrune); } } if (should_write || m_next_write == NodeClock::time_point::max()) { constexpr auto range{DATABASE_WRITE_INTERVAL_MAX - DATABASE_WRITE_INTERVAL_MIN}; m_next_write = FastRandomContext().rand_uniform_delay(NodeClock::now() + DATABASE_WRITE_INTERVAL_MIN, range); } } if (full_flush_completed) { if (m_chainman.m_options.signals) { // Update best block in wallet (so we can detect restored wallets). m_chainman.m_options.signals->ChainStateFlushed(this->GetRole(), GetLocator(m_chain.Tip())); } if (!m_chainman.m_interrupt && ShouldCompactChainstate(m_chainman.IsInitialBlockDownload())) { try { CoinsDB().CompactFull(); } catch (const std::exception& e) { LogWarning("Failed to start chainstate compaction (%s)", e.what()); } } } } catch (const std::runtime_error& e) { return FatalError(m_chainman.GetNotifications(), state, strprintf(_("System error while flushing: %s"), e.what())); } return true; } void Chainstate::ForceFlushStateToDisk(bool wipe_cache) { BlockValidationState state; if (!this->FlushStateToDisk(state, wipe_cache ? FlushStateMode::FORCE_FLUSH : FlushStateMode::FORCE_SYNC)) { LogWarning("Failed to force flush state (%s)", state.ToString()); } } void Chainstate::PruneAndFlush() { BlockValidationState state; m_blockman.m_check_for_pruning = true; if (!this->FlushStateToDisk(state, FlushStateMode::NONE)) { LogWarning("Failed to flush state (%s)", state.ToString()); } } static void UpdateTipLog( const ChainstateManager& chainman, const CCoinsViewCache& coins_tip, const CBlockIndex* tip, const std::string& func_name, const std::string& prefix, const std::string& warning_messages) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main) { AssertLockHeld(::cs_main); // Disable rate limiting in LogPrintLevel_ so this source location may log during IBD. LogPrintLevel_(BCLog::LogFlags::ALL, util::log::Level::Info, /*should_ratelimit=*/false, "%s%s: new best=%s height=%d version=0x%08x log2_work=%f tx=%lu date='%s' progress=%f cache=%.1fMiB(%utxo)%s\n", prefix, func_name, tip->GetBlockHash().ToString(), tip->nHeight, tip->nVersion, log(tip->nChainWork.getdouble()) / log(2.0), tip->m_chain_tx_count, FormatISO8601DateTime(tip->GetBlockTime()), chainman.GuessVerificationProgress(tip), coins_tip.DynamicMemoryUsage() * (1.0 / (1 << 20)), coins_tip.GetCacheSize(), !warning_messages.empty() ? strprintf(" warning='%s'", warning_messages) : ""); } void Chainstate::UpdateTip(const CBlockIndex* pindexNew) { AssertLockHeld(::cs_main); const auto& coins_tip = this->CoinsTip(); // The remainder of the function isn't relevant if we are not acting on // the active chainstate, so return if need be. if (this != &m_chainman.ActiveChainstate()) { // Only log every so often so that we don't bury log messages at the tip. constexpr int BACKGROUND_LOG_INTERVAL = 2000; if (pindexNew->nHeight % BACKGROUND_LOG_INTERVAL == 0) { UpdateTipLog(m_chainman, coins_tip, pindexNew, __func__, "[background validation] ", ""); } return; } // New best block if (m_mempool) { m_mempool->AddTransactionsUpdated(1); } std::vector<bilingual_str> warning_messages; if (!m_chainman.IsInitialBlockDownload()) { auto bits = m_chainman.m_versionbitscache.CheckUnknownActivations(pindexNew, m_chainman.GetParams()); for (auto [bit, active] : bits) { const bilingual_str warning = strprintf(_("Unknown new rules activated (versionbit %i)"), bit); if (active) { m_chainman.GetNotifications().warningSet(kernel::Warning::UNKNOWN_NEW_RULES_ACTIVATED, warning); } else { warning_messages.push_back(warning); } } } UpdateTipLog(m_chainman, coins_tip, pindexNew, __func__, "", util::Join(warning_messages, Untranslated(", ")).original); } /** Disconnect m_chain's tip. * After calling, the mempool will be in an inconsistent state, with * transactions from disconnected blocks being added to disconnectpool. You * should make the mempool consistent again by calling MaybeUpdateMempoolForReorg. * with cs_main held. * * If disconnectpool is nullptr, then no disconnected transactions are added to * disconnectpool (note that the caller is responsible for mempool consistency * in any case). */ bool Chainstate::DisconnectTip(BlockValidationState& state, DisconnectedBlockTransactions* disconnectpool) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); if (m_mempool) AssertLockHeld(m_mempool->cs); CBlockIndex *pindexDelete = m_chain.Tip(); assert(pindexDelete); assert(pindexDelete->pprev); // Read block from disk. std::shared_ptr<CBlock> pblock = std::make_shared<CBlock>(); CBlock& block = *pblock; if (!m_blockman.ReadBlock(block, *pindexDelete)) { LogError("DisconnectTip(): Failed to read block\n"); return false; } // Apply the block atomically to the chain state. const auto time_start{SteadyClock::now()}; { CCoinsViewCache view(&CoinsTip()); assert(view.GetBestBlock() == pindexDelete->GetBlockHash()); if (DisconnectBlock(block, pindexDelete, view) != DISCONNECT_OK) { LogError("DisconnectTip(): DisconnectBlock %s failed\n", pindexDelete->GetBlockHash().ToString()); return false; } view.Flush(/*reallocate_cache=*/false); // local CCoinsViewCache goes out of scope } LogDebug(BCLog::BENCH, "- Disconnect block: %.2fms\n", Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(SteadyClock::now() - time_start)); { // Prune locks that began at or after the tip should be moved backward so they get a chance to reorg const int max_height_first{pindexDelete->nHeight - 1}; for (auto& prune_lock : m_blockman.m_prune_locks) { if (prune_lock.second.height_first <= max_height_first) continue; prune_lock.second.height_first = max_height_first; LogDebug(BCLog::PRUNE, "%s prune lock moved back to %d\n", prune_lock.first, max_height_first); } } // Write the chain state to disk, if necessary. if (!FlushStateToDisk(state, FlushStateMode::IF_NEEDED)) { return false; } if (disconnectpool && m_mempool) { // Save transactions to re-add to mempool at end of reorg. If any entries are evicted for // exceeding memory limits, remove them and their descendants from the mempool. for (auto&& evicted_tx : disconnectpool->AddTransactionsFromBlock(block.vtx)) { m_mempool->removeRecursive(*evicted_tx, MemPoolRemovalReason::REORG); } } m_chain.SetTip(*pindexDelete->pprev); m_chainman.UpdateIBDStatus(); UpdateTip(pindexDelete->pprev); // Let wallets know transactions went from 1-confirmed to // 0-confirmed or conflicted: if (m_chainman.m_options.signals) { m_chainman.m_options.signals->BlockDisconnected(pblock, pindexDelete); } return true; } struct PerBlockConnectTrace { CBlockIndex* pindex = nullptr; std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> pblock; PerBlockConnectTrace() = default; }; /** * Used to track blocks whose transactions were applied to the UTXO state as a * part of a single ActivateBestChainStep call. * * This class is single-use, once you call GetBlocksConnected() you have to throw * it away and make a new one. */ class ConnectTrace { private: std::vector<PerBlockConnectTrace> blocksConnected; public: explicit ConnectTrace() : blocksConnected(1) {} void BlockConnected(CBlockIndex* pindex, std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> pblock) { assert(!blocksConnected.back().pindex); assert(pindex); assert(pblock); blocksConnected.back().pindex = pindex; blocksConnected.back().pblock = std::move(pblock); blocksConnected.emplace_back(); } std::vector<PerBlockConnectTrace>& GetBlocksConnected() { // We always keep one extra block at the end of our list because // blocks are added after all the conflicted transactions have // been filled in. Thus, the last entry should always be an empty // one waiting for the transactions from the next block. We pop // the last entry here to make sure the list we return is sane. assert(!blocksConnected.back().pindex); blocksConnected.pop_back(); return blocksConnected; } }; /** * Connect a new block to m_chain. block_to_connect is either nullptr or a pointer to a CBlock * corresponding to pindexNew, to bypass loading it again from disk. * * The block is added to connectTrace if connection succeeds. */ bool Chainstate::ConnectTip( BlockValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pindexNew, std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> block_to_connect, ConnectTrace& connectTrace, DisconnectedBlockTransactions& disconnectpool) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); if (m_mempool) AssertLockHeld(m_mempool->cs); assert(pindexNew->pprev == m_chain.Tip()); // Read block from disk. const auto time_1{SteadyClock::now()}; if (!block_to_connect) { std::shared_ptr<CBlock> pblockNew = std::make_shared<CBlock>(); if (!m_blockman.ReadBlock(*pblockNew, *pindexNew)) { return FatalError(m_chainman.GetNotifications(), state, _("Failed to read block.")); } block_to_connect = std::move(pblockNew); } else { LogDebug(BCLog::BENCH, " - Using cached block\n"); } // Apply the block atomically to the chain state. const auto time_2{SteadyClock::now()}; SteadyClock::time_point time_3; // When adding aggregate statistics in the future, keep in mind that // num_blocks_total may be zero until the ConnectBlock() call below. LogDebug(BCLog::BENCH, " - Load block from disk: %.2fms\n", Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_2 - time_1)); { CCoinsViewCache& view{*m_coins_views->m_connect_block_view}; const auto reset_guard{view.CreateResetGuard()}; bool rv = ConnectBlock(*block_to_connect, state, pindexNew, view); if (m_chainman.m_options.signals) { m_chainman.m_options.signals->BlockChecked(block_to_connect, state); } if (!rv) { if (state.IsInvalid()) InvalidBlockFound(pindexNew, state); LogError("%s: ConnectBlock %s failed, %s\n", __func__, pindexNew->GetBlockHash().ToString(), state.ToString()); return false; } time_3 = SteadyClock::now(); m_chainman.time_connect_total += time_3 - time_2; assert(m_chainman.num_blocks_total > 0); LogDebug(BCLog::BENCH, " - Connect total: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n", Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_3 - time_2), Ticks<SecondsDouble>(m_chainman.time_connect_total), Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(m_chainman.time_connect_total) / m_chainman.num_blocks_total); view.Flush(/*reallocate_cache=*/false); // No need to reallocate since it only has capacity for 1 block } const auto time_4{SteadyClock::now()}; m_chainman.time_flush += time_4 - time_3; LogDebug(BCLog::BENCH, " - Flush: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n", Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_4 - time_3), Ticks<SecondsDouble>(m_chainman.time_flush), Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(m_chainman.time_flush) / m_chainman.num_blocks_total); // Write the chain state to disk, if necessary. if (!FlushStateToDisk(state, FlushStateMode::IF_NEEDED)) { return false; } const auto time_5{SteadyClock::now()}; m_chainman.time_chainstate += time_5 - time_4; LogDebug(BCLog::BENCH, " - Writing chainstate: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n", Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_5 - time_4), Ticks<SecondsDouble>(m_chainman.time_chainstate), Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(m_chainman.time_chainstate) / m_chainman.num_blocks_total); // Remove conflicting transactions from the mempool.; if (m_mempool) { m_mempool->removeForBlock(block_to_connect->vtx, pindexNew->nHeight); disconnectpool.removeForBlock(block_to_connect->vtx); } // Update m_chain & related variables. m_chain.SetTip(*pindexNew); m_chainman.UpdateIBDStatus(); UpdateTip(pindexNew); const auto time_6{SteadyClock::now()}; m_chainman.time_post_connect += time_6 - time_5; m_chainman.time_total += time_6 - time_1; LogDebug(BCLog::BENCH, " - Connect postprocess: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n", Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_6 - time_5), Ticks<SecondsDouble>(m_chainman.time_post_connect), Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(m_chainman.time_post_connect) / m_chainman.num_blocks_total); LogDebug(BCLog::BENCH, "- Connect block: %.2fms [%.2fs (%.2fms/blk)]\n", Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(time_6 - time_1), Ticks<SecondsDouble>(m_chainman.time_total), Ticks<MillisecondsDouble>(m_chainman.time_total) / m_chainman.num_blocks_total); // See if this chainstate has reached a target block and can be used to // validate an assumeutxo snapshot. If it can, hashing the UTXO database // will be slow, and cs_main could remain locked here for several minutes. // If the snapshot is validated, the UTXO hash will be saved to // this->m_target_utxohash, causing HistoricalChainstate() to return null // and this chainstate to no longer be used. ActivateBestChain() will also // stop connecting blocks to this chainstate because this->ReachedTarget() // will be true and this->setBlockIndexCandidates will not have additional // blocks. Chainstate& current_cs{m_chainman.CurrentChainstate()}; m_chainman.MaybeValidateSnapshot(*this, current_cs); connectTrace.BlockConnected(pindexNew, std::move(block_to_connect)); return true; } /** * Return the tip of the chain with the most work in it, that isn't * known to be invalid (it's however far from certain to be valid). */ CBlockIndex* Chainstate::FindMostWorkChain() { AssertLockHeld(::cs_main); do { CBlockIndex *pindexNew = nullptr; // Find the best candidate header. { std::set<CBlockIndex*, CBlockIndexWorkComparator>::reverse_iterator it = setBlockIndexCandidates.rbegin(); if (it == setBlockIndexCandidates.rend()) return nullptr; pindexNew = *it; } // Check whether all blocks on the path between the currently active chain and the candidate are valid. // Just going until the active chain is an optimization, as we know all blocks in it are valid already. CBlockIndex *pindexTest = pindexNew; bool fInvalidAncestor = false; while (pindexTest && !m_chain.Contains(pindexTest)) { assert(pindexTest->HaveNumChainTxs() || pindexTest->nHeight == 0); // Pruned nodes may have entries in setBlockIndexCandidates for // which block files have been deleted. Remove those as candidates // for the most work chain if we come across them; we can't switch // to a chain unless we have all the non-active-chain parent blocks. bool fFailedChain = pindexTest->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_VALID; bool fMissingData = !(pindexTest->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA); if (fFailedChain || fMissingData) { // Candidate chain is not usable (either invalid or missing data) if (fFailedChain && (m_chainman.m_best_invalid == nullptr || pindexNew->nChainWork > m_chainman.m_best_invalid->nChainWork)) { m_chainman.m_best_invalid = pindexNew; } CBlockIndex *pindexFailed = pindexNew; // Remove the entire chain from the set. while (pindexTest != pindexFailed) { if (fFailedChain) { pindexFailed->nStatus |= BLOCK_FAILED_VALID; m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(pindexFailed); } else if (fMissingData) { // If we're missing data, then add back to m_blocks_unlinked, // so that if the block arrives in the future we can try adding // to setBlockIndexCandidates again. m_blockman.m_blocks_unlinked.insert( std::make_pair(pindexFailed->pprev, pindexFailed)); } setBlockIndexCandidates.erase(pindexFailed); pindexFailed = pindexFailed->pprev; } setBlockIndexCandidates.erase(pindexTest); fInvalidAncestor = true; break; } pindexTest = pindexTest->pprev; } if (!fInvalidAncestor) return pindexNew; } while(true); } /** Delete all entries in setBlockIndexCandidates that are worse than the current tip. */ void Chainstate::PruneBlockIndexCandidates() { // Note that we can't delete the current block itself, as we may need to return to it later in case a // reorganization to a better block fails. std::set<CBlockIndex*, CBlockIndexWorkComparator>::iterator it = setBlockIndexCandidates.begin(); while (it != setBlockIndexCandidates.end() && setBlockIndexCandidates.value_comp()(*it, m_chain.Tip())) { setBlockIndexCandidates.erase(it++); } // Either the current tip or a successor of it we're working towards is left in setBlockIndexCandidates. assert(!setBlockIndexCandidates.empty()); } /** * Try to make some progress towards making pindexMostWork the active block. * pblock is either nullptr or a pointer to a CBlock corresponding to pindexMostWork. * * @returns true unless a system error occurred */ bool Chainstate::ActivateBestChainStep(BlockValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pindexMostWork, const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>& pblock, bool& fInvalidFound, ConnectTrace& connectTrace) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); if (m_mempool) AssertLockHeld(m_mempool->cs); const CBlockIndex* pindexOldTip = m_chain.Tip(); const CBlockIndex* pindexFork = m_chain.FindFork(pindexMostWork); // Disconnect active blocks which are no longer in the best chain. bool fBlocksDisconnected = false; DisconnectedBlockTransactions disconnectpool{MAX_DISCONNECTED_TX_POOL_BYTES}; while (m_chain.Tip() && m_chain.Tip() != pindexFork) { if (!DisconnectTip(state, &disconnectpool)) { // This is likely a fatal error, but keep the mempool consistent, // just in case. Only remove from the mempool in this case. MaybeUpdateMempoolForReorg(disconnectpool, false); // If we're unable to disconnect a block during normal operation, // then that is a failure of our local system -- we should abort // rather than stay on a less work chain. FatalError(m_chainman.GetNotifications(), state, _("Failed to disconnect block.")); return false; } fBlocksDisconnected = true; } // Build list of new blocks to connect (in descending height order). std::vector<CBlockIndex*> vpindexToConnect; bool fContinue = true; int nHeight = pindexFork ? pindexFork->nHeight : -1; while (fContinue && nHeight != pindexMostWork->nHeight) { // Don't iterate the entire list of potential improvements toward the best tip, as we likely only need // a few blocks along the way. int nTargetHeight = std::min(nHeight + 32, pindexMostWork->nHeight); vpindexToConnect.clear(); vpindexToConnect.reserve(nTargetHeight - nHeight); CBlockIndex* pindexIter = pindexMostWork->GetAncestor(nTargetHeight); while (pindexIter && pindexIter->nHeight != nHeight) { vpindexToConnect.push_back(pindexIter); pindexIter = pindexIter->pprev; } nHeight = nTargetHeight; // Connect new blocks. for (CBlockIndex* pindexConnect : vpindexToConnect | std::views::reverse) { if (!ConnectTip(state, pindexConnect, pindexConnect == pindexMostWork ? pblock : std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>(), connectTrace, disconnectpool)) { if (state.IsInvalid()) { // The block violates a consensus rule. if (state.GetResult() != BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED) { InvalidChainFound(vpindexToConnect.front()); } state = BlockValidationState(); fInvalidFound = true; fContinue = false; break; } else { // A system error occurred (disk space, database error, ...). // Make the mempool consistent with the current tip, just in case // any observers try to use it before shutdown. MaybeUpdateMempoolForReorg(disconnectpool, false); return false; } } else { PruneBlockIndexCandidates(); if (!pindexOldTip || m_chain.Tip()->nChainWork > pindexOldTip->nChainWork) { // We're in a better position than we were. Return temporarily to release the lock. fContinue = false; break; } } } } if (fBlocksDisconnected) { // If any blocks were disconnected, disconnectpool may be non empty. Add // any disconnected transactions back to the mempool. MaybeUpdateMempoolForReorg(disconnectpool, true); } if (m_mempool) m_mempool->check(this->CoinsTip(), this->m_chain.Height() + 1); CheckForkWarningConditions(); return true; } static SynchronizationState GetSynchronizationState(bool init, bool blockfiles_indexed) { if (!init) return SynchronizationState::POST_INIT; if (!blockfiles_indexed) return SynchronizationState::INIT_REINDEX; return SynchronizationState::INIT_DOWNLOAD; } void ChainstateManager::UpdateIBDStatus() { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); if (!m_cached_is_ibd.load(std::memory_order_relaxed)) return; if (m_blockman.LoadingBlocks()) return; if (!CurrentChainstate().m_chain.IsTipRecent(MinimumChainWork(), m_options.max_tip_age)) return; LogInfo("Leaving InitialBlockDownload (latching to false)"); m_cached_is_ibd.store(false, std::memory_order_relaxed); } bool ChainstateManager::NotifyHeaderTip() { bool fNotify = false; bool fInitialBlockDownload = false; CBlockIndex* pindexHeader = nullptr; { LOCK(GetMutex()); pindexHeader = m_best_header; if (pindexHeader != m_last_notified_header) { fNotify = true; fInitialBlockDownload = IsInitialBlockDownload(); m_last_notified_header = pindexHeader; } } // Send block tip changed notifications without the lock held if (fNotify) { GetNotifications().headerTip(GetSynchronizationState(fInitialBlockDownload, m_blockman.m_blockfiles_indexed), pindexHeader->nHeight, pindexHeader->nTime, false); } return fNotify; } static void LimitValidationInterfaceQueue(ValidationSignals& signals) LOCKS_EXCLUDED(cs_main) { AssertLockNotHeld(cs_main); if (signals.CallbacksPending() > 10) { signals.SyncWithValidationInterfaceQueue(); } } bool Chainstate::ActivateBestChain(BlockValidationState& state, std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> pblock) { AssertLockNotHeld(m_chainstate_mutex); // Note that while we're often called here from ProcessNewBlock, this is // far from a guarantee. Things in the P2P/RPC will often end up calling // us in the middle of ProcessNewBlock - do not assume pblock is set // sanely for performance or correctness! AssertLockNotHeld(::cs_main); // ABC maintains a fair degree of expensive-to-calculate internal state // because this function periodically releases cs_main so that it does not lock up other threads for too long // during large connects - and to allow for e.g. the callback queue to drain // we use m_chainstate_mutex to enforce mutual exclusion so that only one caller may execute this function at a time LOCK(m_chainstate_mutex); // Belt-and-suspenders check that we aren't attempting to advance the // chainstate past the target block. if (WITH_LOCK(::cs_main, return m_target_utxohash)) { LogError("%s", STR_INTERNAL_BUG("m_target_utxohash is set - this chainstate should not be in operation.")); return Assume(false); } CBlockIndex *pindexMostWork = nullptr; CBlockIndex *pindexNewTip = nullptr; bool exited_ibd{false}; do { // Block until the validation queue drains. This should largely // never happen in normal operation, however may happen during // reindex, causing memory blowup if we run too far ahead. // Note that if a validationinterface callback ends up calling // ActivateBestChain this may lead to a deadlock! We should // probably have a DEBUG_LOCKORDER test for this in the future. if (m_chainman.m_options.signals) LimitValidationInterfaceQueue(*m_chainman.m_options.signals); { LOCK(cs_main); { // Lock transaction pool for at least as long as it takes for connectTrace to be consumed LOCK(MempoolMutex()); const bool was_in_ibd = m_chainman.IsInitialBlockDownload(); CBlockIndex* starting_tip = m_chain.Tip(); bool blocks_connected = false; do { // We absolutely may not unlock cs_main until we've made forward progress // (with the exception of shutdown due to hardware issues, low disk space, etc). ConnectTrace connectTrace; // Destructed before cs_main is unlocked if (pindexMostWork == nullptr) { pindexMostWork = FindMostWorkChain(); } // Whether we have anything to do at all. if (pindexMostWork == nullptr || pindexMostWork == m_chain.Tip()) { break; } bool fInvalidFound = false; std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> nullBlockPtr; // BlockConnected signals must be sent for the original role; // in case snapshot validation is completed during ActivateBestChainStep, the // result of GetRole() changes from BACKGROUND to NORMAL. const ChainstateRole chainstate_role{this->GetRole()}; if (!ActivateBestChainStep(state, pindexMostWork, pblock && pblock->GetHash() == pindexMostWork->GetBlockHash() ? pblock : nullBlockPtr, fInvalidFound, connectTrace)) { // A system error occurred return false; } blocks_connected = true; if (fInvalidFound) { // Wipe cache, we may need another branch now. pindexMostWork = nullptr; } pindexNewTip = m_chain.Tip(); for (const PerBlockConnectTrace& trace : connectTrace.GetBlocksConnected()) { assert(trace.pblock && trace.pindex); if (m_chainman.m_options.signals) { m_chainman.m_options.signals->BlockConnected(chainstate_role, trace.pblock, trace.pindex); } } // Break this do-while to ensure we don't advance past the target block. if (ReachedTarget()) { break; } } while (!m_chain.Tip() || (starting_tip && CBlockIndexWorkComparator()(m_chain.Tip(), starting_tip))); if (!blocks_connected) return true; const CBlockIndex* pindexFork = m_chain.FindFork(starting_tip); bool still_in_ibd = m_chainman.IsInitialBlockDownload(); if (was_in_ibd && !still_in_ibd) { // Active chainstate has exited IBD. exited_ibd = true; } // Notify external listeners about the new tip. // Enqueue while holding cs_main to ensure that UpdatedBlockTip is called in the order in which blocks are connected if (this == &m_chainman.ActiveChainstate() && pindexFork != pindexNewTip) { // Notify ValidationInterface subscribers if (m_chainman.m_options.signals) { m_chainman.m_options.signals->UpdatedBlockTip(pindexNewTip, pindexFork, still_in_ibd); } if (kernel::IsInterrupted(m_chainman.GetNotifications().blockTip( /*state=*/GetSynchronizationState(still_in_ibd, m_chainman.m_blockman.m_blockfiles_indexed), /*index=*/*pindexNewTip, /*verification_progress=*/m_chainman.GuessVerificationProgress(pindexNewTip)))) { // Just breaking and returning success for now. This could // be changed to bubble up the kernel::Interrupted value to // the caller so the caller could distinguish between // completed and interrupted operations. break; } } } // release MempoolMutex // Notify external listeners about the new tip, even if pindexFork == pindexNewTip. if (m_chainman.m_options.signals && this == &m_chainman.ActiveChainstate()) { m_chainman.m_options.signals->ActiveTipChange(*Assert(pindexNewTip), m_chainman.IsInitialBlockDownload()); } } // release cs_main // When we reach this point, we switched to a new tip (stored in pindexNewTip). bool reached_target; { LOCK(m_chainman.GetMutex()); if (exited_ibd) { // If a background chainstate is in use, we may need to rebalance our // allocation of caches once a chainstate exits initial block download. m_chainman.MaybeRebalanceCaches(); } // Write changes periodically to disk, after relay. if (!FlushStateToDisk(state, FlushStateMode::PERIODIC)) { return false; } reached_target = ReachedTarget(); } if (reached_target) { // Chainstate has reached the target block, so exit. // // Restart indexes so indexes can resync and index new blocks after // the target block. // // This cannot be done while holding cs_main (within // MaybeValidateSnapshot) or a cs_main deadlock will occur. if (m_chainman.snapshot_download_completed) { m_chainman.snapshot_download_completed(); } break; } // We check interrupt only after giving ActivateBestChainStep a chance to run once so that we // never interrupt before connecting the genesis block during LoadChainTip(). Previously this // caused an assert() failure during interrupt in such cases as the UTXO DB flushing checks // that the best block hash is non-null. if (m_chainman.m_interrupt) break; } while (pindexNewTip != pindexMostWork); m_chainman.CheckBlockIndex(); return true; } bool Chainstate::PreciousBlock(BlockValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pindex) { AssertLockNotHeld(m_chainstate_mutex); AssertLockNotHeld(::cs_main); { LOCK(cs_main); if (pindex->nChainWork < m_chain.Tip()->nChainWork) { // Nothing to do, this block is not at the tip. return true; } if (m_chain.Tip()->nChainWork > m_chainman.nLastPreciousChainwork) { // The chain has been extended since the last call, reset the counter. m_chainman.nBlockReverseSequenceId = -1; } m_chainman.nLastPreciousChainwork = m_chain.Tip()->nChainWork; setBlockIndexCandidates.erase(pindex); pindex->nSequenceId = m_chainman.nBlockReverseSequenceId; if (m_chainman.nBlockReverseSequenceId > std::numeric_limits<int32_t>::min()) { // We can't keep reducing the counter if somebody really wants to // call preciousblock 2**31-1 times on the same set of tips... m_chainman.nBlockReverseSequenceId--; } if (pindex->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS) && pindex->HaveNumChainTxs()) { setBlockIndexCandidates.insert(pindex); PruneBlockIndexCandidates(); } } return ActivateBestChain(state, std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>()); } bool Chainstate::InvalidateBlock(BlockValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pindex) { AssertLockNotHeld(m_chainstate_mutex); AssertLockNotHeld(::cs_main); // Genesis block can't be invalidated assert(pindex); if (pindex->nHeight == 0) return false; // We do not allow ActivateBestChain() to run while InvalidateBlock() is // running, as that could cause the tip to change while we disconnect // blocks. LOCK(m_chainstate_mutex); // We'll be acquiring and releasing cs_main below, to allow the validation // callbacks to run. However, we should keep the block index in a // consistent state as we disconnect blocks -- in particular we need to // add equal-work blocks to setBlockIndexCandidates as we disconnect. // To avoid walking the block index repeatedly in search of candidates, // build a map once so that we can look up candidate blocks by chain // work as we go. std::multimap<const arith_uint256, CBlockIndex*> highpow_outofchain_headers; { LOCK(cs_main); for (auto& entry : m_blockman.m_block_index) { CBlockIndex* candidate = &entry.second; // We don't need to put anything in our active chain into the // multimap, because those candidates will be found and considered // as we disconnect. // Instead, consider only non-active-chain blocks that score // at least as good with CBlockIndexWorkComparator as the new tip. if (!m_chain.Contains(candidate) && !CBlockIndexWorkComparator()(candidate, pindex->pprev) && !(candidate->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_VALID)) { highpow_outofchain_headers.insert({candidate->nChainWork, candidate}); } } } CBlockIndex* to_mark_failed = pindex; bool pindex_was_in_chain = false; int disconnected = 0; // Disconnect (descendants of) pindex, and mark them invalid. while (true) { if (m_chainman.m_interrupt) break; // Make sure the queue of validation callbacks doesn't grow unboundedly. if (m_chainman.m_options.signals) LimitValidationInterfaceQueue(*m_chainman.m_options.signals); LOCK(cs_main); // Lock for as long as disconnectpool is in scope to make sure MaybeUpdateMempoolForReorg is // called after DisconnectTip without unlocking in between LOCK(MempoolMutex()); if (!m_chain.Contains(pindex)) break; pindex_was_in_chain = true; CBlockIndex* disconnected_tip{m_chain.Tip()}; // ActivateBestChain considers blocks already in m_chain // unconditionally valid already, so force disconnect away from it. DisconnectedBlockTransactions disconnectpool{MAX_DISCONNECTED_TX_POOL_BYTES}; bool ret = DisconnectTip(state, &disconnectpool); // DisconnectTip will add transactions to disconnectpool. // Adjust the mempool to be consistent with the new tip, adding // transactions back to the mempool if disconnecting was successful, // and we're not doing a very deep invalidation (in which case // keeping the mempool up to date is probably futile anyway). MaybeUpdateMempoolForReorg(disconnectpool, /* fAddToMempool = */ (++disconnected <= 10) && ret); if (!ret) return false; CBlockIndex* new_tip{m_chain.Tip()}; assert(disconnected_tip->pprev == new_tip); // We immediately mark the disconnected blocks as invalid. // This prevents a case where pruned nodes may fail to invalidateblock // and be left unable to start as they have no tip candidates (as there // are no blocks that meet the "have data and are not invalid per // nStatus" criteria for inclusion in setBlockIndexCandidates). disconnected_tip->nStatus |= BLOCK_FAILED_VALID; m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(disconnected_tip); setBlockIndexCandidates.erase(disconnected_tip); setBlockIndexCandidates.insert(new_tip); // Mark out-of-chain descendants of the invalidated block as invalid // Add any equal or more work headers that are not invalidated to setBlockIndexCandidates // Recalculate m_best_header if it became invalid. auto candidate_it = highpow_outofchain_headers.lower_bound(new_tip->nChainWork); const bool best_header_needs_update{m_chainman.m_best_header->GetAncestor(disconnected_tip->nHeight) == disconnected_tip}; if (best_header_needs_update) { // new_tip is definitely still valid at this point, but there may be better ones m_chainman.m_best_header = new_tip; } while (candidate_it != highpow_outofchain_headers.end()) { CBlockIndex* candidate{candidate_it->second}; if (candidate->GetAncestor(disconnected_tip->nHeight) == disconnected_tip) { // Children of failed blocks are marked as BLOCK_FAILED_VALID. candidate->nStatus |= BLOCK_FAILED_VALID; m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(candidate); // If invalidated, the block is irrelevant for setBlockIndexCandidates // and for m_best_header and can be removed from the cache. candidate_it = highpow_outofchain_headers.erase(candidate_it); continue; } if (!CBlockIndexWorkComparator()(candidate, new_tip) && candidate->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS) && candidate->HaveNumChainTxs()) { setBlockIndexCandidates.insert(candidate); // Do not remove candidate from the highpow_outofchain_headers cache, because it might be a descendant of the block being invalidated // which needs to be marked failed later. } if (best_header_needs_update && m_chainman.m_best_header->nChainWork < candidate->nChainWork) { m_chainman.m_best_header = candidate; } ++candidate_it; } // Track the last disconnected block to call InvalidChainFound on it. to_mark_failed = disconnected_tip; } m_chainman.CheckBlockIndex(); { LOCK(cs_main); if (m_chain.Contains(to_mark_failed)) { // If the to-be-marked invalid block is in the active chain, something is interfering and we can't proceed. return false; } // Mark pindex as invalid if it never was in the main chain if (!pindex_was_in_chain && !(pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_VALID)) { pindex->nStatus |= BLOCK_FAILED_VALID; m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(pindex); setBlockIndexCandidates.erase(pindex); } // If any new blocks somehow arrived while we were disconnecting // (above), then the pre-calculation of what should go into // setBlockIndexCandidates may have missed entries. This would // technically be an inconsistency in the block index, but if we clean // it up here, this should be an essentially unobservable error. // Loop back over all block index entries and add any missing entries // to setBlockIndexCandidates. for (auto& [_, block_index] : m_blockman.m_block_index) { if (block_index.IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS) && block_index.HaveNumChainTxs() && !setBlockIndexCandidates.value_comp()(&block_index, m_chain.Tip())) { setBlockIndexCandidates.insert(&block_index); } } InvalidChainFound(to_mark_failed); } // Only notify about a new block tip if the active chain was modified. if (pindex_was_in_chain) { // Ignoring return value for now, this could be changed to bubble up // kernel::Interrupted value to the caller so the caller could // distinguish between completed and interrupted operations. It might // also make sense for the blockTip notification to have an enum // parameter indicating the source of the tip change so hooks can // distinguish user-initiated invalidateblock changes from other // changes. (void)m_chainman.GetNotifications().blockTip( /*state=*/GetSynchronizationState(m_chainman.IsInitialBlockDownload(), m_chainman.m_blockman.m_blockfiles_indexed), /*index=*/*to_mark_failed->pprev, /*verification_progress=*/WITH_LOCK(m_chainman.GetMutex(), return m_chainman.GuessVerificationProgress(to_mark_failed->pprev))); // Fire ActiveTipChange now for the current chain tip to make sure clients are notified. // ActivateBestChain may call this as well, but not necessarily. if (m_chainman.m_options.signals) { m_chainman.m_options.signals->ActiveTipChange(*Assert(m_chain.Tip()), m_chainman.IsInitialBlockDownload()); } } return true; } void Chainstate::SetBlockFailureFlags(CBlockIndex* invalid_block) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); for (auto& [_, block_index] : m_blockman.m_block_index) { if (invalid_block != &block_index && block_index.GetAncestor(invalid_block->nHeight) == invalid_block) { block_index.nStatus |= BLOCK_FAILED_VALID; m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(&block_index); } } } void Chainstate::ResetBlockFailureFlags(CBlockIndex *pindex) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); int nHeight = pindex->nHeight; // Remove the invalidity flag from this block and all its descendants and ancestors. for (auto& [_, block_index] : m_blockman.m_block_index) { if ((block_index.nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_VALID) && (block_index.GetAncestor(nHeight) == pindex || pindex->GetAncestor(block_index.nHeight) == &block_index)) { block_index.nStatus &= ~BLOCK_FAILED_VALID; m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(&block_index); if (block_index.IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS) && block_index.HaveNumChainTxs() && setBlockIndexCandidates.value_comp()(m_chain.Tip(), &block_index)) { setBlockIndexCandidates.insert(&block_index); } if (&block_index == m_chainman.m_best_invalid) { // Reset invalid block marker if it was pointing to one of those. m_chainman.m_best_invalid = nullptr; } } } } void Chainstate::TryAddBlockIndexCandidate(CBlockIndex* pindex) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); // Do not continue building a chainstate that is based on an invalid // snapshot. This is a belt-and-suspenders type of check because if an // invalid snapshot is loaded, the node will shut down to force a manual // intervention. But it is good to handle this case correctly regardless. if (m_assumeutxo == Assumeutxo::INVALID) { return; } // The block only is a candidate for the most-work-chain if it has the same // or more work than our current tip. if (m_chain.Tip() != nullptr && setBlockIndexCandidates.value_comp()(pindex, m_chain.Tip())) { return; } const CBlockIndex* target_block{TargetBlock()}; if (!target_block) { // If no specific target block, add all entries that have more // work than the tip. setBlockIndexCandidates.insert(pindex); } else { // If there is a target block, only consider connecting blocks // towards the target block. if (target_block->GetAncestor(pindex->nHeight) == pindex) { setBlockIndexCandidates.insert(pindex); } } } /** Mark a block as having its data received and checked (up to BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS). */ void ChainstateManager::ReceivedBlockTransactions(const CBlock& block, CBlockIndex* pindexNew, const FlatFilePos& pos) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); pindexNew->nTx = block.vtx.size(); // Typically m_chain_tx_count will be 0 at this point, but it can be nonzero if this // is a pruned block which is being downloaded again, or if this is an // assumeutxo snapshot block which has a hardcoded m_chain_tx_count value from the // snapshot metadata. If the pindex is not the snapshot block and the // m_chain_tx_count value is not zero, assert that value is actually correct. auto prev_tx_sum = [](CBlockIndex& block) { return block.nTx + (block.pprev ? block.pprev->m_chain_tx_count : 0); }; if (!Assume(pindexNew->m_chain_tx_count == 0 || pindexNew->m_chain_tx_count == prev_tx_sum(*pindexNew) || std::ranges::any_of(m_chainstates, [&](const auto& cs) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(cs_main) { return cs->SnapshotBase() == pindexNew; }))) { LogWarning("Internal bug detected: block %d has unexpected m_chain_tx_count %i that should be %i (%s %s). Please report this issue here: %s\n", pindexNew->nHeight, pindexNew->m_chain_tx_count, prev_tx_sum(*pindexNew), CLIENT_NAME, FormatFullVersion(), CLIENT_BUGREPORT); pindexNew->m_chain_tx_count = 0; } pindexNew->nFile = pos.nFile; pindexNew->nDataPos = pos.nPos; pindexNew->nUndoPos = 0; pindexNew->nStatus |= BLOCK_HAVE_DATA; if (DeploymentActiveAt(*pindexNew, *this, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT)) { pindexNew->nStatus |= BLOCK_OPT_WITNESS; } pindexNew->RaiseValidity(BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS); m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(pindexNew); if (pindexNew->pprev == nullptr || pindexNew->pprev->HaveNumChainTxs()) { // If pindexNew is the genesis block or all parents are BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS. std::deque<CBlockIndex*> queue; queue.push_back(pindexNew); // Recursively process any descendant blocks that now may be eligible to be connected. while (!queue.empty()) { CBlockIndex *pindex = queue.front(); queue.pop_front(); // Before setting m_chain_tx_count, assert that it is 0 or already set to // the correct value. This assert will fail after receiving the // assumeutxo snapshot block if assumeutxo snapshot metadata has an // incorrect hardcoded AssumeutxoData::m_chain_tx_count value. if (!Assume(pindex->m_chain_tx_count == 0 || pindex->m_chain_tx_count == prev_tx_sum(*pindex))) { LogWarning("Internal bug detected: block %d has unexpected m_chain_tx_count %i that should be %i (%s %s). Please report this issue here: %s\n", pindex->nHeight, pindex->m_chain_tx_count, prev_tx_sum(*pindex), CLIENT_NAME, FormatFullVersion(), CLIENT_BUGREPORT); } pindex->m_chain_tx_count = prev_tx_sum(*pindex); pindex->nSequenceId = nBlockSequenceId++; for (const auto& c : m_chainstates) { c->TryAddBlockIndexCandidate(pindex); } std::pair<std::multimap<CBlockIndex*, CBlockIndex*>::iterator, std::multimap<CBlockIndex*, CBlockIndex*>::iterator> range = m_blockman.m_blocks_unlinked.equal_range(pindex); while (range.first != range.second) { std::multimap<CBlockIndex*, CBlockIndex*>::iterator it = range.first; queue.push_back(it->second); range.first++; m_blockman.m_blocks_unlinked.erase(it); } } } else { if (pindexNew->pprev && pindexNew->pprev->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TREE)) { m_blockman.m_blocks_unlinked.insert(std::make_pair(pindexNew->pprev, pindexNew)); } } } static bool CheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidationState& state, const Consensus::Params& consensusParams, bool fCheckPOW = true) { // Check proof of work matches claimed amount if (fCheckPOW && !CheckProofOfWork(block.GetHash(), block.nBits, consensusParams)) return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, "high-hash", "proof of work failed"); return true; } static bool CheckMerkleRoot(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state) { if (block.m_checked_merkle_root) return true; bool mutated; uint256 merkle_root = BlockMerkleRoot(block, &mutated); if (block.hashMerkleRoot != merkle_root) { return state.Invalid( /*result=*/BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, /*reject_reason=*/"bad-txnmrklroot", /*debug_message=*/"hashMerkleRoot mismatch"); } // Check for merkle tree malleability (CVE-2012-2459): repeating sequences // of transactions in a block without affecting the merkle root of a block, // while still invalidating it. if (mutated) { return state.Invalid( /*result=*/BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, /*reject_reason=*/"bad-txns-duplicate", /*debug_message=*/"duplicate transaction"); } block.m_checked_merkle_root = true; return true; } /** CheckWitnessMalleation performs checks for block malleation with regard to * its witnesses. * * Note: If the witness commitment is expected (i.e. `expect_witness_commitment * = true`), then the block is required to have at least one transaction and the * first transaction needs to have at least one input. */ static bool CheckWitnessMalleation(const CBlock& block, bool expect_witness_commitment, BlockValidationState& state) { if (expect_witness_commitment) { if (block.m_checked_witness_commitment) return true; int commitpos = GetWitnessCommitmentIndex(block); if (commitpos != NO_WITNESS_COMMITMENT) { assert(!block.vtx.empty() && !block.vtx[0]->vin.empty()); const auto& witness_stack{block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptWitness.stack}; if (witness_stack.size() != 1 || witness_stack[0].size() != 32) { return state.Invalid( /*result=*/BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, /*reject_reason=*/"bad-witness-nonce-size", /*debug_message=*/strprintf("%s : invalid witness reserved value size", __func__)); } // The malleation check is ignored; as the transaction tree itself // already does not permit it, it is impossible to trigger in the // witness tree. uint256 hash_witness = BlockWitnessMerkleRoot(block); CHash256().Write(hash_witness).Write(witness_stack[0]).Finalize(hash_witness); if (memcmp(hash_witness.begin(), &block.vtx[0]->vout[commitpos].scriptPubKey[6], 32)) { return state.Invalid( /*result=*/BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, /*reject_reason=*/"bad-witness-merkle-match", /*debug_message=*/strprintf("%s : witness merkle commitment mismatch", __func__)); } block.m_checked_witness_commitment = true; return true; } } // No witness data is allowed in blocks that don't commit to witness data, as this would otherwise leave room for spam for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) { if (tx->HasWitness()) { return state.Invalid( /*result=*/BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MUTATED, /*reject_reason=*/"unexpected-witness", /*debug_message=*/strprintf("%s : unexpected witness data found", __func__)); } } return true; } bool CheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, const Consensus::Params& consensusParams, bool fCheckPOW, bool fCheckMerkleRoot) { // These are checks that are independent of context. if (block.fChecked) return true; // Check that the header is valid (particularly PoW). This is mostly // redundant with the call in AcceptBlockHeader. if (!CheckBlockHeader(block, state, consensusParams, fCheckPOW)) return false; // Signet only: check block solution if (consensusParams.signet_blocks && fCheckPOW && !CheckSignetBlockSolution(block, consensusParams)) { return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-signet-blksig", "signet block signature validation failure"); } // Check the merkle root. if (fCheckMerkleRoot && !CheckMerkleRoot(block, state)) { return false; } // All potential-corruption validation must be done before we do any // transaction validation, as otherwise we may mark the header as invalid // because we receive the wrong transactions for it. // Note that witness malleability is checked in ContextualCheckBlock, so no // checks that use witness data may be performed here. // Size limits if (block.vtx.empty() || block.vtx.size() * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT || ::GetSerializeSize(TX_NO_WITNESS(block)) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT) return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-blk-length", "size limits failed"); // First transaction must be coinbase, the rest must not be if (block.vtx.empty() || !block.vtx[0]->IsCoinBase()) return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-cb-missing", "first tx is not coinbase"); for (unsigned int i = 1; i < block.vtx.size(); i++) if (block.vtx[i]->IsCoinBase()) return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-cb-multiple", "more than one coinbase"); // Check transactions // Must check for duplicate inputs (see CVE-2018-17144) for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) { TxValidationState tx_state; if (!CheckTransaction(*tx, tx_state)) { // CheckBlock() does context-free validation checks. The only // possible failures are consensus failures. assert(tx_state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_CONSENSUS); return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, tx_state.GetRejectReason(), strprintf("Transaction check failed (tx hash %s) %s", tx->GetHash().ToString(), tx_state.GetDebugMessage())); } } // This underestimates the number of sigops, because unlike ConnectBlock it // does not count witness and p2sh sigops. unsigned int nSigOps = 0; for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) { nSigOps += GetLegacySigOpCount(*tx); } if (nSigOps * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_SIGOPS_COST) return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-blk-sigops", "out-of-bounds SigOpCount"); if (fCheckPOW && fCheckMerkleRoot) block.fChecked = true; return true; } void ChainstateManager::UpdateUncommittedBlockStructures(CBlock& block, const CBlockIndex* pindexPrev) const { int commitpos = GetWitnessCommitmentIndex(block); static const std::vector<unsigned char> nonce(32, 0x00); if (commitpos != NO_WITNESS_COMMITMENT && DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, *this, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT) && !block.vtx[0]->HasWitness()) { CMutableTransaction tx(*block.vtx[0]); tx.vin[0].scriptWitness.stack.resize(1); tx.vin[0].scriptWitness.stack[0] = nonce; block.vtx[0] = MakeTransactionRef(std::move(tx)); } } void ChainstateManager::GenerateCoinbaseCommitment(CBlock& block, const CBlockIndex* pindexPrev) const { int commitpos = GetWitnessCommitmentIndex(block); std::vector<unsigned char> ret(32, 0x00); if (commitpos == NO_WITNESS_COMMITMENT) { uint256 witnessroot = BlockWitnessMerkleRoot(block); CHash256().Write(witnessroot).Write(ret).Finalize(witnessroot); CTxOut out; out.nValue = 0; out.scriptPubKey.resize(MINIMUM_WITNESS_COMMITMENT); out.scriptPubKey[0] = OP_RETURN; out.scriptPubKey[1] = 0x24; out.scriptPubKey[2] = 0xaa; out.scriptPubKey[3] = 0x21; out.scriptPubKey[4] = 0xa9; out.scriptPubKey[5] = 0xed; memcpy(&out.scriptPubKey[6], witnessroot.begin(), 32); CMutableTransaction tx(*block.vtx[0]); tx.vout.push_back(out); block.vtx[0] = MakeTransactionRef(std::move(tx)); } UpdateUncommittedBlockStructures(block, pindexPrev); } bool HasValidProofOfWork(std::span<const CBlockHeader> headers, const Consensus::Params& consensusParams) { return std::ranges::all_of(headers, [&](const auto& header) { return CheckProofOfWork(header.GetHash(), header.nBits, consensusParams); }); } bool IsBlockMutated(const CBlock& block, bool check_witness_root) { BlockValidationState state; if (!CheckMerkleRoot(block, state)) { LogDebug(BCLog::VALIDATION, "Block mutated: %s\n", state.ToString()); return true; } if (block.vtx.empty() || !block.vtx[0]->IsCoinBase()) { // Consider the block mutated if any transaction is 64 bytes in size (see 3.1 // in "Weaknesses in Bitcoin’s Merkle Root Construction": // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/attachments/20190225/a27d8837/attachment-0001.pdf). // // Note: This is not a consensus change as this only applies to blocks that // don't have a coinbase transaction and would therefore already be invalid. return std::any_of(block.vtx.begin(), block.vtx.end(), [](auto& tx) { return GetSerializeSize(TX_NO_WITNESS(tx)) == 64; }); } else { // Theoretically it is still possible for a block with a 64 byte // coinbase transaction to be mutated but we neglect that possibility // here as it requires at least 224 bits of work. } if (!CheckWitnessMalleation(block, check_witness_root, state)) { LogDebug(BCLog::VALIDATION, "Block mutated: %s\n", state.ToString()); return true; } return false; } arith_uint256 CalculateClaimedHeadersWork(std::span<const CBlockHeader> headers) { arith_uint256 total_work{0}; for (const CBlockHeader& header : headers) { total_work += GetBlockProof(header); } return total_work; } /** Context-dependent validity checks. * By "context", we mean only the previous block headers, but not the UTXO * set; UTXO-related validity checks are done in ConnectBlock(). * NOTE: This function is not currently invoked by ConnectBlock(), so we * should consider upgrade issues if we change which consensus rules are * enforced in this function (eg by adding a new consensus rule). See comment * in ConnectBlock(). * Note that -reindex-chainstate skips the validation that happens here! * * NOTE: failing to check the header's height against the last checkpoint's opened a DoS vector between * v0.12 and v0.15 (when no additional protection was in place) whereby an attacker could unboundedly * grow our in-memory block index. See https://bitcoincore.org/en/2024/07/03/disclose-header-spam. */ static bool ContextualCheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidationState& state, BlockManager& blockman, const ChainstateManager& chainman, const CBlockIndex* pindexPrev) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main) { AssertLockHeld(::cs_main); assert(pindexPrev != nullptr); const int nHeight = pindexPrev->nHeight + 1; // Check proof of work const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = chainman.GetConsensus(); if (block.nBits != GetNextWorkRequired(pindexPrev, &block, consensusParams)) return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, "bad-diffbits", "incorrect proof of work"); // Check timestamp against prev if (block.GetBlockTime() <= pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast()) return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, "time-too-old", "block's timestamp is too early"); // Testnet4 and regtest only: Check timestamp against prev for difficulty-adjustment // blocks to prevent timewarp attacks (see https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/15482). if (consensusParams.enforce_BIP94) { // Check timestamp for the first block of each difficulty adjustment // interval, except the genesis block. if (nHeight % consensusParams.DifficultyAdjustmentInterval() == 0) { if (block.GetBlockTime() < pindexPrev->GetBlockTime() - MAX_TIMEWARP) { return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, "time-timewarp-attack", "block's timestamp is too early on diff adjustment block"); } } } // Check timestamp if (block.Time() > NodeClock::now() + std::chrono::seconds{MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME}) { return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE, "time-too-new", "block timestamp too far in the future"); } // Reject blocks with outdated version if ((block.nVersion < 2 && DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_HEIGHTINCB)) || (block.nVersion < 3 && DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_DERSIG)) || (block.nVersion < 4 && DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_CLTV))) { return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER, strprintf("bad-version(0x%08x)", block.nVersion), strprintf("rejected nVersion=0x%08x block", block.nVersion)); } return true; } /** NOTE: This function is not currently invoked by ConnectBlock(), so we * should consider upgrade issues if we change which consensus rules are * enforced in this function (eg by adding a new consensus rule). See comment * in ConnectBlock(). * Note that -reindex-chainstate skips the validation that happens here! */ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, BlockValidationState& state, const ChainstateManager& chainman, const CBlockIndex* pindexPrev) { const int nHeight = pindexPrev == nullptr ? 