src/main.rs - main - GreyCat/openhuman

src/main.rs
389 строк17 KB
Mega Mind
fix(observability): demote Ollama Cloud hosted-inference 500 flood (TAURI-RUST-5MV) (#4069)
25 июн 2026, 11:04
25 июн 2026, 11:04c75ca0b
//! The entry point for the OpenHuman core application.
//!
//! This file is responsible for:
//! - Initializing error tracking with Sentry.
//! - Setting up secret scrubbing for outgoing error reports.
//! - Dispatching command-line arguments to the core logic in `openhuman_core`.

use once_cell::sync::Lazy;
use regex::Regex;

/// Main application entry point.
///
/// It initializes the Sentry SDK for error monitoring, ensuring that sensitive
/// information is redacted before being sent to the server. After setup, it
/// delegates execution to the core library based on CLI arguments.
fn main() {
    restore_default_sigpipe();

    // Load `.env` before `sentry::init` so a DSN defined only in the dotenv
    // file is visible to the Sentry client at startup. `dotenvy::dotenv()` is
    // a no-op for variables already present in the process environment, and
    // the CLI dispatcher later calls `load_dotenv_for_cli` which honors
    // `OPENHUMAN_DOTENV_PATH`; this early call handles the common default
    // case (repo-local `.env`) so startup-time consumers (Sentry, config
    // overrides) see the same values as runtime RPC handlers.
    let _ = dotenvy::dotenv();