0 : pindexPrev->nHeight + 1; // Enforce BIP113 (Median Time Past). bool enforce_locktime_median_time_past{false}; if (DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_CSV)) { assert(pindexPrev != nullptr); enforce_locktime_median_time_past = true; } const int64_t nLockTimeCutoff{enforce_locktime_median_time_past ? pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast() : block.GetBlockTime()}; // Check that all transactions are finalized for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) { if (!IsFinalTx(*tx, nHeight, nLockTimeCutoff)) { return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-txns-nonfinal", "non-final transaction"); } } // Enforce rule that the coinbase starts with serialized block height if (DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_HEIGHTINCB)) { CScript expect = CScript() << nHeight; if (block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptSig.size() < expect.size() || !std::equal(expect.begin(), expect.end(), block.vtx[0]->vin[0].scriptSig.begin())) { return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-cb-height", "block height mismatch in coinbase"); } } // Validation for witness commitments. // * We compute the witness hash (which is the hash including witnesses) of all the block's transactions, except the // coinbase (where 0x0000....0000 is used instead). // * The coinbase scriptWitness is a stack of a single 32-byte vector, containing a witness reserved value (unconstrained). // * We build a merkle tree with all those witness hashes as leaves (similar to the hashMerkleRoot in the block header). // * There must be at least one output whose scriptPubKey is a single 36-byte push, the first 4 bytes of which are // {0xaa, 0x21, 0xa9, 0xed}, and the following 32 bytes are SHA256^2(witness root, witness reserved value). In case there are // multiple, the last one is used. if (!CheckWitnessMalleation(block, DeploymentActiveAfter(pindexPrev, chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT), state)) { return false; } // After the coinbase witness reserved value and commitment are verified, // we can check if the block weight passes (before we've checked the // coinbase witness, it would be possible for the weight to be too // large by filling up the coinbase witness, which doesn't change // the block hash, so we couldn't mark the block as permanently // failed). if (GetBlockWeight(block) > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT) { return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CONSENSUS, "bad-blk-weight", strprintf("%s : weight limit failed", __func__)); } return true; } bool ChainstateManager::AcceptBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, BlockValidationState& state, CBlockIndex** ppindex, bool min_pow_checked) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); // Check for duplicate uint256 hash = block.GetHash(); BlockMap::iterator miSelf{m_blockman.m_block_index.find(hash)}; if (hash != GetConsensus().hashGenesisBlock) { if (miSelf != m_blockman.m_block_index.end()) { // Block header is already known. CBlockIndex* pindex = &(miSelf->second); if (ppindex) *ppindex = pindex; if (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_VALID) { LogDebug(BCLog::VALIDATION, "%s: block %s is marked invalid\n", __func__, hash.ToString()); return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CACHED_INVALID, "duplicate-invalid", strprintf("block %s was previously marked invalid", hash.ToString())); } return true; } if (!CheckBlockHeader(block, state, GetConsensus())) { LogDebug(BCLog::VALIDATION, "%s: Consensus::CheckBlockHeader: %s, %s\n", __func__, hash.ToString(), state.ToString()); return false; } // Get prev block index CBlockIndex* pindexPrev = nullptr; BlockMap::iterator mi{m_blockman.m_block_index.find(block.hashPrevBlock)}; if (mi == m_blockman.m_block_index.end()) { LogDebug(BCLog::VALIDATION, "header %s has prev block not found: %s\n", hash.ToString(), block.hashPrevBlock.ToString()); return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV, "prev-blk-not-found"); } pindexPrev = &((*mi).second); if (pindexPrev->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_VALID) { LogDebug(BCLog::VALIDATION, "header %s has prev block invalid: %s\n", hash.ToString(), block.hashPrevBlock.ToString()); return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV, "bad-prevblk"); } if (!ContextualCheckBlockHeader(block, state, m_blockman, *this, pindexPrev)) { LogDebug(BCLog::VALIDATION, "%s: Consensus::ContextualCheckBlockHeader: %s, %s\n", __func__, hash.ToString(), state.ToString()); return false; } } if (!min_pow_checked) { LogDebug(BCLog::VALIDATION, "%s: not adding new block header %s, missing anti-dos proof-of-work validation\n", __func__, hash.ToString()); return state.Invalid(BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_HEADER_LOW_WORK, "too-little-chainwork"); } CBlockIndex* pindex{m_blockman.AddToBlockIndex(block, m_best_header)}; if (ppindex) *ppindex = pindex; return true; } // Exposed wrapper for AcceptBlockHeader bool ChainstateManager::ProcessNewBlockHeaders(std::span<const CBlockHeader> headers, bool min_pow_checked, BlockValidationState& state, const CBlockIndex** ppindex) { AssertLockNotHeld(cs_main); { LOCK(cs_main); for (const CBlockHeader& header : headers) { CBlockIndex *pindex = nullptr; // Use a temp pindex instead of ppindex to avoid a const_cast bool accepted{AcceptBlockHeader(header, state, &pindex, min_pow_checked)}; CheckBlockIndex(); if (!accepted) { return false; } if (ppindex) { *ppindex = pindex; } } } if (NotifyHeaderTip()) { if (IsInitialBlockDownload() && ppindex && *ppindex) { const CBlockIndex& last_accepted{**ppindex}; int64_t blocks_left{(NodeClock::now() - last_accepted.Time()) / GetConsensus().PowTargetSpacing()}; blocks_left = std::max<int64_t>(0, blocks_left); const double progress{100.0 * last_accepted.nHeight / (last_accepted.nHeight + blocks_left)}; LogInfo("Synchronizing blockheaders, height: %d (~%.2f%%)\n", last_accepted.nHeight, progress); } } return true; } void ChainstateManager::ReportHeadersPresync(int64_t height, int64_t timestamp) { AssertLockNotHeld(GetMutex()); { LOCK(GetMutex()); // Don't report headers presync progress if we already have a post-minchainwork header chain. // This means we lose reporting for potentially legitimate, but unlikely, deep reorgs, but // prevent attackers that spam low-work headers from filling our logs. if (m_best_header->nChainWork >= UintToArith256(GetConsensus().nMinimumChainWork)) return; // Rate limit headers presync updates to 4 per second, as these are not subject to DoS // protection. auto now = MockableSteadyClock::now(); if (now < m_last_presync_update + std::chrono::milliseconds{250}) return; m_last_presync_update = now; } bool initial_download = IsInitialBlockDownload(); GetNotifications().headerTip(GetSynchronizationState(initial_download, m_blockman.m_blockfiles_indexed), height, timestamp, /*presync=*/true); if (initial_download) { int64_t blocks_left{(NodeClock::now() - NodeSeconds{std::chrono::seconds{timestamp}}) / GetConsensus().PowTargetSpacing()}; blocks_left = std::max<int64_t>(0, blocks_left); const double progress{100.0 * height / (height + blocks_left)}; LogInfo("Pre-synchronizing blockheaders, height: %d (~%.2f%%)\n", height, progress); } } /** Store block on disk. If dbp is non-nullptr, the file is known to already reside on disk */ bool ChainstateManager::AcceptBlock(const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>& pblock, BlockValidationState& state, CBlockIndex** ppindex, bool fRequested, const FlatFilePos* dbp, bool* fNewBlock, bool min_pow_checked) { const CBlock& block = *pblock; if (fNewBlock) *fNewBlock = false; AssertLockHeld(cs_main); CBlockIndex *pindexDummy = nullptr; CBlockIndex *&pindex = ppindex ? *ppindex : pindexDummy; bool accepted_header{AcceptBlockHeader(block, state, &pindex, min_pow_checked)}; CheckBlockIndex(); if (!accepted_header) return false; // Check all requested blocks that we do not already have for validity and // save them to disk. Skip processing of unrequested blocks as an anti-DoS // measure, unless the blocks have more work than the active chain tip, and // aren't too far ahead of it, so are likely to be attached soon. bool fAlreadyHave = pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA; bool fHasMoreOrSameWork = (ActiveTip() ? pindex->nChainWork >= ActiveTip()->nChainWork : true); // Blocks that are too out-of-order needlessly limit the effectiveness of // pruning, because pruning will not delete block files that contain any // blocks which are too close in height to the tip. Apply this test // regardless of whether pruning is enabled; it should generally be safe to // not process unrequested blocks. bool fTooFarAhead{pindex->nHeight > ActiveHeight() + int(MIN_BLOCKS_TO_KEEP)}; // TODO: Decouple this function from the block download logic by removing fRequested // This requires some new chain data structure to efficiently look up if a // block is in a chain leading to a candidate for best tip, despite not // being such a candidate itself. // Note that this would break the getblockfrompeer RPC // TODO: deal better with return value and error conditions for duplicate // and unrequested blocks. if (fAlreadyHave) return true; if (!fRequested) { // If we didn't ask for it: if (pindex->nTx != 0) return true; // This is a previously-processed block that was pruned if (!fHasMoreOrSameWork) return true; // Don't process less-work chains if (fTooFarAhead) return true; // Block height is too high // Protect against DoS attacks from low-work chains. // If our tip is behind, a peer could try to send us // low-work blocks on a fake chain that we would never // request; don't process these. if (pindex->nChainWork < MinimumChainWork()) return true; } const CChainParams& params{GetParams()}; if (!CheckBlock(block, state, params.GetConsensus()) || !ContextualCheckBlock(block, state, *this, pindex->pprev)) { if (Assume(state.IsInvalid())) { ActiveChainstate().InvalidBlockFound(pindex, state); } LogError("%s: %s\n", __func__, state.ToString()); return false; } // Header is valid/has work, merkle tree and segwit merkle tree are good...RELAY NOW // (but if it does not build on our best tip, let the SendMessages loop relay it) if (!IsInitialBlockDownload() && ActiveTip() == pindex->pprev && m_options.signals) { m_options.signals->NewPoWValidBlock(pindex, pblock); } // Write block to history file if (fNewBlock) *fNewBlock = true; try { FlatFilePos blockPos{}; if (dbp) { blockPos = *dbp; m_blockman.UpdateBlockInfo(block, pindex->nHeight, blockPos); } else { blockPos = m_blockman.WriteBlock(block, pindex->nHeight); if (blockPos.IsNull()) { state.Error(strprintf("%s: Failed to find position to write new block to disk", __func__)); return false; } } ReceivedBlockTransactions(block, pindex, blockPos); } catch (const std::runtime_error& e) { return FatalError(GetNotifications(), state, strprintf(_("System error while saving block to disk: %s"), e.what())); } // TODO: FlushStateToDisk() handles flushing of both block and chainstate // data, so we should move this to ChainstateManager so that we can be more // intelligent about how we flush. // For now, since FlushStateMode::NONE is used, all that can happen is that // the block files may be pruned, so we can just call this on one // chainstate (particularly if we haven't implemented pruning with // background validation yet). ActiveChainstate().FlushStateToDisk(state, FlushStateMode::NONE); CheckBlockIndex(); return true; } bool ChainstateManager::ProcessNewBlock(const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock>& block, bool force_processing, bool min_pow_checked, bool* new_block) { AssertLockNotHeld(cs_main); { CBlockIndex *pindex = nullptr; if (new_block) *new_block = false; BlockValidationState state; // CheckBlock() does not support multi-threaded block validation because CBlock::fChecked can cause data race. // Therefore, the following critical section must include the CheckBlock() call as well. LOCK(cs_main); // Skipping AcceptBlock() for CheckBlock() failures means that we will never mark a block as invalid if // CheckBlock() fails. This is protective against consensus failure if there are any unknown forms of block // malleability that cause CheckBlock() to fail; see e.g. CVE-2012-2459 and // https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2019-February/016697.html. Because CheckBlock() is // not very expensive, the anti-DoS benefits of caching failure (of a definitely-invalid block) are not substantial. bool ret = CheckBlock(*block, state, GetConsensus()); if (ret) { // Store to disk ret = AcceptBlock(block, state, &pindex, force_processing, nullptr, new_block, min_pow_checked); } if (!ret) { if (m_options.signals) { m_options.signals->BlockChecked(block, state); } LogError("%s: AcceptBlock FAILED (%s)\n", __func__, state.ToString()); return false; } } NotifyHeaderTip(); BlockValidationState state; // Only used to report errors, not invalidity - ignore it if (!ActiveChainstate().ActivateBestChain(state, block)) { LogError("%s: ActivateBestChain failed (%s)\n", __func__, state.ToString()); return false; } Chainstate* bg_chain{WITH_LOCK(cs_main, return HistoricalChainstate())}; BlockValidationState bg_state; if (bg_chain && !bg_chain->ActivateBestChain(bg_state, block)) { LogError("%s: [background] ActivateBestChain failed (%s)\n", __func__, bg_state.ToString()); return false; } return true; } MempoolAcceptResult ChainstateManager::ProcessTransaction(const CTransactionRef& tx, bool test_accept) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); Chainstate& active_chainstate = ActiveChainstate(); if (!active_chainstate.GetMempool()) { TxValidationState state; state.Invalid(TxValidationResult::TX_NO_MEMPOOL, "no-mempool"); return MempoolAcceptResult::Failure(state); } auto result = AcceptToMemoryPool(active_chainstate, tx, GetTime(), /*bypass_limits=*/ false, test_accept); active_chainstate.GetMempool()->check(active_chainstate.CoinsTip(), active_chainstate.m_chain.Height() + 1); return result; } BlockValidationState TestBlockValidity( Chainstate& chainstate, const CBlock& block, const bool check_pow, const bool check_merkle_root) { // Lock must be held throughout this function for two reasons: // 1. We don't want the tip to change during several of the validation steps // 2. To prevent a CheckBlock() race condition for fChecked, see ProcessNewBlock() AssertLockHeld(chainstate.m_chainman.GetMutex()); BlockValidationState state; CBlockIndex* tip{Assert(chainstate.m_chain.Tip())}; if (block.hashPrevBlock != *Assert(tip->phashBlock)) { state.Invalid({}, "inconclusive-not-best-prevblk"); return state; } // For signets CheckBlock() verifies the challenge iff fCheckPow is set. if (!CheckBlock(block, state, chainstate.m_chainman.GetConsensus(), /*fCheckPow=*/check_pow, /*fCheckMerkleRoot=*/check_merkle_root)) { // This should never happen, but belt-and-suspenders don't approve the // block if it does. if (state.IsValid()) NONFATAL_UNREACHABLE(); return state; } /** * At this point ProcessNewBlock would call AcceptBlock(), but we * don't want to store the block or its header. Run individual checks * instead: * - skip AcceptBlockHeader() because: * - we don't want to update the block index * - we do not care about duplicates * - we already ran CheckBlockHeader() via CheckBlock() * - we already checked for prev-blk-not-found * - we know the tip is valid, so no need to check bad-prevblk * - we already ran CheckBlock() * - do run ContextualCheckBlockHeader() * - do run ContextualCheckBlock() */ if (!ContextualCheckBlockHeader(block, state, chainstate.m_blockman, chainstate.m_chainman, tip)) { if (state.IsValid()) NONFATAL_UNREACHABLE(); return state; } if (!ContextualCheckBlock(block, state, chainstate.m_chainman, tip)) { if (state.IsValid()) NONFATAL_UNREACHABLE(); return state; } // We don't want ConnectBlock to update the actual chainstate, so create // a cache on top of it, along with a dummy block index. CBlockIndex index_dummy{block}; uint256 block_hash(block.GetHash()); index_dummy.pprev = tip; index_dummy.nHeight = tip->nHeight + 1; index_dummy.phashBlock = &block_hash; CCoinsViewCache view_dummy(&chainstate.CoinsTip()); // Set fJustCheck to true in order to update, and not clear, validation caches. if(!chainstate.ConnectBlock(block, state, &index_dummy, view_dummy, /*fJustCheck=*/true)) { if (state.IsValid()) NONFATAL_UNREACHABLE(); return state; } // Ensure no check returned successfully while also setting an invalid state. if (!state.IsValid()) NONFATAL_UNREACHABLE(); return state; } /* This function is called from the RPC code for pruneblockchain */ void PruneBlockFilesManual(Chainstate& active_chainstate, int nManualPruneHeight) { BlockValidationState state; if (!active_chainstate.FlushStateToDisk( state, FlushStateMode::NONE, nManualPruneHeight)) { LogWarning("Failed to flush state after manual prune (%s)", state.ToString()); } } bool Chainstate::LoadChainTip() { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); const CCoinsViewCache& coins_cache = CoinsTip(); assert(!coins_cache.GetBestBlock().IsNull()); // Never called when the coins view is empty CBlockIndex* tip = m_chain.Tip(); if (tip && tip->GetBlockHash() == coins_cache.GetBestBlock()) { return true; } // Load pointer to end of best chain CBlockIndex* pindex = m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(coins_cache.GetBestBlock()); if (!pindex) { return false; } m_chain.SetTip(*pindex); m_chainman.UpdateIBDStatus(); tip = m_chain.Tip(); // nSequenceId is one of the keys used to sort setBlockIndexCandidates. Ensure all // candidate sets are empty to avoid UB, as nSequenceId is about to be modified. for (const auto& cs : m_chainman.m_chainstates) { assert(cs->setBlockIndexCandidates.empty()); } // Make sure our chain tip before shutting down scores better than any other candidate // to maintain a consistent best tip over reboots in case of a tie. auto target = tip; while (target) { target->nSequenceId = SEQ_ID_BEST_CHAIN_FROM_DISK; target = target->pprev; } LogInfo("Loaded best chain: hashBestChain=%s height=%d date=%s progress=%f", tip->GetBlockHash().ToString(), m_chain.Height(), FormatISO8601DateTime(tip->GetBlockTime()), m_chainman.GuessVerificationProgress(tip)); // Ensure KernelNotifications m_tip_block is set even if no new block arrives. if (!this->GetRole().historical) { // Ignoring return value for now. (void)m_chainman.GetNotifications().blockTip( /*state=*/GetSynchronizationState(/*init=*/true, m_chainman.m_blockman.m_blockfiles_indexed), /*index=*/*pindex, /*verification_progress=*/m_chainman.GuessVerificationProgress(tip)); } CheckForkWarningConditions(); return true; } CVerifyDB::CVerifyDB(Notifications& notifications) : m_notifications{notifications} { m_notifications.progress(_("Verifying blocks…"), 0, false); } CVerifyDB::~CVerifyDB() { m_notifications.progress(bilingual_str{}, 100, false); } VerifyDBResult CVerifyDB::VerifyDB( Chainstate& chainstate, const Consensus::Params& consensus_params, CCoinsView& coinsview, int nCheckLevel, int nCheckDepth) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); if (chainstate.m_chain.Tip() == nullptr || chainstate.m_chain.Tip()->pprev == nullptr) { return VerifyDBResult::SUCCESS; } // Verify blocks in the best chain if (nCheckDepth <= 0 || nCheckDepth > chainstate.m_chain.Height()) { nCheckDepth = chainstate.m_chain.Height(); } nCheckLevel = std::max(0, std::min(4, nCheckLevel)); LogInfo("Verifying last %i blocks at level %i", nCheckDepth, nCheckLevel); CCoinsViewCache coins(&coinsview); CBlockIndex* pindex; CBlockIndex* pindexFailure = nullptr; int nGoodTransactions = 0; BlockValidationState state; int reportDone = 0; bool skipped_no_block_data{false}; bool skipped_l3_checks{false}; LogInfo("Verification progress: 0%%"); const bool is_snapshot_cs{chainstate.m_from_snapshot_blockhash}; for (pindex = chainstate.m_chain.Tip(); pindex && pindex->pprev; pindex = pindex->pprev) { const int percentageDone = std::max(1, std::min(99, (int)(((double)(chainstate.m_chain.Height() - pindex->nHeight)) / (double)nCheckDepth * (nCheckLevel >= 4 ? 