    // Initialize Sentry as the very first operation so the guard outlives everything.
    // Resolves the core Sentry DSN by checking, in order:
    //   1. `OPENHUMAN_CORE_SENTRY_DSN` at runtime (preferred, namespaced name)
    //   2. `OPENHUMAN_SENTRY_DSN` at runtime (legacy unprefixed name — kept
    //      so existing CI vars and contributor `.env` files keep working until
    //      the GH org-level variable can be renamed)
    //   3. Each of the same names baked at compile time via `option_env!`
    // If none resolve to a non-empty value, `sentry::init` returns a no-op guard.
    let _sentry_guard = sentry::init(sentry::ClientOptions {
        dsn: std::env::var("OPENHUMAN_CORE_SENTRY_DSN")
            .ok()
            .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
            .or_else(|| std::env::var("OPENHUMAN_SENTRY_DSN").ok())
            .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
            .or_else(|| option_env!("OPENHUMAN_CORE_SENTRY_DSN").map(|s| s.to_string()))
            .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
            .or_else(|| option_env!("OPENHUMAN_SENTRY_DSN").map(|s| s.to_string()))
            .filter(|s| !s.is_empty())
            .and_then(|s| s.parse().ok()),
        release: Some(std::borrow::Cow::Owned(build_release_tag())),
        environment: Some(std::borrow::Cow::Owned(resolve_environment())),
        send_default_pii: false,
        before_send: Some(std::sync::Arc::new(|mut event| {
            // Defense-in-depth: drop transient-upstream provider failures that
            // slipped past the call-site classifier. The reliable-provider
            // layer already retries 429/408/502/503/504 with backoff +
            // fallback, and the aggregate "all providers exhausted" event
            // still fires for genuine outages. Per-attempt reports flood
            // Sentry — see OPENHUMAN-TAURI-2E (~1393 events), -84 (~1050),
            // -T (~871). The primary fix lives in
            // `openhuman::inference::provider::ops::should_report_provider_http_failure`
            // (transient codes excluded). This filter catches any future call
            // site that bypasses it.
            if openhuman_core::core::observability::is_transient_provider_http_failure(&event) {
                return None;
            }
            if openhuman_core::core::observability::is_all_transient_provider_exhaustion_event(
                &event,
            ) {
                return None;
            }
            // Defense-in-depth: drop managed-backend `errorCode` events (#870)
            // the backend owns (F2/F4) — primary suppression lives in
            // `api_error` / the streaming gates and the `web_channel`
            // re-report classifier. The malformed `BAD_REQUEST` carve-out
            // (F8) is excluded by the underlying decision, so a client-built
            // bad payload still pages.
            if openhuman_core::core::observability::is_backend_error_code_event(&event) {
                return None;
            }
            // Defense-in-depth: drop transient streaming transport blips
            // (domain=llm_provider, failure=transport) — flaky-network
            // timeouts/resets recovered by retry/fallback (F7). The primary
            // gate lives at the `stream_chat` / `stream_chat_history` emit
            // sites.
            if openhuman_core::core::observability::is_transient_provider_transport_failure(&event)
            {
                return None;
            }
            // Defense-in-depth for budget-exhausted 400s. Emit sites demote the
            // known backend responses before they hit Sentry; this catches any
            // future non_2xx/status=400 event that carries the same tight body
            // phrases.
            if openhuman_core::core::observability::is_budget_event(&event) {
                return None;
            }
            // Defense-in-depth for insufficient-credits 402s. The native_chat
            // emit site demotes them, but the compatible provider reports the
            // same out-of-balance 402 from chat_with_system / chat_with_history
            // / the streaming gates / api_error too; this is the single net
            // that catches every path (TAURI-RUST-C62).
            if openhuman_core::core::observability::is_insufficient_credits_event(&event) {
                return None;
            }
            // Drop provider monthly-quota exhausted events — third-party plan
            // allotment spent (e.g. Kiro `MONTHLY_REQUEST_COUNT`, sometimes
            // wrapped in a 500 envelope so the 402-gated credits filter above
            // misses it). No local lever (TAURI-RUST-C9A).
            if openhuman_core::core::observability::is_quota_exhausted_event(&event) {
                return None;
            }
            // Defense-in-depth for Ollama Cloud hosted-inference 500s. The
            // native_chat / streaming_chat / api_error emit sites demote them and
            // the agent re-report routes through `TransientUpstreamHttp`, but the
            // compatible provider can report the same `Internal Server Error
            // (ref: …)` body from other paths; this is the single net that
            // catches every path (TAURI-RUST-5MV).
            if openhuman_core::core::observability::is_ollama_cloud_internal_500_event(&event) {
                return None;
            }
            // Defense-in-depth: drop max-tool-iterations cap events that
            // slipped past the call-site filters in
            // `agent::harness::session::runtime::run_single`,
            // `channels::runtime::dispatch`, and
            // `channels::providers::web::run_chat_task`. The cap is a
            // deterministic agent-state outcome surfaced to the user via
            // the chat-rendered "Error: …" message — Sentry is the wrong
            // surface for it (OPENHUMAN-TAURI-99 / -98).
            if openhuman_core::core::observability::is_max_iterations_event(&event) {
                return None;
            }
            if openhuman_core::core::observability::is_transient_backend_api_failure(&event)
                || openhuman_core::core::observability::is_transient_integrations_failure(&event)
                || openhuman_core::core::observability::is_updater_transient_event(&event)
            {
                return None;
            }
            // Defense-in-depth: 404 on PATCH/DELETE to a channel-message path
            // is an expected state (provider-side delete or backend GC). Primary
            // suppression lives in `authed_json`; this catches any future call
            // site that bypasses it. Targets OPENHUMAN-TAURI-R7 (28 events).
            if openhuman_core::core::observability::is_channel_message_not_found_event(&event) {
                return None;
            }
            // Drop 401 "Session expired. Please log in again." bodies surfaced
            // by llm_provider / backend_api, plus pre-flight "no session token
            // stored" guards from the rpc dispatcher. Primary suppression
            // lives at the call sites (`openhuman::inference::provider::ops::api_error`
            // publishes a SessionExpired event_bus signal and short-circuits;
            // the rpc dispatcher's `is_session_expired_error` skip-path in
            // `src/core/jsonrpc.rs` redirects to a tracing::info). This
            // filter catches any future call site that re-emits the same
            // shape — keeping OPENHUMAN-TAURI-25 / -1Q / -27 / -1G off
            // Sentry permanently (~185 events/day combined).
            // Defense-in-depth: drop opaque "GET /auth/me" events from the
            // `openhuman.auth_get_me` RPC. The primary fix in
            // `credentials::ops::auth_get_me` walks the full anyhow context
            // chain so `is_transient_message_failure` can demote transient
            // transport failures at the rpc dispatcher. This catches any
            // future regression where a sibling call site collapses the
            // chain via `e.to_string()` and reproduces TAURI-RUST-10
            // (~409 events / 17 users).
            if openhuman_core::core::observability::is_auth_get_me_opaque_transport_event(&event) {
                log::debug!(
                    "[sentry-auth-get-me-opaque-filter] dropping opaque transport event_id={:?}",
                    event.event_id
                );
                return None;
            }
            if openhuman_core::core::observability::is_session_expired_event(&event) {
                // Metadata-only log shape — `event.message` carries the raw
                // backend response body (often a JSON envelope with the
                // session JWT context attached) which CLAUDE.md forbids from
                // local logs. `event.event_id` is a correlation-safe Sentry
                // uuid that lets triage match the dropped event against the
                // breadcrumb chain without leaking the payload.
                log::debug!(
                    "[sentry-session-expired-filter] dropping session-expired event_id={:?}",
                    event.event_id
                );
                return None;
            }
            // Strip server_name (hostname) to avoid leaking machine identity
            event.server_name = None;
            // Attach the cached account uid so Sentry can count unique users
            // affected by an issue. We only carry `id` — never email, name,
            // or IP — so this stays consistent with `send_default_pii: false`.
            //
            // Issue #3135: the primary source for `event.user` is now the
            // Sentry scope, bound proactively at session boundaries
            // (credentials::store_session / clear_session) and at server boot
            // (run_server_inner). The `app_state_snapshot` cache is kept as a
            // fallback so any pre-boot / pre-login event that still rides
            // the legacy path retains its previous attribution behaviour —
            // but we only consult it when the scope hasn't already bound a
            // user, otherwise we'd silently clobber the scope binding when
            // the cache is empty (root cause of the original userCount=0).
            if event.user.is_none() {
                event.user =
                    openhuman_core::openhuman::app_state::peek_cached_current_user_identity()
                        .and_then(|identity| identity.id)
                        .map(|id| sentry::User {
                            id: Some(id),
                            ..Default::default()
                        });
            }
            // Scrub secrets from exception values and top-level message.
            for exc in &mut event.exception.values {
                if let Some(ref value) = exc.value {
                    exc.value = Some(scrub_secrets(value));
                }
            }
            if let Some(msg) = event.message.take() {
                event.message = Some(scrub_secrets(&msg));
            }
            Some(event)
        })),
        sample_rate: 1.0,
        ..sentry::ClientOptions::default()
    });