50 : 100)))); if (reportDone < percentageDone / 10) { // report every 10% step LogInfo("Verification progress: %d%%", percentageDone); reportDone = percentageDone / 10; } m_notifications.progress(_("Verifying blocks…"), percentageDone, false); if (pindex->nHeight <= chainstate.m_chain.Height() - nCheckDepth) { break; } if ((chainstate.m_blockman.IsPruneMode() || is_snapshot_cs) && !(pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA)) { // If pruning or running under an assumeutxo snapshot, only go // back as far as we have data. LogInfo("Block verification stopping at height %d (no data). This could be due to pruning or use of an assumeutxo snapshot.", pindex->nHeight); skipped_no_block_data = true; break; } CBlock block; // check level 0: read from disk if (!chainstate.m_blockman.ReadBlock(block, *pindex)) { LogError("Verification error: ReadBlock failed at %d, hash=%s", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString()); return VerifyDBResult::CORRUPTED_BLOCK_DB; } // check level 1: verify block validity if (nCheckLevel >= 1 && !CheckBlock(block, state, consensus_params)) { LogError("Verification error: found bad block at %d, hash=%s (%s)", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString(), state.ToString()); return VerifyDBResult::CORRUPTED_BLOCK_DB; } // check level 2: verify undo validity if (nCheckLevel >= 2 && pindex) { CBlockUndo undo; if (!pindex->GetUndoPos().IsNull()) { if (!chainstate.m_blockman.ReadBlockUndo(undo, *pindex)) { LogError("Verification error: found bad undo data at %d, hash=%s", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString()); return VerifyDBResult::CORRUPTED_BLOCK_DB; } } } // check level 3: check for inconsistencies during memory-only disconnect of tip blocks size_t curr_coins_usage = coins.DynamicMemoryUsage() + chainstate.CoinsTip().DynamicMemoryUsage(); if (nCheckLevel >= 3) { if (curr_coins_usage <= chainstate.m_coinstip_cache_size_bytes) { assert(coins.GetBestBlock() == pindex->GetBlockHash()); DisconnectResult res = chainstate.DisconnectBlock(block, pindex, coins); if (res == DISCONNECT_FAILED) { LogError("Verification error: irrecoverable inconsistency in block data at %d, hash=%s", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString()); return VerifyDBResult::CORRUPTED_BLOCK_DB; } if (res == DISCONNECT_UNCLEAN) { nGoodTransactions = 0; pindexFailure = pindex; } else { nGoodTransactions += block.vtx.size(); } } else { skipped_l3_checks = true; } } if (chainstate.m_chainman.m_interrupt) return VerifyDBResult::INTERRUPTED; } if (pindexFailure) { LogError("Verification error: coin database inconsistencies found (last %i blocks, %i good transactions before that)", chainstate.m_chain.Height() - pindexFailure->nHeight + 1, nGoodTransactions); return VerifyDBResult::CORRUPTED_BLOCK_DB; } if (skipped_l3_checks) { LogWarning("Skipped verification of level >=3 (insufficient database cache size). Consider increasing -dbcache."); } // store block count as we move pindex at check level >= 4 int block_count = chainstate.m_chain.Height() - pindex->nHeight; // check level 4: try reconnecting blocks if (nCheckLevel >= 4 && !skipped_l3_checks) { while (pindex != chainstate.m_chain.Tip()) { const int percentageDone = std::max(1, std::min(99, 100 - (int)(((double)(chainstate.m_chain.Height() - pindex->nHeight)) / (double)nCheckDepth * 50))); if (reportDone < percentageDone / 10) { // report every 10% step LogInfo("Verification progress: %d%%", percentageDone); reportDone = percentageDone / 10; } m_notifications.progress(_("Verifying blocks…"), percentageDone, false); pindex = chainstate.m_chain.Next(pindex); CBlock block; if (!chainstate.m_blockman.ReadBlock(block, *pindex)) { LogError("Verification error: ReadBlock failed at %d, hash=%s", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString()); return VerifyDBResult::CORRUPTED_BLOCK_DB; } if (!chainstate.ConnectBlock(block, state, pindex, coins)) { LogError("Verification error: found unconnectable block at %d, hash=%s (%s)", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString(), state.ToString()); return VerifyDBResult::CORRUPTED_BLOCK_DB; } if (chainstate.m_chainman.m_interrupt) return VerifyDBResult::INTERRUPTED; } } LogInfo("Verification: No coin database inconsistencies in last %i blocks (%i transactions)", block_count, nGoodTransactions); if (skipped_l3_checks) { return VerifyDBResult::SKIPPED_L3_CHECKS; } if (skipped_no_block_data) { return VerifyDBResult::SKIPPED_MISSING_BLOCKS; } return VerifyDBResult::SUCCESS; } /** Apply the effects of a block on the utxo cache, ignoring that it may already have been applied. */ bool Chainstate::RollforwardBlock(const CBlockIndex* pindex, CCoinsViewCache& inputs) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); // TODO: merge with ConnectBlock CBlock block; if (!m_blockman.ReadBlock(block, *pindex)) { LogError("ReplayBlock(): ReadBlock failed at %d, hash=%s\n", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString()); return false; } for (const CTransactionRef& tx : block.vtx) { if (!tx->IsCoinBase()) { for (const CTxIn &txin : tx->vin) { inputs.SpendCoin(txin.prevout); } } // Pass check = true as every addition may be an overwrite. AddCoins(inputs, *tx, pindex->nHeight, true); } return true; } bool Chainstate::ReplayBlocks() { LOCK(cs_main); CCoinsView& db = this->CoinsDB(); CCoinsViewCache cache(&db); std::vector<uint256> hashHeads = db.GetHeadBlocks(); if (hashHeads.empty()) return true; // We're already in a consistent state. if (hashHeads.size() != 2) { LogError("ReplayBlocks(): unknown inconsistent state\n"); return false; } m_chainman.GetNotifications().progress(_("Replaying blocks…"), 0, false); LogInfo("Replaying blocks"); const CBlockIndex* pindexOld = nullptr; // Old tip during the interrupted flush. const CBlockIndex* pindexNew; // New tip during the interrupted flush. const CBlockIndex* pindexFork = nullptr; // Latest block common to both the old and the new tip. if (!m_blockman.m_block_index.contains(hashHeads[0])) { LogError("ReplayBlocks(): reorganization to unknown block requested\n"); return false; } pindexNew = &(m_blockman.m_block_index[hashHeads[0]]); if (!hashHeads[1].IsNull()) { // The old tip is allowed to be 0, indicating it's the first flush. if (!m_blockman.m_block_index.contains(hashHeads[1])) { LogError("ReplayBlocks(): reorganization from unknown block requested\n"); return false; } pindexOld = &(m_blockman.m_block_index[hashHeads[1]]); pindexFork = LastCommonAncestor(pindexOld, pindexNew); assert(pindexFork != nullptr); } // Rollback along the old branch. const int nForkHeight{pindexFork ? pindexFork->nHeight : 0}; if (pindexOld != pindexFork) { LogInfo("Rolling back from %s (%i to %i)", pindexOld->GetBlockHash().ToString(), pindexOld->nHeight, nForkHeight); while (pindexOld != pindexFork) { if (pindexOld->nHeight > 0) { // Never disconnect the genesis block. CBlock block; if (!m_blockman.ReadBlock(block, *pindexOld)) { LogError("RollbackBlock(): ReadBlock() failed at %d, hash=%s\n", pindexOld->nHeight, pindexOld->GetBlockHash().ToString()); return false; } if (pindexOld->nHeight % 10'000 == 0) { LogInfo("Rolling back %s (%i)", pindexOld->GetBlockHash().ToString(), pindexOld->nHeight); } DisconnectResult res = DisconnectBlock(block, pindexOld, cache); if (res == DISCONNECT_FAILED) { LogError("RollbackBlock(): DisconnectBlock failed at %d, hash=%s\n", pindexOld->nHeight, pindexOld->GetBlockHash().ToString()); return false; } // If DISCONNECT_UNCLEAN is returned, it means a non-existing UTXO was deleted, or an existing UTXO was // overwritten. It corresponds to cases where the block-to-be-disconnect never had all its operations // applied to the UTXO set. However, as both writing a UTXO and deleting a UTXO are idempotent operations, // the result is still a version of the UTXO set with the effects of that block undone. } pindexOld = pindexOld->pprev; } LogInfo("Rolled back to %s", pindexFork->GetBlockHash().ToString()); } // Roll forward from the forking point to the new tip. if (nForkHeight < pindexNew->nHeight) { LogInfo("Rolling forward to %s (%i to %i)", pindexNew->GetBlockHash().ToString(), nForkHeight, pindexNew->nHeight); for (int nHeight = nForkHeight + 1; nHeight <= pindexNew->nHeight; ++nHeight) { const CBlockIndex& pindex{*Assert(pindexNew->GetAncestor(nHeight))}; if (nHeight % 10'000 == 0) { LogInfo("Rolling forward %s (%i)", pindex.GetBlockHash().ToString(), nHeight); } m_chainman.GetNotifications().progress(_("Replaying blocks…"), (int)((nHeight - nForkHeight) * 100.0 / (pindexNew->nHeight - nForkHeight)), false); if (!RollforwardBlock(&pindex, cache)) return false; } LogInfo("Rolled forward to %s", pindexNew->GetBlockHash().ToString()); } cache.SetBestBlock(pindexNew->GetBlockHash()); cache.Flush(/*reallocate_cache=*/false); // local CCoinsViewCache goes out of scope m_chainman.GetNotifications().progress(bilingual_str{}, 100, false); return true; } bool Chainstate::NeedsRedownload() const { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); // At and above m_params.SegwitHeight, segwit consensus rules must be validated CBlockIndex* block{m_chain.Tip()}; while (block != nullptr && DeploymentActiveAt(*block, m_chainman, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT)) { if (!(block->nStatus & BLOCK_OPT_WITNESS)) { // block is insufficiently validated for a segwit client return true; } block = block->pprev; } return false; } void Chainstate::ClearBlockIndexCandidates() { AssertLockHeld(::cs_main); setBlockIndexCandidates.clear(); } void Chainstate::PopulateBlockIndexCandidates() { AssertLockHeld(::cs_main); for (CBlockIndex* pindex : m_blockman.GetAllBlockIndices()) { // With assumeutxo, the snapshot block is a candidate for the tip, but it // may not have BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS (e.g. if we haven't yet downloaded // the block), so we special-case it here. if (pindex == SnapshotBase() || pindex == TargetBlock() || (pindex->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS) && (pindex->HaveNumChainTxs() || pindex->pprev == nullptr))) { TryAddBlockIndexCandidate(pindex); } } } bool ChainstateManager::LoadBlockIndex() { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); // Load block index from databases if (m_blockman.m_blockfiles_indexed) { bool ret{m_blockman.LoadBlockIndexDB(CurrentChainstate().m_from_snapshot_blockhash)}; if (!ret) return false; m_blockman.ScanAndUnlinkAlreadyPrunedFiles(); std::vector<CBlockIndex*> vSortedByHeight{m_blockman.GetAllBlockIndices()}; std::sort(vSortedByHeight.begin(), vSortedByHeight.end(), CBlockIndexHeightOnlyComparator()); for (CBlockIndex* pindex : vSortedByHeight) { if (m_interrupt) return false; if (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_VALID && (!m_best_invalid || pindex->nChainWork > m_best_invalid->nChainWork)) { m_best_invalid = pindex; } if (pindex->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TREE) && (m_best_header == nullptr || CBlockIndexWorkComparator()(m_best_header, pindex))) m_best_header = pindex; } } return true; } bool Chainstate::LoadGenesisBlock() { LOCK(cs_main); const CChainParams& params{m_chainman.GetParams()}; // Check whether we're already initialized by checking for genesis in // m_blockman.m_block_index. Note that we can't use m_chain here, since it is // set based on the coins db, not the block index db, which is the only // thing loaded at this point. if (m_blockman.m_block_index.contains(params.GenesisBlock().GetHash())) return true; try { const CBlock& block = params.GenesisBlock(); FlatFilePos blockPos{m_blockman.WriteBlock(block, 0)}; if (blockPos.IsNull()) { LogError("%s: writing genesis block to disk failed\n", __func__); return false; } CBlockIndex* pindex = m_blockman.AddToBlockIndex(block, m_chainman.m_best_header); m_chainman.ReceivedBlockTransactions(block, pindex, blockPos); } catch (const std::runtime_error& e) { LogError("%s: failed to write genesis block: %s\n", __func__, e.what()); return false; } return true; } void ChainstateManager::LoadExternalBlockFile( AutoFile& file_in, FlatFilePos* dbp, std::multimap<uint256, FlatFilePos>* blocks_with_unknown_parent) { // Either both should be specified (-reindex), or neither (-loadblock). assert(!dbp == !blocks_with_unknown_parent); const auto start{SteadyClock::now()}; const CChainParams& params{GetParams()}; int nLoaded = 0; try { BufferedFile blkdat{file_in, 2 * MAX_BLOCK_SERIALIZED_SIZE, MAX_BLOCK_SERIALIZED_SIZE + 8}; // nRewind indicates where to resume scanning in case something goes wrong, // such as a block fails to deserialize. uint64_t nRewind = blkdat.GetPos(); while (!blkdat.eof()) { if (m_interrupt) return; blkdat.SetPos(nRewind); nRewind++; // start one byte further next time, in case of failure blkdat.SetLimit(); // remove former limit unsigned int nSize = 0; try { // locate a header MessageStartChars buf; blkdat.FindByte(std::byte(params.MessageStart()[0])); nRewind = blkdat.GetPos() + 1; blkdat >> buf; if (buf != params.MessageStart()) { continue; } // read size blkdat >> nSize; if (nSize < 80 || nSize > MAX_BLOCK_SERIALIZED_SIZE) continue; } catch (const std::exception&) { // no valid block header found; don't complain // (this happens at the end of every blk.dat file) break; } try { // read block header const uint64_t nBlockPos{blkdat.GetPos()}; if (dbp) dbp->nPos = nBlockPos; blkdat.SetLimit(nBlockPos + nSize); CBlockHeader header; blkdat >> header; const uint256 hash{header.GetHash()}; // Skip the rest of this block (this may read from disk into memory); position to the marker before the // next block, but it's still possible to rewind to the start of the current block (without a disk read). nRewind = nBlockPos + nSize; blkdat.SkipTo(nRewind); std::shared_ptr<CBlock> pblock{}; // needs to remain available after the cs_main lock is released to avoid duplicate reads from disk { LOCK(cs_main); // detect out of order blocks, and store them for later if (hash != params.GetConsensus().hashGenesisBlock && !m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(header.hashPrevBlock)) { LogDebug(BCLog::REINDEX, "%s: Out of order block %s, parent %s not known\n", __func__, hash.ToString(), header.hashPrevBlock.ToString()); if (dbp && blocks_with_unknown_parent) { blocks_with_unknown_parent->emplace(header.hashPrevBlock, *dbp); } continue; } // process in case the block isn't known yet const CBlockIndex* pindex = m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(hash); if (!pindex || (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA) == 0) { // This block can be processed immediately; rewind to its start, read and deserialize it. blkdat.SetPos(nBlockPos); pblock = std::make_shared<CBlock>(); blkdat >> TX_WITH_WITNESS(*pblock); nRewind = blkdat.GetPos(); BlockValidationState state; if (AcceptBlock(pblock, state, nullptr, true, dbp, nullptr, true)) { nLoaded++; } if (state.IsError()) { break; } } else if (hash != params.GetConsensus().hashGenesisBlock && pindex->nHeight % 1000 == 0) { LogDebug(BCLog::REINDEX, "Block Import: already had block %s at height %d\n", hash.ToString(), pindex->nHeight); } } // Activate the genesis block so normal node progress can continue // During first -reindex, this will only connect Genesis since // ActivateBestChain only connects blocks which are in the block tree db, // which only contains blocks whose parents are in it. // But do this only if genesis isn't activated yet, to avoid connecting many blocks // without assumevalid in the case of a continuation of a reindex that // was interrupted by the user. if (hash == params.GetConsensus().hashGenesisBlock && WITH_LOCK(::cs_main, return ActiveHeight()) == -1) { BlockValidationState state; if (!ActiveChainstate().ActivateBestChain(state, nullptr)) { break; } } if (m_blockman.IsPruneMode() && m_blockman.m_blockfiles_indexed && pblock) { // must update the tip for pruning to work while importing with -loadblock. // this is a tradeoff to conserve disk space at the expense of time // spent updating the tip to be able to prune. // otherwise, ActivateBestChain won't be called by the import process // until after all of the block files are loaded. ActivateBestChain can be // called by concurrent network message processing. but, that is not // reliable for the purpose of pruning while importing. if (auto result{ActivateBestChains()}; !result) { LogDebug(BCLog::REINDEX, "%s\n", util::ErrorString(result).original); break; } } NotifyHeaderTip(); if (!blocks_with_unknown_parent) continue; // Recursively process earlier encountered successors of this block std::deque<uint256> queue; queue.push_back(hash); while (!queue.empty()) { uint256 head = queue.front(); queue.pop_front(); auto range = blocks_with_unknown_parent->equal_range(head); while (range.first != range.second) { std::multimap<uint256, FlatFilePos>::iterator it = range.first; std::shared_ptr<CBlock> pblockrecursive = std::make_shared<CBlock>(); if (m_blockman.ReadBlock(*pblockrecursive, it->second, {})) { const auto& block_hash{pblockrecursive->GetHash()}; LogDebug(BCLog::REINDEX, "%s: Processing out of order child %s of %s", __func__, block_hash.ToString(), head.ToString()); LOCK(cs_main); BlockValidationState dummy; if (AcceptBlock(pblockrecursive, dummy, nullptr, true, &it->second, nullptr, true)) { nLoaded++; queue.push_back(block_hash); } } range.first++; blocks_with_unknown_parent->erase(it); NotifyHeaderTip(); } } } catch (const std::exception& e) { // historical bugs added extra data to the block files that does not deserialize cleanly. // commonly this data is between readable blocks, but it does not really matter. such data is not fatal to the import process. // the code that reads the block files deals with invalid data by simply ignoring it. // it continues to search for the next {4 byte magic message start bytes + 4 byte length + block} that does deserialize cleanly // and passes all of the other block validation checks dealing with POW and the merkle root, etc... // we merely note with this informational log message when unexpected data is encountered. // we could also be experiencing a storage system read error, or a read of a previous bad write. these are possible, but // less likely scenarios. we don't have enough information to tell a difference here. // the reindex process is not the place to attempt to clean and/or compact the block files. if so desired, a studious node operator // may use knowledge of the fact that the block files are not entirely pristine in order to prepare a set of pristine, and // perhaps ordered, block files for later reindexing. LogDebug(BCLog::REINDEX, "%s: unexpected data at file offset 0x%x - %s. continuing\n", __func__, (nRewind - 1), e.what()); } } } catch (const std::runtime_error& e) { GetNotifications().fatalError(strprintf(_("System error while loading external block file: %s"), e.what())); } LogInfo("Loaded %i blocks from external file in %dms", nLoaded, Ticks<std::chrono::milliseconds>(SteadyClock::now() - start)); } bool ChainstateManager::ShouldCheckBlockIndex() const { // Assert to verify Flatten() has been called. if (!*Assert(m_options.check_block_index)) return false; if (FastRandomContext().randrange(*m_options.check_block_index) >= 1) return false; return true; } void ChainstateManager::CheckBlockIndex() const { if (!ShouldCheckBlockIndex()) { return; } LOCK(cs_main); // During a reindex, we read the genesis block and call CheckBlockIndex before ActivateBestChain, // so we have the genesis block in m_blockman.m_block_index but no active chain. (A few of the // tests when iterating the block tree require that m_chain has been initialized.) if (ActiveChain().Height() < 0) { assert(m_blockman.m_block_index.size() <= 1); return; } // Build forward-pointing data structure for the entire block tree. // For performance reasons, indexes of the best header chain are stored in a vector (within CChain). // All remaining blocks are stored in a multimap. // The best header chain can differ from the active chain: E.g. its entries may belong to blocks that // are not yet validated. CChain best_hdr_chain; assert(m_best_header); assert(!(m_best_header->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_VALID)); best_hdr_chain.SetTip(*m_best_header); std::multimap<const CBlockIndex*, const CBlockIndex*> forward; for (auto& [_, block_index] : m_blockman.m_block_index) { // Only save indexes in forward that are not part of the best header chain. if (!best_hdr_chain.Contains(&block_index)) { // Only genesis, which must be part of the best header chain, can have a nullptr parent. assert(block_index.pprev); forward.emplace(block_index.pprev, &block_index); } } assert(forward.size() + best_hdr_chain.Height() + 1 == m_blockman.m_block_index.size()); const CBlockIndex* pindex = best_hdr_chain[0]; assert(pindex); // Iterate over the entire block tree, using depth-first search. // Along the way, remember whether there are blocks on the path from genesis // block being explored which are the first to have certain properties. size_t nNodes = 0; int nHeight = 0; const CBlockIndex* pindexFirstInvalid = nullptr; // Oldest ancestor of pindex which is invalid. const CBlockIndex* pindexFirstMissing = nullptr; // Oldest ancestor of pindex which does not have BLOCK_HAVE_DATA, since assumeutxo snapshot if used. const CBlockIndex* pindexFirstNeverProcessed = nullptr; // Oldest ancestor of pindex for which nTx == 0, since assumeutxo snapshot if used. const CBlockIndex* pindexFirstNotTreeValid = nullptr; // Oldest ancestor of pindex which does not have BLOCK_VALID_TREE (regardless of being valid or not). const CBlockIndex* pindexFirstNotTransactionsValid = nullptr; // Oldest ancestor of pindex which does not have BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS (regardless of being valid or not), since assumeutxo snapshot if used. const CBlockIndex* pindexFirstNotChainValid = nullptr; // Oldest ancestor of pindex which does not have BLOCK_VALID_CHAIN (regardless of being valid or not), since assumeutxo snapshot if used. const CBlockIndex* pindexFirstNotScriptsValid = nullptr; // Oldest ancestor of pindex which does not have BLOCK_VALID_SCRIPTS (regardless of being valid or not), since assumeutxo snapshot if used. // After checking an assumeutxo snapshot block, reset pindexFirst pointers // to earlier blocks that have not been downloaded or validated yet, so // checks for later blocks can assume the earlier blocks were validated and // be stricter, testing for more requirements. const CBlockIndex* snap_base{CurrentChainstate().SnapshotBase()}; const CBlockIndex *snap_first_missing{}, *snap_first_notx{}, *snap_first_notv{}, *snap_first_nocv{}, *snap_first_nosv{}; auto snap_update_firsts = [&] { if (pindex == snap_base) { std::swap(snap_first_missing, pindexFirstMissing); std::swap(snap_first_notx, pindexFirstNeverProcessed); std::swap(snap_first_notv, pindexFirstNotTransactionsValid); std::swap(snap_first_nocv, pindexFirstNotChainValid); std::swap(snap_first_nosv, pindexFirstNotScriptsValid); } }; while (pindex != nullptr) { nNodes++; if (pindexFirstInvalid == nullptr && pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_VALID) pindexFirstInvalid = pindex; if (pindexFirstMissing == nullptr && !(pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA)) { pindexFirstMissing = pindex; } if (pindexFirstNeverProcessed == nullptr && pindex->nTx == 0) pindexFirstNeverProcessed = pindex; if (pindex->pprev != nullptr && pindexFirstNotTreeValid == nullptr && (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_VALID_MASK) < BLOCK_VALID_TREE) pindexFirstNotTreeValid = pindex; if (pindex->pprev != nullptr) { if (pindexFirstNotTransactionsValid == nullptr && (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_VALID_MASK) < BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS) { pindexFirstNotTransactionsValid = pindex; } if (pindexFirstNotChainValid == nullptr && (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_VALID_MASK) < BLOCK_VALID_CHAIN) { pindexFirstNotChainValid = pindex; } if (pindexFirstNotScriptsValid == nullptr && (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_VALID_MASK) < BLOCK_VALID_SCRIPTS) { pindexFirstNotScriptsValid = pindex; } } // Begin: actual consistency checks. if (pindex->pprev == nullptr) { // Genesis block checks. assert(pindex->GetBlockHash() == GetConsensus().hashGenesisBlock); // Genesis block's hash must match. for (const auto& c : m_chainstates) { if (c->m_chain.Genesis() != nullptr) { assert(pindex == c->m_chain.Genesis()); // The chain's genesis block must be this block. } } } // nSequenceId can't be set higher than SEQ_ID_INIT_FROM_DISK{1} for blocks that aren't linked // (negative is used for preciousblock, SEQ_ID_BEST_CHAIN_FROM_DISK{0} for active chain when loaded from disk) if (!pindex->HaveNumChainTxs()) assert(pindex->nSequenceId <= SEQ_ID_INIT_FROM_DISK); // VALID_TRANSACTIONS is equivalent to nTx > 0 for all nodes (whether or not pruning has occurred). // HAVE_DATA is only equivalent to nTx > 0 (or VALID_TRANSACTIONS) if no pruning has occurred. if (!m_blockman.m_have_pruned) { // If we've never pruned, then HAVE_DATA should be equivalent to nTx > 0 assert(!(pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA) == (pindex->nTx == 0)); assert(pindexFirstMissing == pindexFirstNeverProcessed); } else { // If we have pruned, then we can only say that HAVE_DATA implies nTx > 0 if (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA) assert(pindex->nTx > 0); } if (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_UNDO) assert(pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA); if (snap_base && snap_base->GetAncestor(pindex->nHeight) == pindex) { // Assumed-valid blocks should connect to the main chain. assert((pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_VALID_MASK) >= BLOCK_VALID_TREE); } // There should only be an nTx value if we have // actually seen a block's transactions. assert(((pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_VALID_MASK) >= BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS) == (pindex->nTx > 0)); // This is pruning-independent. // All parents having had data (at some point) is equivalent to all parents being VALID_TRANSACTIONS, which is equivalent to HaveNumChainTxs(). // HaveNumChainTxs will also be set in the assumeutxo snapshot block from snapshot metadata. assert((pindexFirstNeverProcessed == nullptr || pindex == snap_base) == pindex->HaveNumChainTxs()); assert((pindexFirstNotTransactionsValid == nullptr || pindex == snap_base) == pindex->HaveNumChainTxs()); assert(pindex->nHeight == nHeight); // nHeight must be consistent. assert(pindex->pprev == nullptr || pindex->nChainWork >= pindex->pprev->nChainWork); // For every block except the genesis block, the chainwork must be larger than the parent's. assert(nHeight < 2 || (pindex->pskip && (pindex->pskip->nHeight < nHeight))); // The pskip pointer must point back for all but the first 2 blocks. assert(pindexFirstNotTreeValid == nullptr); // All m_blockman.m_block_index entries must at least be TREE valid if ((pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_VALID_MASK) >= BLOCK_VALID_TREE) assert(pindexFirstNotTreeValid == nullptr); // TREE valid implies all parents are TREE valid if ((pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_VALID_MASK) >= BLOCK_VALID_CHAIN) assert(pindexFirstNotChainValid == nullptr); // CHAIN valid implies all parents are CHAIN valid if ((pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_VALID_MASK) >= BLOCK_VALID_SCRIPTS) assert(pindexFirstNotScriptsValid == nullptr); // SCRIPTS valid implies all parents are SCRIPTS valid if (pindexFirstInvalid == nullptr) { // Checks for not-invalid blocks. assert((pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_VALID) == 0); // The failed flag cannot be set for blocks without invalid parents. } else { assert(pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_VALID); // Invalid blocks and their descendants must be marked as invalid } // Make sure m_chain_tx_count sum is correctly computed. if (!pindex->pprev) { // If no previous block, nTx and m_chain_tx_count must be the same. assert(pindex->m_chain_tx_count == pindex->nTx); } else if (pindex->pprev->m_chain_tx_count > 0 && pindex->nTx > 0) { // If previous m_chain_tx_count is set and number of transactions in block is known, sum must be set. assert(pindex->m_chain_tx_count == pindex->nTx + pindex->pprev->m_chain_tx_count); } else { // Otherwise m_chain_tx_count should only be set if this is a snapshot // block, and must be set if it is. assert((pindex->m_chain_tx_count != 0) == (pindex == snap_base)); } // There should be no block with more work than m_best_header, unless it's known to be invalid assert((pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_VALID) || pindex->nChainWork <= m_best_header->nChainWork); // Chainstate-specific checks on setBlockIndexCandidates for (const auto& c : m_chainstates) { if (c->m_chain.Tip() == nullptr) continue; // Two main factors determine whether pindex is a candidate in // setBlockIndexCandidates: // // - If pindex has less work than the chain tip, it should not be a // candidate, and this will be asserted below. Otherwise it is a // potential candidate. // // - If pindex or one of its parent blocks back to the genesis block // or an assumeutxo snapshot never downloaded transactions // (pindexFirstNeverProcessed is non-null), it should not be a // candidate, and this will be asserted below. The only exception // is if pindex itself is an assumeutxo snapshot block. Then it is // also a potential candidate. if (!CBlockIndexWorkComparator()(pindex, c->m_chain.Tip()) && (pindexFirstNeverProcessed == nullptr || pindex == snap_base)) { // If pindex was detected as invalid (pindexFirstInvalid is // non-null), it is not required to be in // setBlockIndexCandidates. if (pindexFirstInvalid == nullptr) { // If pindex and all its parents back to the genesis block // or an assumeutxo snapshot block downloaded transactions, // and the transactions were not pruned (pindexFirstMissing // is null), it is a potential candidate. The check // excludes pruned blocks, because if any blocks were // pruned between pindex and the current chain tip, pindex will // only temporarily be added to setBlockIndexCandidates, // before being moved to m_blocks_unlinked. This check // could be improved to verify that if all blocks between // the chain tip and pindex have data, pindex must be a // candidate. // // If pindex is the chain tip, it also is a potential // candidate. // // If the chainstate was loaded from a snapshot and pindex // is the base of the snapshot, pindex is also a potential // candidate. if (pindexFirstMissing == nullptr || pindex == c->m_chain.Tip() || pindex == c->SnapshotBase()) { // If this chainstate is not a historical chainstate // targeting a specific block, pindex must be in // setBlockIndexCandidates. Otherwise, pindex only // needs to be added if it is an ancestor of the target // block. if (!c->TargetBlock() || c->TargetBlock()->GetAncestor(pindex->nHeight) == pindex) { assert(c->setBlockIndexCandidates.contains(pindex)); } } // If some parent is missing, then it could be that this block was in // setBlockIndexCandidates but had to be removed because of the missing data. // In this case it must be in m_blocks_unlinked -- see test below. } } else { // If this block sorts worse than the current tip or some ancestor's block has never been seen, it cannot be in setBlockIndexCandidates. assert(!c->setBlockIndexCandidates.contains(pindex)); } } // Check whether this block is in m_blocks_unlinked. auto rangeUnlinked{m_blockman.m_blocks_unlinked.equal_range(pindex->pprev)}; bool foundInUnlinked = false; while (rangeUnlinked.first != rangeUnlinked.second) { assert(rangeUnlinked.first->first == pindex->pprev); if (rangeUnlinked.first->second == pindex) { foundInUnlinked = true; break; } rangeUnlinked.first++; } if (pindex->pprev && (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA) && pindexFirstNeverProcessed != nullptr && pindexFirstInvalid == nullptr) { // If this block has block data available, some parent was never received, and has no invalid parents, it must be in m_blocks_unlinked. assert(foundInUnlinked); } if (!(pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA)) assert(!foundInUnlinked); // Can't be in m_blocks_unlinked if we don't HAVE_DATA if (pindexFirstMissing == nullptr) assert(!foundInUnlinked); // We aren't missing data for any parent -- cannot be in m_blocks_unlinked. if (pindex->pprev && (pindex->nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA) && pindexFirstNeverProcessed == nullptr && pindexFirstMissing != nullptr) { // We HAVE_DATA for this block, have received data for all parents at some point, but we're currently missing data for some parent. assert(m_blockman.m_have_pruned); // This block may have entered m_blocks_unlinked if: // - it has a descendant that at some point had more work than the // tip, and // - we tried switching to that descendant but were missing // data for some intermediate block between m_chain and the // tip. // So if this block is itself better than any m_chain.Tip() and it wasn't in // setBlockIndexCandidates, then it must be in m_blocks_unlinked. for (const auto& c : m_chainstates) { if (!CBlockIndexWorkComparator()(pindex, c->m_chain.Tip()) && !c->setBlockIndexCandidates.contains(pindex)) { if (pindexFirstInvalid == nullptr) { if (!c->TargetBlock() || c->TargetBlock()->GetAncestor(pindex->nHeight) == pindex) { assert(foundInUnlinked); } } } } } // assert(pindex->GetBlockHash() == pindex->GetBlockHeader().GetHash()); // Perhaps too slow // End: actual consistency checks. // Try descending into the first subnode. Always process forks first and the best header chain after. snap_update_firsts(); auto range{forward.equal_range(pindex)}; if (range.first != range.second) { // A subnode not part of the best header chain was found. pindex = range.first->second; nHeight++; continue; } else if (best_hdr_chain.Contains(pindex)) { // Descend further into best header chain. nHeight++; pindex = best_hdr_chain[nHeight]; if (!pindex) break; // we are finished, since the best header chain is always processed last continue; } // This is a leaf node. // Move upwards until we reach a node of which we have not yet visited the last child. while (pindex) { // We are going to either move to a parent or a sibling of pindex. snap_update_firsts(); // If pindex was the first with a certain property, unset the corresponding variable. if (pindex == pindexFirstInvalid) pindexFirstInvalid = nullptr; if (pindex == pindexFirstMissing) pindexFirstMissing = nullptr; if (pindex == pindexFirstNeverProcessed) pindexFirstNeverProcessed = nullptr; if (pindex == pindexFirstNotTreeValid) pindexFirstNotTreeValid = nullptr; if (pindex == pindexFirstNotTransactionsValid) pindexFirstNotTransactionsValid = nullptr; if (pindex == pindexFirstNotChainValid) pindexFirstNotChainValid = nullptr; if (pindex == pindexFirstNotScriptsValid) pindexFirstNotScriptsValid = nullptr; // Find our parent. CBlockIndex* pindexPar = pindex->pprev; // Find which child we just visited. auto rangePar{forward.equal_range(pindexPar)}; while (rangePar.first->second != pindex) { assert(rangePar.first != rangePar.second); // Our parent must have at least the node we're coming from as child. rangePar.first++; } // Proceed to the next one. rangePar.first++; if (rangePar.first != rangePar.second) { // Move to a sibling not part of the best header chain. pindex = rangePar.first->second; break; } else if (pindexPar == best_hdr_chain[nHeight - 1]) { // Move to pindex's sibling on the best-chain, if it has one. pindex = best_hdr_chain[nHeight]; // There will not be a next block if (and only if) parent block is the best header. assert((pindex == nullptr) == (pindexPar == best_hdr_chain.Tip())); break; } else { // Move up further. pindex = pindexPar; nHeight--; continue; } } } // Check that we actually traversed the entire block index. assert(nNodes == forward.size() + best_hdr_chain.Height() + 1); } std::string Chainstate::ToString() { AssertLockHeld(::cs_main); CBlockIndex* tip = m_chain.Tip(); return strprintf("Chainstate [%s] @ height %d (%s)", m_from_snapshot_blockhash ? "snapshot" : "ibd", tip ? tip->nHeight : -1, tip ? tip->GetBlockHash().ToString() : "null"); } bool Chainstate::ResizeCoinsCaches(size_t coinstip_size, size_t coinsdb_size) { AssertLockHeld(::cs_main); if (coinstip_size == m_coinstip_cache_size_bytes && coinsdb_size == m_coinsdb_cache_size_bytes) { // Cache sizes are unchanged, no need to continue. return true; } size_t old_coinstip_size = m_coinstip_cache_size_bytes; m_coinstip_cache_size_bytes = coinstip_size; m_coinsdb_cache_size_bytes = coinsdb_size; CoinsDB().ResizeCache(coinsdb_size); LogInfo("[%s] resized coinsdb cache to %.1f MiB", this->ToString(), coinsdb_size * (1.0 / 1024 / 1024)); LogInfo("[%s] resized coinstip cache to %.1f MiB", this->ToString(), coinstip_size * (1.0 / 1024 / 1024)); BlockValidationState state; bool ret; if (coinstip_size > old_coinstip_size) { // Likely no need to flush if cache sizes have grown. ret = FlushStateToDisk(state, FlushStateMode::IF_NEEDED); } else { // Otherwise, flush state to disk and deallocate the in-memory coins map. ret = FlushStateToDisk(state, FlushStateMode::FORCE_FLUSH); } return ret; } double ChainstateManager::GuessVerificationProgress(const CBlockIndex* pindex) const { AssertLockHeld(GetMutex()); const ChainTxData& data{GetParams().TxData()}; if (pindex == nullptr) { return 0.0; } if (pindex->m_chain_tx_count == 0) { LogDebug(BCLog::VALIDATION, "Block %d has unset m_chain_tx_count. Unable to estimate verification progress.