    // Collect command-line arguments, skipping the binary name.
    let args: Vec<String> = std::env::args().skip(1).collect();

    // Delegate to the core library to handle the command.
    if let Err(err) = openhuman_core::run_core_from_args(&args) {
        eprintln!("{err}");
        std::process::exit(1);
    }
}

#[cfg(unix)]
fn restore_default_sigpipe() {
    // Rust ignores SIGPIPE at startup. That makes writes to a closed pipe
    // return EPIPE, which the print macros turn into a panic. CLI tools should
    // instead terminate quietly when a downstream reader such as `head` exits.
    unsafe {
        libc::signal(libc::SIGPIPE, libc::SIG_DFL);
    }
}

#[cfg(not(unix))]
fn restore_default_sigpipe() {}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Release / environment resolution for Sentry
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

/// Canonical release tag: `openhuman@<version>[+<short_sha>]`.
///
/// Matches the string the frontend reports (`SENTRY_RELEASE` in
/// `app/src/utils/config.ts`) so events from every surface group under
/// the same release in the Sentry dashboard and benefit from the same
/// source-map upload.
fn build_release_tag() -> String {
    let version = env!("CARGO_PKG_VERSION");
    let sha = option_env!("OPENHUMAN_BUILD_SHA").unwrap_or("").trim();
    let sha_short: String = sha.chars().take(12).collect();
    if sha_short.is_empty() {
        format!("openhuman@{version}")
    } else {
        format!("openhuman@{version}+{sha_short}")
    }
}