\n", pindex->nHeight); return 0.0; } const int64_t nNow{TicksSinceEpoch<std::chrono::seconds>(NodeClock::now())}; const auto block_time{ (Assume(m_best_header) && std::abs(nNow - pindex->GetBlockTime()) <= Ticks<std::chrono::seconds>(2h) && Assume(m_best_header->nHeight >= pindex->nHeight)) ? // When the header is known to be recent, switch to a height-based // approach. This ensures the returned value is quantized when // close to "1.0", because some users expect it to be. This also // avoids relying too much on the exact miner-set timestamp, which // may be off. nNow - (m_best_header->nHeight - pindex->nHeight) * GetConsensus().nPowTargetSpacing : pindex->GetBlockTime(), }; double fTxTotal; if (pindex->m_chain_tx_count <= data.tx_count) { fTxTotal = data.tx_count + (nNow - data.nTime) * data.dTxRate; } else { fTxTotal = pindex->m_chain_tx_count + (nNow - block_time) * data.dTxRate; } return std::min<double>(pindex->m_chain_tx_count / fTxTotal, 1.0); } Chainstate& ChainstateManager::InitializeChainstate(CTxMemPool* mempool) { AssertLockHeld(::cs_main); assert(m_chainstates.empty()); m_chainstates.emplace_back(std::make_unique<Chainstate>(mempool, m_blockman, *this)); return *m_chainstates.back(); } [[nodiscard]] static bool DeleteCoinsDBFromDisk(const fs::path db_path, bool is_snapshot) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main) { AssertLockHeld(::cs_main); if (is_snapshot) { fs::path base_blockhash_path = db_path / node::SNAPSHOT_BLOCKHASH_FILENAME; try { bool existed = fs::remove(base_blockhash_path); if (!existed) { LogWarning("[snapshot] snapshot chainstate dir being removed lacks %s file", fs::PathToString(node::SNAPSHOT_BLOCKHASH_FILENAME)); } } catch (const fs::filesystem_error& e) { LogWarning("[snapshot] failed to remove file %s: %s\n", fs::PathToString(base_blockhash_path), e.code().message()); } } std::string path_str = fs::PathToString(db_path); LogInfo("Removing leveldb dir at %s\n", path_str); // We have to destruct before this call leveldb::DB in order to release the db // lock, otherwise `DestroyDB` will fail. See `leveldb::~DBImpl()`. const bool destroyed = DestroyDB(path_str); if (!destroyed) { LogError("leveldb DestroyDB call failed on %s", path_str); } // Datadir should be removed from filesystem; otherwise initialization may detect // it on subsequent statups and get confused. // // If the base_blockhash_path removal above fails in the case of snapshot // chainstates, this will return false since leveldb won't remove a non-empty // directory. return destroyed && !fs::exists(db_path); } util::Result<CBlockIndex*> ChainstateManager::ActivateSnapshot( AutoFile& coins_file, const SnapshotMetadata& metadata, bool in_memory) { uint256 base_blockhash = metadata.m_base_blockhash; CBlockIndex* snapshot_start_block{}; { LOCK(::cs_main); if (this->CurrentChainstate().m_from_snapshot_blockhash) { return util::Error{Untranslated("Can't activate a snapshot-based chainstate more than once")}; } if (!GetParams().AssumeutxoForBlockhash(base_blockhash).has_value()) { auto available_heights = GetParams().GetAvailableSnapshotHeights(); std::string heights_formatted = util::Join(available_heights, ", ", [&](const auto& i) { return util::ToString(i); }); return util::Error{Untranslated(strprintf("assumeutxo block hash in snapshot metadata not recognized (hash: %s). The following snapshot heights are available: %s", base_blockhash.ToString(), heights_formatted))}; } snapshot_start_block = m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(base_blockhash); if (!snapshot_start_block) { return util::Error{Untranslated(strprintf("The base block header (%s) must appear in the headers chain. Make sure all headers are syncing, and call loadtxoutset again", base_blockhash.ToString()))}; } bool start_block_invalid = snapshot_start_block->nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_VALID; if (start_block_invalid) { return util::Error{Untranslated(strprintf("The base block header (%s) is part of an invalid chain", base_blockhash.ToString()))}; } if (!m_best_header || m_best_header->GetAncestor(snapshot_start_block->nHeight) != snapshot_start_block) { return util::Error{Untranslated("A forked headers-chain with more work than the chain with the snapshot base block header exists. Please proceed to sync without AssumeUtxo.")}; } auto mempool{CurrentChainstate().GetMempool()}; if (mempool && mempool->size() > 0) { return util::Error{Untranslated("Can't activate a snapshot when mempool not empty")}; } } int64_t current_coinsdb_cache_size{0}; int64_t current_coinstip_cache_size{0}; // Cache percentages to allocate to each chainstate. // // These particular percentages don't matter so much since they will only be // relevant during snapshot activation; caches are rebalanced at the conclusion of // this function. We want to give (essentially) all available cache capacity to the // snapshot to aid the bulk load later in this function. static constexpr double IBD_CACHE_PERC = 0.01; static constexpr double SNAPSHOT_CACHE_PERC = 0.99; { LOCK(::cs_main); // Resize the coins caches to ensure we're not exceeding memory limits. // // Allocate the majority of the cache to the incoming snapshot chainstate, since // (optimistically) getting to its tip will be the top priority. We'll need to call // `MaybeRebalanceCaches()` once we're done with this function to ensure // the right allocation (including the possibility that no snapshot was activated // and that we should restore the active chainstate caches to their original size). // current_coinsdb_cache_size = this->ActiveChainstate().m_coinsdb_cache_size_bytes; current_coinstip_cache_size = this->ActiveChainstate().m_coinstip_cache_size_bytes; // Temporarily resize the active coins cache to make room for the newly-created // snapshot chain. this->ActiveChainstate().ResizeCoinsCaches( static_cast<size_t>(current_coinstip_cache_size * IBD_CACHE_PERC), static_cast<size_t>(current_coinsdb_cache_size * IBD_CACHE_PERC)); } auto snapshot_chainstate = WITH_LOCK(::cs_main, return std::make_unique<Chainstate>( /*mempool=*/nullptr, m_blockman, *this, base_blockhash)); { LOCK(::cs_main); snapshot_chainstate->InitCoinsDB( static_cast<size_t>(current_coinsdb_cache_size * SNAPSHOT_CACHE_PERC), in_memory, /*should_wipe=*/false); snapshot_chainstate->InitCoinsCache( static_cast<size_t>(current_coinstip_cache_size * SNAPSHOT_CACHE_PERC)); } auto cleanup_bad_snapshot = [&](bilingual_str reason) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main) { this->MaybeRebalanceCaches(); // PopulateAndValidateSnapshot can return (in error) before the leveldb datadir // has been created, so only attempt removal if we got that far. if (auto snapshot_datadir = node::FindAssumeutxoChainstateDir(m_options.datadir)) { // We have to destruct leveldb::DB in order to release the db lock, otherwise // DestroyDB() (in DeleteCoinsDBFromDisk()) will fail. See `leveldb::~DBImpl()`. // Destructing the chainstate (and so resetting the coinsviews object) does this. snapshot_chainstate.reset(); bool removed = DeleteCoinsDBFromDisk(*snapshot_datadir, /*is_snapshot=*/true); if (!removed) { GetNotifications().fatalError(strprintf(_("Failed to remove snapshot chainstate dir (%s). " "Manually remove it before restarting.\n"), fs::PathToString(*snapshot_datadir))); } } return util::Error{std::move(reason)}; }; if (auto res{this->PopulateAndValidateSnapshot(*snapshot_chainstate, coins_file, metadata)}; !res) { LOCK(::cs_main); return cleanup_bad_snapshot(Untranslated(strprintf("Population failed: %s", util::ErrorString(res).original))); } LOCK(::cs_main); // cs_main required for rest of snapshot activation. // Do a final check to ensure that the snapshot chainstate is actually a more // work chain than the active chainstate; a user could have loaded a snapshot // very late in the IBD process, and we wouldn't want to load a useless chainstate. if (!CBlockIndexWorkComparator()(ActiveTip(), snapshot_chainstate->m_chain.Tip())) { return cleanup_bad_snapshot(Untranslated("work does not exceed active chainstate")); } // If not in-memory, persist the base blockhash for use during subsequent // initialization. if (!in_memory) { if (!node::WriteSnapshotBaseBlockhash(*snapshot_chainstate)) { return cleanup_bad_snapshot(Untranslated("could not write base blockhash")); } } Chainstate& chainstate{AddChainstate(std::move(snapshot_chainstate))}; m_blockman.m_snapshot_height = Assert(chainstate.SnapshotBase())->nHeight; chainstate.PopulateBlockIndexCandidates(); LogInfo("[snapshot] successfully activated snapshot %s", base_blockhash.ToString()); LogInfo("[snapshot] (%.2f MB)", chainstate.CoinsTip().DynamicMemoryUsage() / (1000 * 1000)); this->MaybeRebalanceCaches(); return snapshot_start_block; } static void FlushSnapshotToDisk(CCoinsViewCache& coins_cache, bool snapshot_loaded) { LOG_TIME_MILLIS_WITH_CATEGORY_MSG_ONCE( strprintf("%s (%.2f MB)", snapshot_loaded ? "saving snapshot chainstate" : "flushing coins cache", coins_cache.DynamicMemoryUsage() / (1000 * 1000)), BCLog::LogFlags::ALL); coins_cache.Flush(); } struct StopHashingException : public std::exception { const char* what() const noexcept override { return "ComputeUTXOStats interrupted."; } }; static void SnapshotUTXOHashBreakpoint(const util::SignalInterrupt& interrupt) { if (interrupt) throw StopHashingException(); } util::Result<void> ChainstateManager::PopulateAndValidateSnapshot( Chainstate& snapshot_chainstate, AutoFile& coins_file, const SnapshotMetadata& metadata) { // It's okay to release cs_main before we're done using `coins_cache` because we know // that nothing else will be referencing the newly created snapshot_chainstate yet. CCoinsViewCache& coins_cache = *WITH_LOCK(::cs_main, return &snapshot_chainstate.CoinsTip()); uint256 base_blockhash = metadata.m_base_blockhash; CBlockIndex* snapshot_start_block = WITH_LOCK(::cs_main, return m_blockman.LookupBlockIndex(base_blockhash)); if (!snapshot_start_block) { // Needed for ComputeUTXOStats to determine the // height and to avoid a crash when base_blockhash.IsNull() return util::Error{Untranslated(strprintf("Did not find snapshot start blockheader %s", base_blockhash.ToString()))}; } int base_height = snapshot_start_block->nHeight; const auto& maybe_au_data = GetParams().AssumeutxoForHeight(base_height); if (!maybe_au_data) { return util::Error{Untranslated(strprintf("Assumeutxo height in snapshot metadata not recognized " "(%d) - refusing to load snapshot", base_height))}; } const AssumeutxoData& au_data = *maybe_au_data; // This work comparison is a duplicate check with the one performed later in // ActivateSnapshot(), but is done so that we avoid doing the long work of staging // a snapshot that isn't actually usable. if (WITH_LOCK(::cs_main, return !CBlockIndexWorkComparator()(ActiveTip(), snapshot_start_block))) { return util::Error{Untranslated("Work does not exceed active chainstate")}; } const uint64_t coins_count = metadata.m_coins_count; uint64_t coins_left = metadata.m_coins_count; LogInfo("[snapshot] loading %d coins from snapshot %s", coins_left, base_blockhash.ToString()); int64_t coins_processed{0}; while (coins_left > 0) { try { Txid txid; coins_file >> txid; size_t coins_per_txid{0}; coins_per_txid = ReadCompactSize(coins_file); if (coins_per_txid > coins_left) { return util::Error{Untranslated("Mismatch in coins count in snapshot metadata and actual snapshot data")}; } for (size_t i = 0; i < coins_per_txid; i++) { COutPoint outpoint; Coin coin; outpoint.n = static_cast<uint32_t>(ReadCompactSize(coins_file)); outpoint.hash = txid; coins_file >> coin; if (coin.nHeight > base_height || outpoint.n >= std::numeric_limits<decltype(outpoint.n)>::max() // Avoid integer wrap-around in coinstats.cpp:ApplyHash ) { return util::Error{Untranslated(strprintf("Bad snapshot data after deserializing %d coins", coins_count - coins_left))}; } if (!MoneyRange(coin.out.nValue)) { return util::Error{Untranslated(strprintf("Bad snapshot data after deserializing %d coins - bad tx out value", coins_count - coins_left))}; } coins_cache.EmplaceCoinInternalDANGER(std::move(outpoint), std::move(coin)); --coins_left; ++coins_processed; if (coins_processed % 1000000 == 0) { LogInfo("[snapshot] %d coins loaded (%.2f%%, %.2f MB)", coins_processed, static_cast<float>(coins_processed) * 100 / static_cast<float>(coins_count), coins_cache.DynamicMemoryUsage() / (1000 * 1000)); } // Batch write and flush (if we need to) every so often. // // If our average Coin size is roughly 41 bytes, checking every 120,000 coins // means <5MB of memory imprecision. if (coins_processed % 120000 == 0) { if (m_interrupt) { return util::Error{Untranslated("Aborting after an interrupt was requested")}; } const auto snapshot_cache_state = WITH_LOCK(::cs_main, return snapshot_chainstate.GetCoinsCacheSizeState()); if (snapshot_cache_state >= CoinsCacheSizeState::CRITICAL) { // This is a hack - we don't know what the actual best block is, but that // doesn't matter for the purposes of flushing the cache here. We'll set this // to its correct value (`base_blockhash`) below after the coins are loaded. coins_cache.SetBestBlock(GetRandHash()); // No need to acquire cs_main since this chainstate isn't being used yet. FlushSnapshotToDisk(coins_cache, /*snapshot_loaded=*/false); } } } } catch (const std::ios_base::failure&) { return util::Error{Untranslated(strprintf("Bad snapshot format or truncated snapshot after deserializing %d coins", coins_processed))}; } } // Important that we set this. This and the coins_cache accesses above are // sort of a layer violation, but either we reach into the innards of // CCoinsViewCache here or we have to invert some of the Chainstate to // embed them in a snapshot-activation-specific CCoinsViewCache bulk load // method. coins_cache.SetBestBlock(base_blockhash); bool out_of_coins{false}; try { std::byte left_over_byte; coins_file >> left_over_byte; } catch (const std::ios_base::failure&) { // We expect an exception since we should be out of coins. out_of_coins = true; } if (!out_of_coins) { return util::Error{Untranslated(strprintf("Bad snapshot - coins left over after deserializing %d coins", coins_count))}; } LogInfo("[snapshot] loaded %d (%.2f MB) coins from snapshot %s", coins_count, coins_cache.DynamicMemoryUsage() / (1000 * 1000), base_blockhash.ToString()); // No need to acquire cs_main since this chainstate isn't being used yet. FlushSnapshotToDisk(coins_cache, /*snapshot_loaded=*/true); assert(coins_cache.GetBestBlock() == base_blockhash); // As above, okay to immediately release cs_main here since no other context knows // about the snapshot_chainstate. CCoinsViewDB* snapshot_coinsdb = WITH_LOCK(::cs_main, return &snapshot_chainstate.CoinsDB()); std::optional<CCoinsStats> maybe_stats; try { maybe_stats = ComputeUTXOStats( CoinStatsHashType::HASH_SERIALIZED, snapshot_coinsdb, m_blockman, [&interrupt = m_interrupt] { SnapshotUTXOHashBreakpoint(interrupt); }); } catch (StopHashingException const&) { return util::Error{Untranslated("Aborting after an interrupt was requested")}; } if (!maybe_stats.has_value()) { return util::Error{Untranslated("Failed to generate coins stats")}; } // Assert that the deserialized chainstate contents match the expected assumeutxo value. if (AssumeutxoHash{maybe_stats->hashSerialized} != au_data.hash_serialized) { return util::Error{Untranslated(strprintf("Bad snapshot content hash: expected %s, got %s", au_data.hash_serialized.ToString(), maybe_stats->hashSerialized.ToString()))}; } snapshot_chainstate.m_chain.SetTip(*snapshot_start_block); // The remainder of this function requires modifying data protected by cs_main. LOCK(::cs_main); // Fake various pieces of CBlockIndex state: CBlockIndex* index = nullptr; // Don't make any modifications to the genesis block since it shouldn't be // necessary, and since the genesis block doesn't have normal flags like // BLOCK_VALID_SCRIPTS set. constexpr int AFTER_GENESIS_START{1}; for (int i = AFTER_GENESIS_START; i <= snapshot_chainstate.m_chain.Height(); ++i) { index = snapshot_chainstate.m_chain[i]; // Fake BLOCK_OPT_WITNESS so that Chainstate::NeedsRedownload() // won't ask for -reindex on startup. if (DeploymentActiveAt(*index, *this, Consensus::DEPLOYMENT_SEGWIT)) { index->nStatus |= BLOCK_OPT_WITNESS; } m_blockman.m_dirty_blockindex.insert(index); // Changes to the block index will be flushed to disk after this call // returns in `ActivateSnapshot()`, when `MaybeRebalanceCaches()` is // called, since we've added a snapshot chainstate and therefore will // have to downsize the IBD chainstate, which will result in a call to // `FlushStateToDisk(FORCE_FLUSH)`. } assert(index); assert(index == snapshot_start_block); index->m_chain_tx_count = au_data.m_chain_tx_count; LogInfo("[snapshot] validated snapshot (%.2f MB)", coins_cache.DynamicMemoryUsage() / (1000 * 1000)); return {}; } // Currently, this function holds cs_main for its duration, which could be for // multiple minutes due to the ComputeUTXOStats call. Holding cs_main used to be // necessary (before d43a1f1a2fa3) to avoid advancing validated_cs farther than // its target block. Now it should be possible to avoid this, but simply // releasing cs_main here would not be possible because this function is invoked // by ConnectTip within ActivateBestChain. // // Eventually (TODO) it would be better to call this function outside of // ActivateBestChain, on a separate thread that should not require cs_main to // hash, because the UTXO set is only hashed after the historical chainstate // reaches its target block and is no longer changing. SnapshotCompletionResult ChainstateManager::MaybeValidateSnapshot(Chainstate& validated_cs, Chainstate& unvalidated_cs) { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); // If the snapshot does not need to be validated... if (unvalidated_cs.m_assumeutxo != Assumeutxo::UNVALIDATED || // Or if either chainstate is unusable... !unvalidated_cs.m_from_snapshot_blockhash || validated_cs.m_assumeutxo != Assumeutxo::VALIDATED || !validated_cs.m_chain.Tip() || // Or the validated chainstate is not targeting the snapshot block... !validated_cs.m_target_blockhash || *validated_cs.m_target_blockhash != *unvalidated_cs.m_from_snapshot_blockhash || // Or the validated chainstate has not reached the snapshot block yet... !validated_cs.ReachedTarget()) { // Then the snapshot cannot be validated and there is nothing to do. return SnapshotCompletionResult::SKIPPED; } assert(validated_cs.TargetBlock() == validated_cs.m_chain.Tip()); auto handle_invalid_snapshot = [&]() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(::cs_main) { bilingual_str user_error = strprintf(_( "%s failed to validate the -assumeutxo snapshot state. " "This indicates a hardware problem, or a bug in the software, or a " "bad software modification that allowed an invalid snapshot to be " "loaded. As a result of this, the node will shut down and stop using any " "state that was built on the snapshot, resetting the chain height " "from %d to %d. On the next " "restart, the node will resume syncing from %d " "without using any snapshot data. " "Please report this incident to %s, including how you obtained the snapshot. " "The invalid snapshot chainstate will be left on disk in case it is " "helpful in diagnosing the issue that caused this error."), CLIENT_NAME, unvalidated_cs.m_chain.Height(), validated_cs.m_chain.Height(), validated_cs.m_chain.Height(), CLIENT_BUGREPORT); LogError("[snapshot] !!! %s\n", user_error.original); LogError("[snapshot] deleting snapshot, reverting to validated chain, and stopping node\n"); // Reset chainstate target to network tip instead of snapshot block. validated_cs.SetTargetBlock(nullptr); unvalidated_cs.m_assumeutxo = Assumeutxo::INVALID; auto rename_result = unvalidated_cs.InvalidateCoinsDBOnDisk(); if (!rename_result) { user_error += Untranslated("\n") + util::ErrorString(rename_result); } GetNotifications().fatalError(user_error); }; CCoinsViewDB& validated_coins_db = validated_cs.CoinsDB(); validated_cs.ForceFlushStateToDisk(); const auto& maybe_au_data = m_options.chainparams.AssumeutxoForHeight(validated_cs.m_chain.Height()); if (!maybe_au_data) { LogWarning("[snapshot] assumeutxo data not found for height " "(%d) - refusing to validate snapshot", validated_cs.m_chain.Height()); handle_invalid_snapshot(); return SnapshotCompletionResult::MISSING_CHAINPARAMS; } const AssumeutxoData& au_data = *maybe_au_data; std::optional<CCoinsStats> validated_cs_stats; LogInfo("[snapshot] computing UTXO stats for background chainstate to validate " "snapshot - this could take a few minutes"); try { validated_cs_stats = ComputeUTXOStats( CoinStatsHashType::HASH_SERIALIZED, &validated_coins_db, m_blockman, [&interrupt = m_interrupt] { SnapshotUTXOHashBreakpoint(interrupt); }); } catch (StopHashingException const&) { return SnapshotCompletionResult::STATS_FAILED; } // XXX note that this function is slow and will hold cs_main for potentially minutes. if (!validated_cs_stats) { LogWarning("[snapshot] failed to generate stats for validation coins db"); // While this isn't a problem with the snapshot per se, this condition // prevents us from validating the snapshot, so we should shut down and let the // user handle the issue manually. handle_invalid_snapshot(); return SnapshotCompletionResult::STATS_FAILED; } // Compare the validated chainstate's UTXO set hash against the hard-coded // assumeutxo hash we expect. // // TODO: For belt-and-suspenders, we could cache the UTXO set // hash for the snapshot when it's loaded in its chainstate's leveldb. We could then // reference that here for an additional check. if (AssumeutxoHash{validated_cs_stats->hashSerialized} != au_data.hash_serialized) { LogWarning("[snapshot] hash mismatch: actual=%s, expected=%s", validated_cs_stats->hashSerialized.ToString(), au_data.hash_serialized.ToString()); handle_invalid_snapshot(); return SnapshotCompletionResult::HASH_MISMATCH; } LogInfo("[snapshot] snapshot beginning at %s has been fully validated", unvalidated_cs.m_from_snapshot_blockhash->ToString()); unvalidated_cs.m_assumeutxo = Assumeutxo::VALIDATED; validated_cs.m_target_utxohash = AssumeutxoHash{validated_cs_stats->hashSerialized}; this->MaybeRebalanceCaches(); return SnapshotCompletionResult::SUCCESS; } Chainstate& ChainstateManager::ActiveChainstate() const { LOCK(::cs_main); return CurrentChainstate(); } void ChainstateManager::MaybeRebalanceCaches() { AssertLockHeld(::cs_main); Chainstate& current_cs{CurrentChainstate()}; Chainstate* historical_cs{HistoricalChainstate()}; if (!historical_cs && !current_cs.m_from_snapshot_blockhash) { // Allocate everything to the IBD chainstate. This will always happen // when we are not using a snapshot. current_cs.ResizeCoinsCaches(m_total_coinstip_cache, m_total_coinsdb_cache); } else if (!historical_cs) { // If background validation has completed and snapshot is our active chain... LogInfo("[snapshot] allocating all cache to the snapshot chainstate"); // Allocate everything to the snapshot chainstate. current_cs.ResizeCoinsCaches(m_total_coinstip_cache, m_total_coinsdb_cache); } else { // If both chainstates exist, determine who needs more cache based on IBD status. // // Note: shrink caches first so that we don't inadvertently overwhelm available memory. if (IsInitialBlockDownload()) { historical_cs->ResizeCoinsCaches( m_total_coinstip_cache * 0.05, m_total_coinsdb_cache * 0.05); current_cs.ResizeCoinsCaches( m_total_coinstip_cache * 0.95, m_total_coinsdb_cache * 0.95); } else { current_cs.ResizeCoinsCaches( m_total_coinstip_cache * 0.05, m_total_coinsdb_cache * 0.05); historical_cs->ResizeCoinsCaches( m_total_coinstip_cache * 0.95, m_total_coinsdb_cache * 0.95); } } } void ChainstateManager::ResetChainstates() { m_chainstates.clear(); } /** * Apply default chain params to nullopt members. * This helps to avoid coding errors around the accidental use of the compare * operators that accept nullopt, thus ignoring the intended default value. */ static ChainstateManager::Options&& Flatten(ChainstateManager::Options&& opts) { if (!opts.check_block_index.has_value()) opts.check_block_index = opts.chainparams.DefaultConsistencyChecks(); if (!opts.minimum_chain_work.has_value()) opts.minimum_chain_work = UintToArith256(opts.chainparams.GetConsensus().nMinimumChainWork); if (!opts.assumed_valid_block.has_value()) opts.assumed_valid_block = opts.chainparams.GetConsensus().defaultAssumeValid; return std::move(opts); } ChainstateManager::ChainstateManager(const util::SignalInterrupt& interrupt, Options options, node::BlockManager::Options blockman_options) : m_script_check_queue{/*batch_size=*/128, std::clamp(options.worker_threads_num, 0, MAX_SCRIPTCHECK_THREADS)}, m_interrupt{interrupt}, m_options{Flatten(std::move(options))}, m_blockman{interrupt, std::move(blockman_options)}, m_validation_cache{m_options.script_execution_cache_bytes, m_options.signature_cache_bytes} { } ChainstateManager::~ChainstateManager() { LOCK(::cs_main); m_versionbitscache.Clear(); } Chainstate* ChainstateManager::LoadAssumeutxoChainstate() { assert(!CurrentChainstate().m_from_snapshot_blockhash); std::optional<fs::path> path = node::FindAssumeutxoChainstateDir(m_options.datadir); if (!path) { return nullptr; } std::optional<uint256> base_blockhash = node::ReadSnapshotBaseBlockhash(*path); if (!base_blockhash) { return nullptr; } LogInfo("[snapshot] detected active snapshot chainstate (%s) - loading", fs::PathToString(*path)); auto snapshot_chainstate{std::make_unique<Chainstate>(nullptr, m_blockman, *this, base_blockhash)}; LogInfo("[snapshot] switching active chainstate to %s", snapshot_chainstate->ToString()); return &this->AddChainstate(std::move(snapshot_chainstate)); } Chainstate& ChainstateManager::AddChainstate(std::unique_ptr<Chainstate> chainstate) { Chainstate& prev_chainstate{CurrentChainstate()}; assert(prev_chainstate.m_assumeutxo == Assumeutxo::VALIDATED); // Set target block for historical chainstate to snapshot block. assert(!prev_chainstate.m_target_blockhash); prev_chainstate.m_target_blockhash = chainstate->m_from_snapshot_blockhash; m_chainstates.push_back(std::move(chainstate)); Chainstate& curr_chainstate{CurrentChainstate()}; assert(&curr_chainstate == m_chainstates.back().get()); // Transfer possession of the mempool to the chainstate. // Mempool is empty at this point because we're still in IBD. assert(!prev_chainstate.m_mempool || prev_chainstate.m_mempool->size() == 0); assert(!curr_chainstate.m_mempool); std::swap(curr_chainstate.m_mempool, prev_chainstate.m_mempool); return curr_chainstate; } bool IsBIP30Repeat(const CBlockIndex& block_index) { return (block_index.nHeight==91842 && block_index.GetBlockHash() == uint256{"00000000000a4d0a398161ffc163c503763b1f4360639393e0e4c8e300e0caec"}) || (block_index.nHeight==91880 && block_index.GetBlockHash() == uint256{"00000000000743f190a18c5577a3c2d2a1f610ae9601ac046a38084ccb7cd721"}); } bool IsBIP30Unspendable(const uint256& block_hash, int block_height) { return (block_height==91722 && block_hash == uint256{"00000000000271a2dc26e7667f8419f2e15416dc6955e5a6c6cdf3f2574dd08e"}) || (block_height==91812 && block_hash == uint256{"00000000000af0aed4792b1acee3d966af36cf5def14935db8de83d6f9306f2f"}); } util::Result<void> Chainstate::InvalidateCoinsDBOnDisk() { // Should never be called on a non-snapshot chainstate. assert(m_from_snapshot_blockhash); // Coins views no longer usable. m_coins_views.reset(); const fs::path db_path{StoragePath()}; const fs::path invalid_path{db_path + "_INVALID"}; const std::string db_path_str{fs::PathToString(db_path)}; const std::string invalid_path_str{fs::PathToString(invalid_path)}; LogInfo("[snapshot] renaming snapshot datadir %s to %s", db_path_str, invalid_path_str); // The invalid storage directory is simply moved and not deleted because we may // want to do forensics later during issue investigation. The user is instructed // accordingly in MaybeValidateSnapshot(). try { fs::rename(db_path, invalid_path); } catch (const fs::filesystem_error& e) { LogError("While invalidating the coins db: Error renaming file '%s' -> '%s': %s", db_path_str, invalid_path_str, e.what()); return util::Error{strprintf(_( "Rename of '%s' -> '%s' failed. " "You should resolve this by manually moving or deleting the invalid " "snapshot directory %s, otherwise you will encounter the same error again " "on the next startup."), db_path_str, invalid_path_str, db_path_str)}; } return {}; } bool ChainstateManager::DeleteChainstate(Chainstate& chainstate) { AssertLockHeld(::cs_main); assert(!chainstate.m_coins_views); const fs::path db_path{chainstate.StoragePath()}; if (!DeleteCoinsDBFromDisk(db_path, /*is_snapshot=*/bool{chainstate.m_from_snapshot_blockhash})) { LogError("Deletion of %s failed. Please remove it manually to continue reindexing.", fs::PathToString(db_path)); return false; } std::unique_ptr<Chainstate> prev_chainstate{Assert(RemoveChainstate(chainstate))}; Chainstate& curr_chainstate{CurrentChainstate()}; assert(prev_chainstate->m_mempool->size() == 0); assert(!curr_chainstate.m_mempool); std::swap(curr_chainstate.m_mempool, prev_chainstate->m_mempool); return true; } ChainstateRole Chainstate::GetRole() const { return ChainstateRole{.validated = m_assumeutxo == Assumeutxo::VALIDATED, .historical = bool{m_target_blockhash}}; } void ChainstateManager::RecalculateBestHeader() { AssertLockHeld(cs_main); m_best_header = ActiveChain().Tip(); for (auto& entry : m_blockman.m_block_index) { if (!(entry.second.nStatus & BLOCK_FAILED_VALID) && m_best_header->nChainWork < entry.second.nChainWork) { m_best_header = &entry.second; } } } std::optional<int> ChainstateManager::BlocksAheadOfTip() const { LOCK(::cs_main); const CBlockIndex* best_header{m_best_header}; const CBlockIndex* tip{ActiveChain().Tip()}; // Only consider headers that extend the active tip; ignore competing branches. if (best_header && tip && best_header->nChainWork > tip->nChainWork && best_header->GetAncestor(tip->nHeight) == tip) { return best_header->nHeight - tip->nHeight; } return std::nullopt; } bool ChainstateManager::ValidatedSnapshotCleanup(Chainstate& validated_cs, Chainstate& unvalidated_cs) { AssertLockHeld(::cs_main); if (unvalidated_cs.m_assumeutxo != Assumeutxo::VALIDATED) { // No need to clean up. return false; } const fs::path validated_path{validated_cs.StoragePath()}; const fs::path assumed_valid_path{unvalidated_cs.StoragePath()}; const fs::path delete_path{validated_path + "_todelete"}; // Since we're going to be moving around the underlying leveldb filesystem content // for each chainstate, make sure that the chainstates (and their constituent // CoinsViews members) have been destructed first. // // The caller of this method will be responsible for reinitializing chainstates // if they want to continue operation. this->ResetChainstates(); assert(this->m_chainstates.size() == 0); LogInfo("[snapshot] deleting background chainstate directory (now unnecessary) (%s)", fs::PathToString(validated_path)); auto rename_failed_abort = [this]( fs::path p_old, fs::path p_new, const fs::filesystem_error& err) { LogError("[snapshot] Error renaming path (%s) -> (%s): %s\n", fs::PathToString(p_old), fs::PathToString(p_new), err.what()); GetNotifications().fatalError(strprintf(_( "Rename of '%s' -> '%s' failed. " "Cannot clean up the background chainstate leveldb directory."), fs::PathToString(p_old), fs::PathToString(p_new))); }; try { fs::rename(validated_path, delete_path); } catch (const fs::filesystem_error& e) { rename_failed_abort(validated_path, delete_path, e); throw; } LogInfo("[snapshot] moving snapshot chainstate (%s) to " "default chainstate directory (%s)", fs::PathToString(assumed_valid_path), fs::PathToString(validated_path)); try { fs::rename(assumed_valid_path, validated_path); } catch (const fs::filesystem_error& e) { rename_failed_abort(assumed_valid_path, validated_path, e); throw; } if (!DeleteCoinsDBFromDisk(delete_path, /*is_snapshot=*/false)) { // No need to FatalError because once the unneeded bg chainstate data is // moved, it will not interfere with subsequent initialization. LogWarning("Deletion of %s failed. Please remove it manually, as the " "directory is now unnecessary.", fs::PathToString(delete_path)); } else { LogInfo("[snapshot] deleted background chainstate directory (%s)", fs::PathToString(validated_path)); } return true; } std::pair<int, int> Chainstate::GetPruneRange(int last_height_can_prune) const { if (m_chain.Height() <= 0) { return {0, 0}; } int prune_start{0}; if (m_from_snapshot_blockhash && m_assumeutxo != Assumeutxo::VALIDATED) { // Only prune blocks _after_ the snapshot if this is a snapshot chain // that has not been fully validated yet. The earlier blocks need to be // kept to validate the snapshot prune_start = Assert(SnapshotBase())->nHeight + 1; } int max_prune = std::max<int>( 0, m_chain.Height() - static_cast<int>(MIN_BLOCKS_TO_KEEP)); // last block to prune is the lesser of (caller-specified height, MIN_BLOCKS_TO_KEEP from the tip) // // While you might be tempted to prune the background chainstate more // aggressively (i.e. fewer MIN_BLOCKS_TO_KEEP), this won't work with index // building - specifically blockfilterindex requires undo data, and if // we don't maintain this trailing window, we hit indexing failures. int prune_end = std::min(last_height_can_prune, max_prune); return {prune_start, prune_end}; } std::optional<std::pair<const CBlockIndex*, const CBlockIndex*>> ChainstateManager::GetHistoricalBlockRange() const { const Chainstate* chainstate{HistoricalChainstate()}; if (!chainstate) return {}; return std::make_pair(chainstate->m_chain.Tip(), chainstate->TargetBlock()); } util::Result<void> ChainstateManager::ActivateBestChains() { // We can't hold cs_main during ActivateBestChain even though we're accessing // the chainman unique_ptrs since ABC requires us not to be holding cs_main, so retrieve // the relevant pointers before the ABC call. AssertLockNotHeld(cs_main); std::vector<Chainstate*> chainstates; { LOCK(GetMutex()); chainstates.reserve(m_chainstates.size()); for (const auto& chainstate : m_chainstates) { if (chainstate && chainstate->m_assumeutxo != Assumeutxo::INVALID && !chainstate->m_target_utxohash) { chainstates.push_back(chainstate.get()); } } } for (Chainstate* chainstate : chainstates) { BlockValidationState state; if (!chainstate->ActivateBestChain(state, nullptr)) { LOCK(GetMutex()); return util::Error{Untranslated(strprintf("%s Failed to connect best block (%s)", chainstate->ToString(), state.ToString()))}; } } return {}; }