/// Resolve the deployment environment reported to Sentry.
///
/// Honors `OPENHUMAN_APP_ENV` at runtime (`staging` / `production`) so the
/// same binary could in principle be redeployed between environments; falls
/// back to debug/release detection when unset.
fn resolve_environment() -> String {
    if let Ok(value) = std::env::var("OPENHUMAN_APP_ENV") {
        let trimmed = value.trim().to_ascii_lowercase();
        if !trimmed.is_empty() {
            return trimmed;
        }
    }
    if cfg!(debug_assertions) {
        "development".to_string()
    } else {
        "production".to_string()
    }
}

// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
// Secret scrubbing
// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

/// Ordered most-specific → least-specific. Keep in sync with
/// `src/openhuman/memory/safety/mod.rs`.
static SECRET_PATTERNS: Lazy<Vec<(Regex, &'static str)>> = Lazy::new(|| {
    vec![
        // Matches "Bearer <token>" and redacts the token.
        (Regex::new(r"(?i)(bearer\s+)\S+").unwrap(), "${1}[REDACTED]"),
        // Matches "api-key: <key>" or "api_key=<key>" and redacts the key.
        (
            Regex::new(r"(?i)(api[_-]?key[=:\s]+)\S+").unwrap(),
            "${1}[REDACTED]",
        ),
        // \b anchor prevents matching `cancellation_token=` etc.
        (
            Regex::new(r"(?i)\b(token[=:\s]+)\S+").unwrap(),
            "${1}[REDACTED]",
        ),
        // Anthropic keys (sk-ant-api03-...) contain hyphens the generic
        // sk- pattern below won't match.
        (
            Regex::new(r"sk-ant-[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{16,}").unwrap(),
            "[REDACTED]",
        ),
        // OpenAI admin keys (sk-admin-...).
        (
            Regex::new(r"sk-admin-[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{12,}").unwrap(),
            "[REDACTED]",
        ),
        // OpenAI project-scoped and org-scoped keys (sk-proj-... / sk-org-...).
        (
            Regex::new(r"sk-(?:proj|org)-[A-Za-z0-9\-_]{12,}").unwrap(),
            "[REDACTED]",
        ),
        // Generic catch-all for any sk- format not covered above.
        (Regex::new(r"sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{20,}").unwrap(), "[REDACTED]"),
    ]
});

/// Replaces patterns that look like secrets with `[REDACTED]`.
fn scrub_secrets(input: &str) -> String {
    let mut result = input.to_string();
    for (re, replacement) in SECRET_PATTERNS.iter() {
        result = re.replace_all(&result, *replacement).into_owned();
    }
    result
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn scrubs_bearer_token() {
        assert_eq!(
            scrub_secrets("Authorization: Bearer abc123xyz"),
            "Authorization: Bearer [REDACTED]"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn scrubs_api_key() {
        assert_eq!(scrub_secrets("api_key=sk-abc123"), "api_key=[REDACTED]");
    }

    #[test]
    fn scrubs_anthropic_key() {
        assert_eq!(
            scrub_secrets("key: sk-ant-api03-abcdefghijklmnop"),
            "key: [REDACTED]"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn scrubs_openai_admin_key() {
        assert_eq!(
            scrub_secrets("key: sk-admin-abcdefghijkl"),
            "key: [REDACTED]"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn scrubs_openai_proj_key() {
        assert_eq!(
            scrub_secrets("key: sk-proj-abcdefghijkl"),
            "key: [REDACTED]"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn scrubs_generic_sk_key() {
        assert_eq!(scrub_secrets("sk-abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwx"), "[REDACTED]");
    }

    #[test]
    fn token_word_boundary_no_false_positive() {
        let input = "cancellation_token=abc123 next_page_token=xyz789";
        let result = scrub_secrets(input);
        assert_eq!(result, input, "should not scrub compound token fields");
    }

    #[test]
    fn standalone_token_is_scrubbed() {
        assert_eq!(scrub_secrets("token=secret_value_here"), "token=[REDACTED]");
    }
}